

Richard

W. S. Smith

New York

REFLECTIONS

On the CAUSES of

The RISE and FALL

OF THE

ROMAN EMPIRE:

Tranſlated from the FRENCH of

M. DE SECONDAT,

BARON DE MONTESQUIEU.

THE FOURTH EDITION.

To which is added,

THE ELOGE OF

M. DE MONTESQUIEU,

BY M. DE MAUPERTUIS.

GLASGOW:

Printed by ROBERT URIE.

MDCCLVIII.

THE ELOGE OF M. DE MONTESQUIEU.

Tranſlated from the FRENCH of
M. DE MAUPERTUIS.

From the MONTHLY REVIEW.

To the AUTHORS *of the* MONTHLY REVIEW.

GENTLEMEN,

SINCE you were pleaſed to give a place to my firſt letter, in your Supplement to the Reviews of the paſt year, I am encouraged to proceed in my abſtracts of ſuch foreign books as may deſerve the attention of your readers.

I have lately met with nothing more remarkable than a ſmall Pamphlet, bearing this title—*Eloge de Monſieur de* MONTESQUIEU, *par M. de* MAUPERTUIS. *Hambourg.* 12mo. It has always been the laudible cuſtom of

the French academicians, to celebrate their deceaſed Members in an eloge, or panegyric; and in this they are imitated by the royal academy at Berlin; to which the great MONTESQUIEU belonged. I need not inform you, that M. Maupertuis is the preſident of that academy; nor are you unacquainted with his fame in the mathematical world. If your readers, ſuch of them, I mean, as underſtand the French language, are inclined to ſee ſeveral excellent orations of this kind, I will recommend to them, thoſe of M. de Fontenelle, which are printed with the reſt of his works.

As the moſt minute intelligence concerning the lives or writings of great men, will always engage the attention of the Literati, ſo there are, doubtleſs, many of your readers who will not be diſpleaſed with me for extending my account of this little volume, beyond the limits which, to ſome, it may ſeem to require.

Our author thus begins his oration.—"It is not, ſays he, the cuſtom of this academy, to lament the death of her foreign members in a particular panegyric: this would be, in

ſome meaſure, to invade the rights of thoſe nations to which they more immediately belonged. But there *are* men ſo much ſuperior to the reſt of mankind, that no *one nation* has a better claim to them than *another;* as they ſeem to be given to the whole UNIVERSE. We, then, claim our right in common with the reſt of the world.

If any thing could prevent our attempting the praiſes of M. de MONTESQUIEU, it would be, the greatneſs of the ſubject, and the conſciouſneſs of our own inſufficiency. Every other academy, however, that was honoured with his name, will not fail to do juſtice to his memory, and they may more happily acquit themſelves of the taſk, than we ſhall. But it is impoſſible to ſpeak too much, or in too many places, of a man, who was ſo great an honour to ſcience, and to humanity; nor can we too often preſent the image of a MONTESQUIEU, in an age, when men of letters ſeem ſo regardleſs of morals; in an age, when they have endeavoured to perſuade mankind, with but too much ſucceſs, that the virtues of the mind and of the heart are incompatible. Let them

caſt their eyes on the character of MONTESQUIEU. When they find ſo many virtues united in a man, whoſe underſtanding was both ſublime and juſt; when they find a man of his penetration to have been a ſtrictly moral man, they will then, perhaps, be convinced, that vice is the natural effect of an imperfect underſtanding.

M. MONTESQUIEU was born in the year 1689, in the Chateau de la Brede, within three leagues of Bourdeaux, of an ancient and noble family. He applied himſelf, almoſt from his infancy, to the ſtudy of civil law. The firſt product of his early genius was, a work, in which he undertook to prove, that the idolatry of moſt part of the pagans did not deſerve eternal puniſhment. But this book his prudence thought fit to ſuppreſs. In 1714 he was made counſellor of the parliament of Bourdeaux; and in 1716 preſident à mortier. In this year he was alſo created member of the new founded academy of the ſame city. In 1725 he opened the parliament with a ſpeech, the depth and eloquence of which were convincing proofs of his great abilities as an orator. The year following

he quitted his charge; which, in ſo excellent a magiſtrate, would have been inexcuſable, if, in ceaſing to execute the law, he had not put it in his power to render the law itſelf more perfect.

In 1728 he offered himſelf a candidate for a ſeat in the *Academie François*; to which his LETTRES PERSANNES (publiſhed in 1721) ſeemed to give him a ſufficient title: yet ſome, rather too bold, ſtrokes in that work, together with the great circumſpection of that ſociety, rendered the matter dubious. Cardinal Fleury, alarmed with what he had heard concerning theſe letters, wrote, to let the academy know, that the king would not have them admit the author, unleſs he thought proper to diſavow the book. M. MONTESQUIEU declared that he had never owned himſelf to be the author of it; but that he ſhould never diſavow it. The Cardinal read the *Lettres Perſannes*, found them more agreeable than dangerous, and MONTESQUIEU was admitted.

Our orator proceeds to give us a ſhort account of M. MONTESQUIEU's travels. When he left France, he accompanied his intimate

friend, Lord Waldegrave, in his embaſſy to Vienna; and after ſeeing alſo Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, and Holland, he ended his tour in Great-Britain; where, meditating upon the ſprings of that government, in which, ſays M. Maupertuis, ſo many, ſeemingly, incongruous advantages are united, he found all the materials that were wanting to complete the great works which lay wrapt in his imagination.

No ſooner was he returned to France, than he retired to La Brede: where, for the ſpace of two whole years, ſeeing nothing but books and trees, he wrote his *Conſiderations on the cauſes of the grandeur and decline of the Roman Empire*, which was publiſhed in 1733. To this work he deſigned to have added a book on the *Engliſh government*; but this moſt excellent treatiſe has ſince found a more proper place in his *Eſprit des Loix*, with which he obliged the world in the year 1748. The preceding works of M. MONTESQUIEU may be regarded as ſo many ſteps leading up to this great temple, which he erected to the felicity of mankind. How happy was it, that a man of his enlightened underſtanding

applied himſelf ſolely to the ſtudy of that ſcience, which is, of all others, the moſt uſeful! His *Lettres Perſannes* have, no doubt, been frequently miſtaken for books of mere amuſement; but an intelligent reader will ſee them in a very different light. Some parts of them, indeed, are, perhaps, not wrote with ſo much caution as might have been wiſhed. The ſofter paſſions are generally painted in colours rather too lively: but vices and follies are expoſed, in ſuch a manner, as to afford matter of ſpeculation and entertainment to thoſe of the moſt philoſophic turn. The ſtyle of theſe letters is laconic, pure, and brilliant; in which the chief merit of books may not, indeed, properly conſiſt; yet, it is to theſe ornaments they generally owe their ſucceſs. In ſhort, never was there ſo much wiſdom expreſſed in ſo agreeable a manner, nor ſo much good ſenſe *condenſed* into ſo few words.

After having ſhewn, continues our encomiaſt, the effect of the human paſſions in the breaſt of one man, he then proceeded to conſider mankind in the aſſemblage; and choſe, for his peculiar object, the Roman

nation, as the moſt conſpicuous. If it be a difficult thing, to trace the effects of our paſſions in an Individual, how much more ſo muſt it not be, to mark out thoſe of a whole People! Human ſenſe, to what extended degree ſoever it may be poſſeſſed, will, without experience, be found unequal to the taſk. There is required a perfect acquaintance with facts; that laborioufly-acquired knowlege, which is ſo rarely united to a ſublime genius! M. MONTESQUIEU's reflections upon this ſubject, are evidently the reſult of a continued and complete ſtudy of hiſtory. It is from an exact ſeries of events that he draws conſequences the moſt juſt. Theſe *Reflections*, etc. ſo full of profound reaſoning, may be conſidered as an abrigement of the Roman hiſtory, capable of ſupplying what is wanting in Tacitus himſelf.

Theſe works, ſays Mr. Maupertuis, naturally led our author to a third, and much more important one; namely, his *Traité de L'Eſprit des Lois*. Amongſt the many different forms of government which exiſt, there are three principal ones, diſtinguiſhed from the reſt; *Democracy*, where the power

is equally diſtributed to every member of the community; *Monarchy*, where the power is centered in one perſon, but ſubject to the guidance and regulation of certain laws; and *Deſpotiſm*, where all the power is united in one individual, without laws or limitation. Each of theſe kinds of government have a peculiar principle or ſpring upon which the ſtate may be ſaid to move. That of a democracy is *virtue*; that of a monarchy, *honour*; and that of a deſpotiſm, *fear*. Theſe three motives are differently modified in every intermediate kind of government; but each of theſe will predominate in proportion as the government approaches towards that kind of which it is the ſpring. From this ſource, M. MONTESQUIEU draws all the rules applicable to every kind of legiſlation that hath exiſted; ſolves every doubt that can ariſe, and diſplays every poſſible advantage and defect. This ſingle obſervation has thrown more light both upon our civil and political laws, than can be collected from many huge volumes that have been written upon theſe ſubjects.

From the firſt page to the laſt of this book,

the nature of M. MONTESQUIEU's ſoul is diſtinctly viſible; his great love of mankind, his deſire for their happineſs, and his ſentiments of liberty. His picture of Aſiatic deſpotiſm, of that horrid government where one ſees but one Lord, and all the reſt in ſlavery, is one of the beſt preſervatives from ſuch an evil. The ſame wiſdom appears in his advice how to guard againſt the evils that may ariſe from too extenſive an equality.

We may conſider M. MONTESQUIEU as one of thoſe ſages who gave laws to the people; and this without injuring the memory of Solon, or of Lycurgus. If his treatiſe be not that ſyſtem of legiſlation which would render mankind the moſt happy, it contains, at leaſt, all the materials of which that ſyſtem ſhould be formed. They are there, not like precious ſtones and metals in the mines, mingled with groſs heterogeneous matter; here all is pure, all is gold, or diamond. It were indeed to be wiſhed that a little more order had been obſerved in the poſition of theſe jewels, that none of them had ſhone out of their places: but then it would have been a more perfect ſyſtem of legiſlation,

than will ever be formed by the human genius.

We confeſs, ſays our Orator, that M. MONTESQUIEU, in explaining the cauſes of that variety obſervable in the manners of different people, in their laws, in their form of government, and even in their religion, has attributed too much to climate, degree of heat, air, and aliment; and that ſome of his reaſonings, on which theſe explanations are founded, have not the force he ſuppoſed. True it is, that theſe phyſical principles may be admitted to a certain degree; and it is alſo as true, that in having ſometimes extended their influence a little too far, M. MONTESQUIEU does, by no means, deſerve the cenſure which envy would have inſinuated. Yet theſe philoſophical and literary critics gave him little uneaſineſs. Reaſon was his ſufficient advocate. But there was another kind of critics, againſt whom the voice of reaſon was leſs to be depended on. Theſe gave him great uneaſineſs; for he was a man who ought not to have been ſuſpected. He was threatened with no leſs than to ſee his book condemned, or himſelf obliged to make certain retracta-

tions, which, to a man of his ſincerity, would have been extremely mortifying. Yet, after a long, and more judicious, examination, the *Sorbonne* thought proper to acquit him. How could it be imagined, that one, who had done ſo much for the benefit of ſociety, could do harm to religion!

The number of criticiſms that have been written upon *l'Eſprit des Loix*, will be an eternal reproach to the learning of our times. It hath ſeldom been attacked with any ſhadow of juſtice; too often without decency. After having forgot what was due to reaſon, they grew unmindful of what they owed to the perſon of a man, of all others, the moſt reſpectable. He was torn by thoſe kind of vultures, who, not being able to ſubſiſt by their own productions, live on what they can ſnatch from the works of others. But he was defended by ſome very excellent pens.

The *Dialogue between Sylla and Eucrates*, *Lyſimaque*, and the *Temple de Gnyde*, were alſo written by M. MONTESQUIEU; and, though of a different kind, do not leſs indicate their author, than his more profound

compoſitions. They prove to us, that wiſdom is no enemy to mirth.

No ſooner, ſays Mr. Maupertuis, had his Pruſſian Majeſty honoured me with the direction of his academy, than I propoſed M. MONTESQUIEU as a member. Our whole ſociety well knew the value of the acquiſition, and he received our offer with the moſt grateful ſenſibility. Theſe are his ſentiments, in a letter to me, on the occaſion: even the moſt careleſs and familiar lines from Mr. MONTESQUIEU will be always valuable whereſoever they are found.

My very dear and illuſtrious Brother,

You received a letter from me, dated at Paris. I received one of yours written at Potzdam; which, as it was directed to Bourdeaux, ſpent above a month upon the road. Thus was I long deprived of the real pleaſure I feel at the receipt of every mark of your rememberance. I yet want conſolation that I did not find you here; and both my heart and mind are yet in continual ſearch of you. It is impoſſible I ſhould tell you with what reſpect, with what ſentiments

of gratitude, and if I may be allowed to ſay it, with what joy, I learn, by your letter, that the academy has done me the honour to admit me one of its members. Nothing but your friendſhip could have perſuaded the reſt that I might aſpire to a ſeat among them. This will give me emulation to encreaſe my worth. You would, indeed, long ſince have experienced my ambition, had I not feared to torment your friendſhip in rendering it conſpicuous. You muſt now finiſh the work you have begun, by informing me how I am to behave on the occaſion; to whom, and in what manner, I am to expreſs my gratitude. Do you conduct me, and I ſhall be well guided. If, in your converſation with the king, you could find a proper opportunity to ſignify my thankfulneſs, I beg you will not let it eſcape. I have nothing to offer to that great PRINCE, except my admiration; and in this I do nothing that will diſtinguiſh me from the reſt of mankind.

I am ſorry to ſee that you yet want conſolation for the death of your father. I myſelf am ſenſibly affected with it: it is one reaſon the more to diminiſh our hope

of ſeeing you again. I know not whether I may attribute it to my moral or phyſical eſſence, but my ſoul is ſuſceptible of every ſenſation. I was happy at my country-houſe, where I ſaw nothing but trees, and I am no leſs happy in Paris, amidſt crowds of people, numerous as the ſands on the ſea. I aſk nothing of this earth, but to continue my rotation round its center: not that I would willingly deſcribe circles equal in minuteneſs to yours when at Torneo. Adieu, my dear and illuſtrious friend. I embrace you, etc.

Paris, Nov. 25, 1746.

Mr. Maupertuis proceeds to tell us, that the ſame candor which diſtinguiſhed M. MONTESQUIEU in his writings, was alſo his characteriſtic in his converſation with the world. He was the ſame man viewed in all lights. He appears even, if poſſible, more extraordinary when we conſider him as a member of ſociety, than as an author. Profound, ſublime, in his ſimplicity, he charmed, inſtructed, and never offended. I myſelf, ſays our Orator, having had the happineſs to frequent thoſe ſocieties of which he was a mem-

ber, have been frequent witneſs of the impatience with which he was always expected, and the univerſal joy that appeared on his arrival. The modeſty and openneſs of his mein bore great reſemblance to his converſation. *

He was extremely negligent of his dreſs, deſpiſing every thing that went beyond being decent. His cloaths were always of the plaineſt kind, without any ornament of gold or ſilver. The ſame ſimplicity reigned at his table, and in every other part of his oeconomy. His paternal eſtate he left, as he found it, neither increaſed nor diminiſhed. On the 10th of February, in this year [1755] he died, as he had lived, without either oſtentation or puſilanimity, acquitting himſelf of every duty with the greateſt decency. During his indiſpoſition, his houſe was inceſſantly crouded with people of the firſt diſtinction in France, and ſuch as were moſt deſerving of his friendſhip. Her Grace the Ducheſs d'Aiguillon, who will permit me to mention

* Some particulars of his perſon are mentioned; as, that he was well proportioned; and that he had almoſt entirely loſt the ſight of one eye; though that defect was ſcarce obſervable.

her name upon this occaſion (M. MONTESQUIEU's memory would loſe too much were I not to name her) ſcarce ever left him a moment: ſhe received his laſt ſighs. It was in her houſe that I firſt ſaw him, and there began the friendſhip that hath afforded me ſo much delight. To this Lady I am alſo indebted for theſe circumſtances of his death. The ſweetneſs of his diſpoſitions, ſhe tells me, continued to his very laſt moment. Not a ſingle complaint eſcaped his lips, nor even the leaſt ſign of impatience. Theſe were his words to thoſe that ſtood around him: *I always paid great reſpect to religion: The morality of the goſpel is a moſt excellent thing, and the moſt valuable preſent that could poſſibly have been received by man from his Creator.* The Jeſuits who were near him, preſſing him to deliver up his corrections of the *Lettres Perſannes*, he gave to me, and to madame du Pré, his manuſcript, with theſe words—*I will ſacrifice every thing to reaſon and to religion: conſult with my friends, and decide whether this ought to appear.* He had a pleaſure in the preſence of his friends, and, as often as an interval of eaſe would permit,

he would join the converſation. *His ſituation*, he told me, *was cruel, but not without many cauſes of conſolation:* ſo ſenſible was he of the public concern, and of the affection of his friends. Myſelf and Madame du Pré were his attendance almoſt day and night. The Duke de Nivernois, M. de Bucley, the family of Fitzjames, the Chevalier de Jeaucourt, etc. in ſhort, the houſe was always full, and even the ſtreet was ſcarce paſſable. But all our care and anxiety was as ineffectual as the ſkill of his phyſicians. He died in the thirteenth day of his illneſs, of an inflammatory fever, which had ſeized every part of him.

M. MONTESQUIEU was married in 1715, to Jeanne de Lartigue, daughter to Pierre de Lartigue, Lieutenant-colonel of the regiment de Maulevrier. By this Lady he had a ſon and two daughters. His ſon, M. de Secondat, diſtinguiſhed for his phyſical and mathematical knowlege, was named to fill his father's place in the academy of Berlin. M. Chateaubrun, who has introduced the ancient Greek ſimplicity upon the French ſtage, ſucceeds him in the academy Françoiſe; and in that

of Cortonne he is worthily replaced by his friend Mr. Condamine."

This, Gentlemen, is the ſubſtance of the panegyric before me. You will not think I have been too particular, when you conſider this article, not only as an account of Mr. Maupertuis's *Eloge*, but of that great man's writings who is the ſubject of it; that the beſt account of an author's life is the hiſtory of his works; and that the author of whom we have been ſpeaking, was Monſieur de MONTESQUIEU.

I have the honour to be,

GENTLEMEN,

Your very humble ſervant,

B——.

CONTENTS.

CHAP.

I. 1. *THE infancy of Rome.* 2. *The wars it ſuſtained.* Page 25
II. *Of the ſcience of war as practiſed by the Romans.* 35
III. *The methods by which the Romans raiſed themſelves to empire.* 41
IV. 1. *Of the Gauls.* 2. *Of Pyrrhus.* 4. *Parallel between Carthage and Rome.* 4. *The war of Hannibal.* 45
V. *The ſtate of Greece, of Macedonia, of Syria, and of Egypt, after the depreſſion of Carthage.* 57
VI. *The conduct which the Romans obſerved, in order to ſubdue all nations.* 69
VII. *How it was poſſible for Mithridates to reſiſt the Romans.* 82
VIII. *Of the diviſions which always ſubſiſted in the city.* 85
IX. *Two cauſes which deſtroyed Rome.* 93
X. *Of the corruptions of the Romans.* 99
XI. *Of Sylla, Pompey, and Caeſar.* 102
XII. *Obſervations on the ſtate of Rome after the death of Caeſar.* 117
XIII. *Auguſtus.* 124
XIV. *Tiberius.* 134
XV. *Remarks on the emperors from Caius Caligula to Antoninus.* 140
XVI. *Conſiderations on the ſtate of the empire from Antoninus to Probus.* 153

XVII. *Changes in the ſtate.* Page 168
XVIII. *An account of ſome new maxims received by the Romans.* 179
XIX. *Some particulars of the grandeur of Attila. The eſtabliſhment of the Barbarians accounted for. Reaſons why the Weſtern empire was overturned before that in Eaſt.* 187
XX. 1. *The conqueſts of Juſtinian.* 2. *Some account of his government.* 197
XXI. *Diſorders in the Eaſtern empire.* 208
XXII. *The weakneſs of the Eaſtern empire.* 214
XXIII. 1. *The duration of the Eaſtern empire accounted for.* 2. *Its deſtruction.* 229

REFLECTIONS

On the CAUSES of

The RISE and FALL

OF THE

ROMAN EMPIRE.

CHAPTER I.

1. *The Infancy of Rome.* 2. *The Wars it ſuſtained.*

WE muſt not form to ourſelves an idea of the city of Rome, in its infancy, from the cities which exiſt at this time, unleſs we have in view thoſe of the Crim Tartars, built for the ſtowing and ſecuring of plunder, cattle, fruits, and other produce of the country. The antient names of the chief places in Rome are all relative to this uſe.

The city was even without ſtreets, unleſs we will give this name to the continuation of roads which center in it. The houſes were ſtraggling, built after an irregular manner, and very ſmall; for the inhabitants being always either at their work, or in the public ſquare, were very ſeldom at home.

But the greatneſs of Rome ſoon appeared in its public edifices. Works which (*a*) have raiſed, and

(*a*) See the aſtoniſhment of Dionyſius Halicarnaſſeus on the aqueducts built by Tarquin, *Ant. Rom.* l. iii. They are ſtill ſubſiſting.

ſtill raiſe, the greateſt idea of its power, were formed under its kings. They began already to lay the foundation of that city, which was to be eternal.

Romulus, and his ſucceſſors, were engaged in almoſt perpetual wars with their neighbours, to encreaſe the number of their citizens, their women, and their territories. They uſed to return to the city, loaded with the ſpoils of conquered nations; and theſe ſpoils, which conſiſted of wheat-ſheaves and flocks, uſed to fill them with the greateſt joy. Such is the origin of triumphs, to which that city, afterwards, chiefly owed its grandeur.

The ſtrength of the Romans was greatly increaſed by their union with the Sabines, a ſtubborn warlike people, reſembling the Lacedaemonians from whom they ſprung. Romulus (*a*) copied the form of their ſhields, which were large, and uſed them ever afterwards inſtead of the ſmall buckler of Argos: and it is to be obſerved, that the circumſtance, which chiefly raiſed the Romans to the ſovereignty of the world, was, their laying aſide their own cuſtoms as ſoon as they met with better among the people they conquered; and it is well known that they fought ſucceſſively againſt all nations.

It was a maxim then among the republics of Italy, that treaties made with one king were not obligatory towards his ſucceſſor. This was a ſort of law of nations (*b*) among them. Thus every thing which had been ſubmitted to by one king of Rome, they thought themſelves diſengaged from under another, and wars continually begot wars.

(*a*) Plutarch's life of Romulus.

(*b*) This appears throughout the hiſtory of the kings of Rome.

The reign of Numa, being long and pacific, was very well adapted to leave the Romans in their humble condition; and had their territory in that age been leſs confined, and their power greater, it is probable their fortune would have been fixed for ever.

One cauſe of the proſperity of Rome was, that all her kings were great men. No other hiſtory preſents us with an uninterrupted ſucceſſion of ſuch ſtateſmen and ſuch captains.

In the infancy of ſocieties, the leading men in the republic form the conſtitution; afterwards the conſtitution forms the leading men in the republic.

Sextus the ſon of Tarquin, by violating the chaſtity of Lucretia, took ſuch a ſtep as has ſeldom failed to drive tyrants from the cities over which they preſided; for when once a people are made ſtrongly ſenſible, by the commiſſion of ſo enormous a crime, of the ſlavery to which they are reduced, they immediately form a deſperate reſolution.

A people may ſuffer, without murmuring, the impoſing of new tributes, ſince they are not certain but that ſome advantage may accrue to themſelves, from the diſpoſal of the monies ſo levied: but when an inſult is put upon them, they are affected with their misfortune only; and this they aggravate, by fixing to it the idea of all the calamities which can poſſibly happen.

It muſt however be confeſſed, that the death of Lucretia did no more than occaſion, accidentally, the revolution which happened; for a haughty, enterprizing, bold people, confined within walls, muſt

neceſſarily either ſhake off the yoke, or ſoften the aſperity of their manners.

From the ſituation of things at that time, this was the reſult; either that Rome ſhould change the form of its government, or continue for ever a ſmall, poor monarchy.

Modern hiſtory furniſhes us with a very remarkable example of what happened at that time in Rome; for as men have been ſenſible of the ſame paſſions in all ages, the occaſions which gave riſe to great revolutions are various, but the cauſes are for ever the ſame.

As Henry VII of England increaſed the power of the commons, merely to humble the nobility; ſo Servius Tullius enlarged the privileges of the people, in order to depreſs the ſenate; but the people, growing afterwards bolder, ruined each of the monarchies under which they lived.

No flattering colours have been employed, in the picture which is left us of Tarquin; his name has not eſcaped any of the orators who declaimed againſt tyranny; but his conduct before his calamities, which it is evident he foreſaw; his gentleneſs and humanity towards the conquered, his beneficence to the ſoldiers, the arts by which he engaged ſuch numbers to endeavour at his preſervation, the edifices he raiſed for the public uſe, his courage in the field, the conſtancy and patience with which he bore his misfortunes, a twenty years war he either carried on, or cauſed to be carried on againſt the Romans, though deprived of his kingdom, and very poor; theſe things, and the reſources he perpetually found, prove manifeſtly, that he was no contemptible perſon.

The rank or place, which poſterity beſtows, is

ſubject, as all others are, to the whim and caprice of fortune: woe to the reputation of that monarch who is oppreſſed by a party which after becomes the prevailing one; or who has endeavoured to deſtroy a prepoſſeſſion that ſurvives him.

The Romans, after having baniſhed their kings, appointed conſuls annually, a circumſtance which contributed to raiſe them to ſo exalted a pitch. In the lives of all princes there are certain periods of ambition, and theſe are afterwards ſucceeded by other paſſions, and even by indolence; but the commonwealth being governed by magiſtrates who were changed every year, and who endeavoured to ſignalize themſelves in their employment, in the view of obtaining new ones, ambition had not a moment to loſe. Hence it was that theſe magiſtrates were ever perſuading the ſenate to ſtir up the people to war, and pointed out to them new enemies every day.

This body (the ſenate) was inclined enough to do this of their own accord; for, being quite tired of the complaints and demands of the people, they endeavoured to remove the occaſion of their diſquiet, and to employ them in foreign wars.

Now the common people were generally pleaſed with war, becauſe a method had been found to make it beneficial to them, by the judicious diſtribution that was made of the ſpoils.

Rome being a city in which neither trade nor arts flouriſhed, the ſeveral individuals had no other way of enriching themſelves, but by rapine.

An order and diſcipline was therefore eſtabliſhed in the way and manner of pillaging (*a*), and this

(*a*) See Polybius, Book x.

was pretty near the ſame with that now practiſed among the inhabitants of Leſſer Tartary.

The plunder was laid together, and afterwards diſtributed among the ſoldiers; not even the minuteſt article was loſt, becauſe every man, before he ſet out, ſwore not to embezzle any thing; beſides that, the Romans were, of all nations, the moſt religious obſervers of oaths, theſe being conſidered as the ſinews of their military diſcipline.

In fine, thoſe citizens, who ſtaid at home, ſhared alſo in the fruits of the victory; for part of the conquered lands was confiſcated, and this was ſubdivided into two portions, one of which was ſold for the benefit of the public, and the other divided by the commonwealth, among ſuch citizens as were but in poor circumſtances, upon condition of their paying a ſmall acknowlegement.

As the conſuls had no other way of obtaining the honour of a triumph, than by a conqueſt or a victory, this made them ruſh into the field with unparallelled impetuoſity; they marched directly to the enemy, when force immediately decided the conteſt.

Rome was therefore engaged in an eternal, and ever-obſtinate war: now, a nation that is always (*a*) at war, and that too from the very frame and eſſence of its government, muſt neceſſarily be deſtroyed, or ſubdue all other nations; for, theſe being ſometimes at war, and at other times in peace, could never be ſo able to invade others, nor ſo well prepared to defend themſelves.

By this means the Romans attained a perfect

(*a*) The Romans conſidered foreigners as enemies: Hoſtis, according to Varro, De Lingua Lat. lib. iv. ſignified at firſt a foreigner who lived according to his own laws.

knowlege in the military arts: in tranſient wars moſt of the examples are loſt; peace ſuggeſts different ideas, and we forget not only our faults, but even our virtues.

Another conſequence of the maxim of waging perpetual war, was, that the Romans never concluded a peace but when they were victorious; and indeed, to what purpoſe would it be to make an ignominious peace with one nation, and afterwards go and invade another?

In this view their pretenſions roſe always in proportion to their defeat; by this they ſurprized the conquerors, and laid themſelves under a greater neceſſity of conquering.

Being for ever obnoxious to the moſt ſevere vengeance; perſeverance and valour became neceſſary virtues: and theſe could not be diſtinguiſhed, among them, from ſelf-love, from the love of one's family, of one's country, and whatever is deareſt among men.

The ſame had happened to Italy, which befel America in late ages; the natives of the former, quite helpleſs and diſperſed up and down, having reſigned their habitations to new comers, it was afterwards peopled by three different nations, the Tuſcans (*a*), the Gauls, and the Greeks. The Gauls had no manner of relation or affinity either with the Greeks or Tuſcans; the latter formed a ſociety which had its peculiar language, cuſtoms and morals; and the Grecian colonies, who deſcended from

(*a*) It is not known whether they were originally of that country, or only a colony; but Dion. Halicarnaſſeus is of the former opinion, lib. i.

different nations that were often at variance, had pretty ſeparate intereſts.

The world in that age was not like the world in ours: voyages, conqueſt, traffic; the eſtabliſhment of mighty ſtates; the invention of poſt-offices, of the ſea-compaſs, and of printing; theſe, with a certain general polity, have made correſpondence much eaſier, and given riſe, among us, to an art called by the name of politics: every man ſees at one glance whatever is tranſacted in the whole univerſe; and if a people diſcover but ever ſo little ambition, all the nations round them are immediately terrified.

The people of Italy had (*a*) none of thoſe engines which were employed in ſieges: and further, as the ſoldiers were not allowed any ſtipend, there was no poſſibility of keeping them long before a town or fortreſs: hence it was, that few of their wars were deciſive: theſe fought from no other motive, but merely to plunder the enemies camp or his lands; after which, both the conqueror and the conquered marched back to their reſpective cities. This circumſtance gave riſe to the ſtrong reſiſtance which the people of Italy made, and at the ſame time to the inflexible reſolution the Romans formed to ſubdue them; this favoured the latter with victories, which no ways depraved their morals, and left them in their original poverty.

(*a*) D. Halicarnaſſ. declares ſo expreſly, lib ix. and this appears by hiſtory: they uſed to attempt the ſcalado of cities with ladders. Ephorus relates that Artemon the engineer invented large machines to batter the ſtrongeſt wall. Pericles was the firſt who made uſe of them at the ſiege of Samos, as Plutarch tells us in the life of that general.

Had the Romans made a rapid conqueſt of the neighbouring cities, they would have been in a declining condition at the arrival of Pyrrhus, of the Gauls, and of Hannibal; and, by a fate common to moſt governments in the world, they would have made too quick a tranſition from poverty to riches, and from riches to depravity.

But Rome, for ever ſtruggling, and ever meeting with obſtacles, made other nations tremble at its power, and at the ſame time was unable to extend it; and exerciſed, in a very narrow compaſs of ground, a train of virtues that were to prove of the moſt fatal conſequence to the univerſe.

All the people of Italy were not equally warlike: thoſe who inhabited the eaſtern part, as the Tarentines and the Capuans; all the cities of Campania, and of Graecia Major, were quite immerſed in indolence and in pleaſures; but the Latins, the Hernici, the Sabines, the Æqui, and the Volſcians, were paſſionately fond of war: theſe nations lay round Rome; the reſiſtance they made to that city was incredible, and they ſurpaſſed them in ſtubbornneſs and inflexibility.

The Latin cities ſprung from Alban colonies, which were founded (*a*) by Latinus Sylvius; beſides their common extraction with the Romans, there were ſeveral rites and ceremonies common to both; and Servius Tullus had (*b*) engaged them to build a temple in Rome, to ſerve as the center of union of the two nations. Loſing a battle near the lake Regillus, they were ſubjected to an alliance,

(*a*) As appears from the treatiſe entitled Origo Gentis Romanae, aſcribed to Aurelius Victor. (*b*) D. Halicarnaſ.

and forced to aſſociate in the (*a*) wars which the Romans waged.

It was manifeſtly ſeen, during the ſhort time that the tyranny of the decemvirs laſted, how much the aggrandizing of Rome depended on its liberty. The government ſeemed to have loſt the (*b*) ſoul which animated even to the minuteſt part of it.

There remained at that time but two ſorts of people in the city, thoſe who ſubmitted to ſlavery, and thoſe who for their own private intereſt endeavoured to enſlave the reſt. The ſenators withdrew from Rome as from a foreign city; and the neighbouring nations did not meet with the leaſt reſiſtance from any quarter.

The ſenate having found means to give the ſoldiers a regular ſtipend, the ſiege of Veii was undertaken, which laſted ten years. But now a new art, and a new ſyſtem of war, were ſeen to ariſe among the Romans; their ſucceſſes were more ſignal and conſpicuous; they made a better advantage of their victories; their conqueſts were greater, they ſent out more colonies; in fine, the taking of Veii proved a kind of revolution.

But all this did not leſſen their toils: if, on one ſide, they attacked with greater vigour the Tuſcans, the Æqui, and the Volſcians; for this very reaſon they were abandoned by the Latins and the Hernici their allies, who were armed after the ſame manner, and obſerved the ſame diſcipline with them-

(*a*) See in D. Halicarnaſſ. lib. vi. one of the treaties concluded with this people.

(*b*) Theſe Decemviri, upon pretence of giving written laws to the people, ſeized upon the government. See D. Halicarnaſſ. lib. xi.

ſelves; this engaged the Tuſcans to form new alliances; and prompted the Samnites, the moſt martial people of all Italy, to involve them in a furious war.

After the ſoldiers received pay, the ſenate no longer diſtributed to them the lands of the conquered people, upon whom other conditions were now impoſed; they were obliged, for inſtance, to pay the army a certain quota for a time, and to ſend ſupplies of cloths and corn.

The taking of Rome by the Gauls did no way leſſen its ſtrength; almoſt the whole army, which was diſperſed rather than overcome, withdrew to Veii; the people ſheltered themſelves in the adjacent cities; and the burning of Rome was no more than the ſetting fire to a few cottages of ſhepherds.

CHAPTER II.

Of the Science of war as practiſed by the ROMANS.

AS the Romans devoted themſelves entirely to war, and conſidered it as the only ſcience, they therefore bent all their thoughts, and the genius with which they were informed, to the improvement of it: doubtleſs a god, ſays (*a*) Vegetius, inſpired them with the idea of the legion.

They judged that it would be neceſſary to arm the ſoldiers who compoſed the legion with weapons, whether offenſive or defenſive, of a ſtronger and (*b*) heavier kind than thoſe of any other nation.

But as ſome things muſt be done in war, which

(*a*) L. ii. cap. 1.

(*b*) See in Polybius, and in Joſephus, *De bello Judaico*, lib. ii.

a heavy body is not able to execute, the Romans would have the legion include within itſelf a band of light forces, which might iſſue from it in order to provoke the enemy to battle, or draw back into it in caſe of neceſſity; they alſo would have this legion ſtrengthened with cavalry, with archers, and ſlingers, to purſue thoſe who fled, and complete the victory; that it ſhould be defended by military engines of every kind, which it drew after it; that every evening this body ſhould entrench itſelf, and be, as Vegetius (*a*) obſerves, a kind of ſtrong hold.

But that the Roman ſoldiers might be able to carry heavier arms than other men, it was neceſſary they ſhould become more than men; and this they became by perpetual labour which encreaſed their vigour, and by exerciſes that gave them an activity, which is no more than a juſt diſtribution of the ſtrength we are invigorated with.

It is obſerved in this age, that the (*b*) immoderate labour, which ſoldiers are obliged to undergo, deſtroys our armies; and yet it was by incredible labour that the Romans preſerved themſelves. The reaſon I take to be this; their toils were continual and uninterrupted, whereas our ſoldiers are ever ſhifting from the extremes of labour to the

a deſcription of the arms of the Roman ſoldiers. There is but little difference, ſays the latter, between a Roman ſoldier and a loaded horſe.

" They carried (ſays Cicero) proviſion for fifteen days, " neceſſaries of all ſorts, and whatever they ſhould have occaſion for in throwing up trenches. As to their arms, they " were no more incumbered with them than with their hands."

(*a*) Lib. ii. cap. 25.

(*b*) Particularly the throwing up of the ground.

extremes of idleneſs, than which nothing can poſſibly be more deſtructive.

I muſt here take notice of what authors (*a*) relate concerning the training up of the Roman ſoldiery. They were inured to the military pace, that is, to walk twenty miles, and ſometimes four and twenty, in five hours. During theſe marches, they carried burdens of threeſcore pound weight; they habituated themſelves to running and leaping, armed cap-a-pee; in their (*b*) exerciſes they made uſe of ſwords, javelins and arrows, double the weight of common weapons; and theſe exerciſes were carried on without intermiſſion.

The camp was not the only military ſchool; there being, in Rome, a place in which the citizens uſed to perform exerciſes (it was the Campus Martius): after their fatigues (*c*) they plunged into the Tyber, to accuſtom themſelves to ſwimming, and cleanſe away the duſt and ſweat.

Whenever the Romans thought themſelves expoſed to any danger, or were deſirous of repairing ſome loſs, it was a conſtant practice among them to invigorate and give new life to their military diſcipline. Are they engaged in a war with the Latins,

(*a*) See in Vegetius, lib. 1, and in Livy, lib. xxvi. the exerciſes which Scipio Africanus made the ſoldiers perform after the taking of Carthago Nova. Marius uſed to go every day to the Campus Martius, even in his extreme old age. It was cuſtomary for Pompey, when 58 years of age, to arm himſelf cap-a pee, and engage in ſingle combat with the Roman youths. He uſed to exerciſe himſelf in riding, when he would run with the ſwifteſt career, and hurl the javelin. Plutarch in the lives of Marius and Pompey.

(*b*) Vegetius, Lib. i. (*c*) Idem ibid.

a people no leſs martial than themſelves? Manlius reflects upon the beſt methods of ſtrengthening the command in the field, and puts to death his own ſon, for conquering without his orders. Are they defeated before Numantia? Scipio Aemilianus immediately removes the ſeveral blandiſhments, which had enervated them. Have the Roman legions paſt under the yoke at Numidia? Metellus wipes away their ignominy, the inſtant he has obliged them to reſume their ancient inſtitutions. Marius, that he may be enabled to vanquiſh the Cimbri and the Teutones, begins by diverting the courſe of (*a*) rivers; and Sylla employs, in ſuch hard labour, his ſoldiers, who were terrified at the war which was carrying on againſt Mithridates, that they ſue for battle, to put an end to their hardſhips.

Publius Naſica made the Romans build a fleet of ſhips, at a time when they had no occaſion for ſuch a force: theſe people dreaded idleneſs more than an enemy.

Aulus Gellius (*b*) gives no very good reaſons for the cuſtom among the Romans of letting ſoldiers blood who had committed a fault; the true reaſon is, that ſtrength being the chief qualification of a ſoldier, this was the means of adding not to his weakneſs, but to his diſgrace.

In the battles fought in our age, every ſingle ſoldier has very little ſecurity and confidence except in the multitude; but among the Romans, every individual, more robuſt and of greater experience in war, as well as more inured to the fatigues of it, than his enemy, relied upon himſelf only. He was

(*a*) Frontin. Stratagem. lib. i. cap. 11. (*b*) Lib. x. cap. 8.

naturally endued with courage, or in other words, with that virtue which a ſenſibility of our own ſtrength inſpires.

Theſe men thus enured were generally healthy and vigorous: we do not find by hiſtorians, that the Roman armies, which waged war in ſo great a variety of climates, fell often a prey to diſeaſes; whereas in the preſent age we daily ſee armies, without once engaging, periſh, and melt away, if I may uſe the expreſſion, in a ſingle campaign.

Deſertions are very frequent among us for this reaſon, becauſe the ſoldiers are the dregs of every nation, and not one of them poſſeſſes, or thinks himſelf poſſeſſed of, a certain advantage which gives him a ſuperiority over his comrades. But among the Romans they were leſs frequent; it being ſcarce poſſible that ſoldiers, raiſed from among a people naturally ſo haughty and imperious, and ſo ſure of commanding over others, ſhould demean themſelves to ſuch a degree, as to ceaſe to be Romans.

As their armies were not great, they were eaſily ſubſiſted: the commander had a better opportunity of knowing the ſeveral individuals; and could more eaſily perceive the various faults and miſdemeanours committed by the ſoldiery.

The violence of their exerciſes, and the wonderful roads they built, enabled them to make long and ſpeedy marches. Their ſudden preſence damped the ſpirits of their oppoſers: they ſhewed themſelves, eſpecially after ſome unfortunate event, at a time when their enemies were in that ſtate of negligence which is generally conſequent on victory.

As no troops in the world were, in any age, ſo well diſciplined, it was hardly poſſible that in a battle, how unfortunate ſoever, but ſome Romans muſt rally in one part or other of it; or on the other ſide, but that the enemy muſt be defeated in ſome part of the field: and, indeed, we find every where in hiſtory, that whenever the Romans happened to be overpowered at the beginning, either by numbers, or the fierceneſs of the onſet, they at laſt wreſted the lawrel out of the enemies hand.

Their chief care was to examine, in what particular their enemies had an advantage over them, and when this was found, they immediately rectified it. The cutting ſwords (*a*) of the Gauls, and the elephants of Pyrrhus intimidated them but once. They ſtrengthened their cavalry, (*b*) firſt, by taking the bridles from the horſes; that their impetuoſity might be boundleſs, and afterwards by intermixing them with Velites (*c*): when they underſtood the excellence of the Spaniſh (*d*) ſword, they quitted

(*a*) The Romans uſed to preſent their javelins, when the Gauls ſtruck at them with their ſwords, and by that means blunted them.

(*b*) At the time that they warred againſt the leſſer nations of Italy, their horſe was ſuperior to that of their enemies, and for this reaſon, the cavalry were compoſed of none but the ableſt bodied men, and the moſt conſiderable among the citizens, each of whom had a horſe maintained at the public expence. When they alighted, no infantry was more formidable, and they very often turned the ſcale of victory.

(*c*) Theſe were young men lightly armed, and the moſt nimble of all the legion. At the leaſt ſignal that was given, they would either leap behind a horſeman, or fight on foot. Valerius Maximus, lib. ii. Livy, lib xxvi.

(*d*) Fragmen. of Polybius cited by Suidas in the word μαχαιρα.

their own for it. They baffled all the art of the moſt experienced pilots, by the invention of an engine which is deſcribed by Polybius. In fine, as Joſephus obſerves (*a*), war was a ſubject of meditation to the Romans, and peace an exerciſe.

If any nation boaſted, either from nature or its inſtitution, any peculiar advantage, the Romans immediately made uſe of it: they employed their utmoſt endeavours to procure horſes from Numidia, bowmen from Crete, ſlingers from the Baleares, and ſhips from the Rhodians.

To conclude, no nation in the world ever prepared for war with ſo much wiſdom, and carried it on with ſo much intrepidity.

CHAPTER III.

The Methods by which the ROMANS *raiſed themſelves to Empire.*

AS the people of Europe, in this age, have very near the ſame arms, the ſame diſcipline, the ſame arts, and the ſame manner of making war; the prodigious fortune, to which the Romans attained, ſeems incredible to us. Beſides, power is at this time divided ſo diſproportionably, that it is not poſſible for a petty ſtate to raiſe itſelf, merely by its own ſtrength from the low condition in which providence has placed it.

This merits ſome reflections, otherwiſe we might behold ſeveral events without being able to account for them; and for want of having a perfect idea of

(*a*) De Bello Judaico, lib. ii.

the different ſituation of things, we ſhould believe, in peruſing antient hiſtory, that we view a ſett of men different from ourſelves.

Experience has ſhewn perpetually, that an European prince, who has a million of ſubjects, cannot, without deſtroying himſelf, keep up and maintain above ten thouſand ſoldiers; conſequently, great nations only are poſſeſſed of armies.

But the caſe was different antiently with regard to commonwealths: for this proportion between the ſoldiers and the reſt of the people, which is now as one to an hundred, might, in thoſe times, be pretty near as one is to eight.

The founders of antient commonwealths had made an equal diſtribution of the lands; this circumſtance alone raiſed a nation to power; that is to ſay, made it a well regulated ſociety: this alſo gave ſtrength to its armies; it being equally the intereſt (and this too was very great) of every individual, to exert himſelf in defence of his country.

When laws were not executed in their full rigour, affairs returned back to the ſame point in which we now ſee them: the avarice of ſome particular perſons, and the laviſh profuſeneſs of others, occaſioned the lands to become the property of a few; immediately arts were introduced to ſupply the reciprocal wants of the rich and poor; by which means there were but very few ſoldiers or citizens ſeen; for the revenues of the lands, that had before been employed to ſupport the latter, were now beſtowed wholly on ſlaves and artificers, who adminiſtered to the luxury of the new proprietors; for otherwiſe the government, which, how licentious ſoever it be, muſt exiſt, would have been deſtroyed:

before the corruption of the ſtate, the original revenues of it were divided among the ſoldiers, that is, the labourers: after it was corrupted, they went firſt to the rich, who let them out to ſlaves and artificers, from whom they received by way of tribute a part for the maintenance of the ſoldiers; and it was impoſſible that people of this caſt ſhould be good ſoldiers, they being cowardly and abject; already corrupted by the luxury of cities, and often by the very art they profeſſed; not to mention, that as they could not properly call any country their own, and reaped the fruits of their induſtry in every clime, they had very little either to loſe or keep.

In the ſurvey (*a*) of the people of Rome ſome time after the expulſion of the kings, and in that taken by Demetrius Phalereus (*b*) at Athens, the number of inhabitants was found nearly equal; Rome had four hundred forty thouſand, Athens four hundred thirty one thouſand. But the ſurvey at Rome was made at the time when its eſtabliſhment was come to maturity, and that of Athens when it was quite corrupt. We find that the number of citizens, grown up to manhood, made at Rome a fourth part of its inhabitants, and at Athens a little leſs than the twentieth: the ſtrength of Rome therefore, to that of Athens, was at theſe different times almoſt as four to twenty, that is, it was five times larger.

(*a*) This is the ſurvey mentioned by Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſeus, lib ix. art. 25. and which ſeems to me to be the ſame he ſpeaks of at the end of his ſixth book, made ſix years after the expulſion of the kings.

(*b*) Cteſicles in Athenæus, lib. vi.

(*a*) Agis and Cleomenes obſerving, that inſtead of thirty thouſand citizens, (for ſo many were at Sparta in Lycurgus's time) there were but ſeven hundred, ſcarce a hundred of whom were poſſeſſed of lands; and that all the reſt were no more than a cowardly populace; they undertook to revive the laws enacted on this occaſion; and from that period Lacedaemonia recovered its former power, and again became formidable to all the Greeks.

It was the equal diſtribution of lands that at firſt enabled Rome to ſoar above its humble condition; and this the Romans were ſtrongly ſenſible of in their corrupted ſtate.

This commonwealth was confined to narrow bounds, when the Latins having refuſed to ſuccour them with the troops which had been (*b*) ſtipulated, ten legions were preſently raiſed in the city only: ſcarce at this time, ſays Livy, Rome, whom the whole univerſe is not able to contain, could levy ſuch a force, were an enemy to appear ſuddenly under its walls; a ſure indication that we have not riſen in power, and have only increaſed the luxury and wealth which incommode us.

Tell me, would Tiberius Gracchus ſay (*c*) to the nobles, which is the moſt valuable character, that of a citizen, or of a perpetual ſlave? who is moſt uſeful, a ſoldier, or a man entirely unfit for war? will you, merely for the ſake of enjoying a few more acres of land than the reſt of the citizens, quite lay aſide the hopes of conquering the reſt of the world,

(*a*) See Plutarch's life of Cleomenes.

(*b*) Livy 1 Decad, L. vii. This was ſome time after the taking of Rome, under the conſulſhip of L. Furius Camillus, and App. Claudius Craſſus. (*c*) Appian.

or be expoſed to ſee yourſelves diſpoſſeſſed by the enemy, of thoſe very lands which you refuſe us?

CHAPTER IV.

1. *Of the* Gauls. 2. *Of* Pyrrhus. 3. *Parallel between* Carthage *and* Rome. 4. *The War of* Hannibal.

THE Romans were engaged in ſeveral wars againſt the Gauls: a thirſt of glory, a contempt of death, and an inflexible reſolution of conquering, were equal in both nations, but the weapons they uſed were different; the bucklers of the latter were ſmall, and their ſwords unfit for execution; and indeed, the Gauls were cut to pieces by the Romans, much after the ſame manner as the Mexicans, in theſe latter ages, by the Spaniards; and a ſurprizing circumſtance is, that though theſe people were combating perpetually with the Romans, they yet ſuffered themſelves to be deſtroyed one after another, without their ever being ſenſible of, enquiring after, or obviating, the cauſe of their calamities.

Pyrrhus invaded the Romans at a time when they were ſtrong enough to oppoſe the power of his arms, and to be taught by the victories he obtained over them: from him they learnt to entrench themſelves, as alſo the choice and proper diſpoſition of a camp: he accuſtomed them to elephants, and prepared them for mightier wars.

The grandeur of Pyrrhus was confined merely to his perſonal qualities. Plutarch (*a*) informs us,

(*a*) In his life of Pyrrhus.

that he was obliged to begin the war of Macedonia, from his inability to maintain any longer the ſix thouſand foot, and five hundred horſe in his ſervice. This prince, ſovereign of a ſmall country which has never made the leaſt figure ſince his time, was a military rambler, who was continually forming new enterprizes, becauſe he could not ſubſiſt but by enterprizing.

Tarentum, his ally, had much degenerated from the inſtitution of the Lacedaemonians, her anceſtors (*b*). He might have done great things with the aſſiſtance of the Samnites; but they were almoſt quite deſtroyed by the Romans.

As the Carthaginians grew wealthy ſooner than the Romans, ſo they were ſooner corrupted: thus whilſt at Rome, public employments were made the reward of virtue only, and no other emolument accrued from them than honour, and a preference in toils; at Carthage, the ſeveral advantages which the public can beſtow on particular perſons were venal, and every ſervice done by ſuch perſons was there paid by the public.

A monarchy is not dragged nearer to the brink of ruin by the tyranny of a prince, than a commonwealth by a lukewarmneſs and indifference for the general good. The advantage of a free ſtate is, that the revenues are employed in it to the beſt purpoſes; but where does not the reverſe of this happen! the advantage of a free ſtate is, that it admits of no favourites; but when the contrary is ſeen, and inſtead of the friends and relations of a prince, great fortunes are amaſſed for the friends and relations of all perſons who have any ſhare in the government; in

(*b*) Juſtin, lib. xx.

this caſe an univerſal ruin muſt enſue; the laws are then eluded more dangerouſly, than they are infringed by a ſovereign prince, who, being always the greateſt citizen in the ſtate, is moſt concerned to labour at its preſervation.

By the conſtant practice of ancient cuſtoms and manners, and a peculiar uſe that was made of poverty, the fortunes of all the people in Rome were very near upon a level; but in Carthage, ſome particular perſons boaſted the wealth of kings.

The two prevailing factions in Carthage were ſo divided, that the one was always for peace, and the other always for war; by which means it was impoſſible for that city, either to enjoy the one, or engage in the other to advantage.

In Rome, (*a*) war immediately united the ſeveral intereſts, but in Carthage it divided them ſtill more.

In a monarchy, feuds and diviſions are eaſily quieted, becauſe the prince is inveſted with a coercive power to curb both parties; but they are more laſting in a commonwealth, becauſe the evil generally ſeizes the very power which only could have wrought a cure.

In Rome, which was governed by laws, the people entruſted the ſenate with the management of affairs; but in Carthage, which was governed by fraud

(*a*) Hannibal's preſence put an end to all the feuds and diviſions which till then prevailed among the Romans; but the preſence of Scipio irritated thoſe which already ſubſiſted among the Carthaginians, and ſhakled, as it were, the ſtrength of the city; for the common people now grew diffident of the generals, the ſenate, and the great men; and this made the people more furious. Appian has given us the hiſtory of this war, carried on by the firſt Scipio.

and diſſoluteneſs, the people would themſelves tranſact all things.

Carthage, in warring with all its riches againſt the poverty of Rome, had a diſadvantage in this very circumſtance; for gold and ſilver may be exhauſted, but virtue, perſeverance, ſtrength and poverty are inexhauſtible.

The Romans were ambitious through pride, and the Carthaginians through avarice; the former would command, the latter amaſs; and theſe whoſe minds were wholly turned to traffic, perpetually caſting up their income and expences, never engaged in any war from inclination.

The loſs of battles, the decreaſe of a people, the decay of trade, the conſumption of the public treaſure, the inſurrection of neighbouring nations, might force the Carthaginians to ſubmit to the ſevereſt terms of peace: but Rome was not ſwayed by the conſideration of bleſſings or calamities, being determined by no other motive but its glory; and as the Romans were perſuaded they could not exiſt without commanding over others, neither hopes, nor fears of any kind, could prevail with them to conclude a peace, the conditions of which were not preſcribed by themſelves.

Nothing is ſo powerful as a commonwealth in which the laws are exactly obſerved, and this not from fear nor from reaſon, but from a paſſionate impulſe, as in Rome and Lacedaemon; for then the wiſdom of a good legiſlature is united to all the ſtrength a faction could poſſibly boaſt.

The Carthaginians made uſe of foreign forces, and the Romans employed none but their own. As the latter had never conſidered the vanquiſhed but

merely as ſo many inſtruments for future triumphs; they made ſoldiers of the ſeveral people they conquered; and the greater oppoſition thoſe made, the more worthy they judged them of being incorporated into their republic. Thus we find the Samnites, who were not ſubdued till after four and twenty triumphs (*a*), become auxiliaries to the Romans; and ſome time before the ſecond Punic war, they raiſed from among that nation and their allies (*b*), that is, from a country of little more extent than the territories of the pope and Naples, ſeven hundred thouſand foot, and ſeventy thouſand horſe, to oppoſe the Gauls.

In the height of the ſecond Punic war, Rome had always a ſtanding army of twenty two or twenty four legions; and yet it appears by Livy, that at this time the cenſus, or general ſurvey, amounted to but about 137000 citizens.

The Carthaginians employed a greater number of troops in invading others, and the Romans in defending themſelves; the latter armed, as we have juſt now ſeen, a prodigious multitude of men to oppoſe the Gauls and Hannibal who invaded thm; and they ſent out no more than two legions againſt the moſt powerful kings; by which means their forces were inexhauſtible.

Carthage was not ſo ſtrong from its ſituation, as Rome from the ſpot on which it ſtood: the latter had thirty colonies (*c*) round it, all which were as

(*a*) Flor. l. i.

(*b*) See Polybius. According to the epitome of Florus they raiſed three hundred thouſand men out of the city and among the Latins.

(*c*) See Livy, lib. xxvii.

ſo many bulwarks. The Romans were never abandoned by one of their allies till the battle of Cannae; the reaſon is, the Samnites and other nations of Italy were uſed to their ſovereignty.

As moſt of the cities of Africa were poorly fortified, they preſently ſurrendered to the firſt enemy that appeared under their walls; ſo that Agathocles, Regulus, Scipio, in a word, all who made a deſcent on thoſe places, immediately ſpread deſpair through all Carthage.

We can aſcribe to nothing but to an evil adminiſtration, the ſeveral calamities which the Carthaginians ſuffered during the whole war that Scipio carried on againſt them; their city (*a*), and even their armies were famiſhed, at the ſame time that the Romans enjoyed a profuſion of all things.

Among the Carthaginians, the armies which had been defeated grew more inſolent upon it, inſomuch that they ſometimes uſed to crucify their generals, puniſhing them in this manner for their own cowardice. Among the Romans, the conſul, after puniſhing ſuch ſoldiers as had fled from their colours, by a (*a*) decimation, marched the ſurviving forces againſt the enemy.

The government of the Carthaginians was vaſtly oppreſſive (*c*): they had trampled ſo much upon the Spaniards, that, when the Romans arrived among

(*a*) See Appian, lib. Lybicus.

(*b*) This puniſhment, which was inflicted on thoſe who had run from their colours, on mutineers, etc. was thus: the names of all the criminals, being put together in a veſſel or ſhield, were afterwards drawn out, every tenth man being to die without reprieve. By this means, though all were not put to death, yet all were terrified into obedience. *Note by the tranſlator.*

(*c*) See what is related by Polybius concerning their exactions.

them, they were conſidered as their deliverers; and if we reflect upon the immenſe ſums it coſt the Carthaginians to maintain in that country, a war which proved fatal to them, it will appear that injuſtice is very improvident, and is not miſtreſs of all ſhe promiſes.

The founding of Alexandria had very much leſſened the trade of Carthage. In the firſt ages, ſuperſtition uſed to baniſh, in ſome meaſure, all foreigners from Egypt; and after the Perſians had conquered this kingdom, they had bent their whole thoughts to the weakening of their new ſubjects; but under the Grecian monarchs, Egypt poſſeſſed almoſt the whole commerce of the univerſe (*a*), and that of Carthage began to decay.

Such powers, as are eſtabliſhed by commerce, may ſubſiſt for a long ſeries of years in their humble condition, but their grandeur is of ſhort duration; they riſe by little and little, and in an imperceptible manner, for they do not perform any particular exploit which may make a noiſe, and ſignalize their power: but when they have once raiſed themſelves to ſo exalted a pitch, that it is impoſſible but all muſt ſee them, every one endeavours to deprive this nation of an advantage which it had ſnatched, as it were, from the reſt of the world.

The Carthaginian cavalry was preferable to that of the Romans, for theſe two reaſons; firſt, becauſe the horſes of Numidia and Spain were better than thoſe of Italy; ſecondly, becauſe the Roman cavalry was but indifferently provided with arms; for the Romans, as (*b*) Polybius informs us, did not in-

(*a*) See more of this hereafter in chap. vi.
(*b*) Book vi.

troduce any change on this occaſion, till ſuch time as they fought in Greece.

In the firſt Punic war, Regulus was defeated as ſoon as the Carthaginians made choice of plains for their cavalry to engage in; and in the ſecond, (*a*) Hannibal owed his moſt glorious victories to the Numidians.

Scipio, by the conqueſt of Spain, and the alliance he made with Maſiniſſa, deprived the Carthaginians of this ſuperiority: the Numidian cavalry won the battle of Zama, and put an end to the war.

The Carthaginians had greater experience at ſea, and were better ſkilled in the working of ſhips than the Romans: but this advantage ſeems to have been leſs in thoſe ages than it would be in the preſent.

As the ancients had not the uſe of the ſea-compaſs, they were confined almoſt to coaſting; and indeed they had nothing but gallies, which were ſmall and flat bottomed; moſt roads were to them as ſo many harbours; the knowlege of their pilots was very narrow and contracted, and their tackle extremely ſimple. Their art itſelf was ſo imperfect, that as much is now done with an hundred oars, as in thoſe ages with a thouſand.

Their larger veſſels had a diſadvantage in this, that being moved with difficulty by the crew of galley-ſlaves, it was impoſſible for them to make the neceſſary evolutions. Mark Antony experienced this, in the moſt fatal manner, at Actium; for his ſhips were not able to move about, when attacked on all ſides by the lighter veſſels of Auguſtus.

(*a*) The circumſtance which gave the Romans an opportunity of taking a little breath in the ſecond Punic war, was this, whole bodies of Numidian cavalry went over into Sicily and Italy, and there joined them.

As the ancients uſed nothing but galleons, the lighter veſſels eaſily broke the oars of the greater ones, which were then but as ſo many unwieldy, immoveable machines, like modern ſhips when they have loſt their maſts.

Since the invention of the ſea-compaſs, different methods have been employed; oars (*a*) have been laid aſide; the main ocean has been viſited, great ſhips have been built; the machine is become more complicated, and the practices have been multiplied.

The diſcovery of gun-powder has occaſioned a circumſtance one would no ways have ſuſpected, which is, that the ſtrength of fleets depends more than ever upon art; for in order to reſiſt the fury of the cannon, and prevent the being expoſed to a ſuperior fire, it was neceſſary to build great ſhips; but the power of the art muſt be proportioned to the bulk of the machine.

The ſmall veſſels of the antients uſed often to grapple ſuddenly with one another, on which occaſion the ſoldiers engaged on both ſides: a whole land-army was ſhipped on board a fleet. In the ſea-fight won by Regulus and his collegue, an hundred and thirty thouſand Romans fought againſt an hundred and fifty thouſand Carthaginians: at that time ſoldiers were looked upon as conſiderable, and artiſts the very reverſe; but in theſe ages, the ſoldiers are conſidered as little or nothing, and artiſts the very contrary.

A ſtrong proof of the difference is the victory

(*a*) Hence we may judge of the imperfection of the antient navies, ſince we have laid aſide a practice in which we had ſo much ſuperiority over them.

won by Duillius the conſul: the Romans were totally ignorant of navigation, when a Carthaginian galley, happening to be ſtranded on their coaſt, ſerved them as a model for the building of others: in three months time their ſailors were trained, their fleet was completely fitted out; the Romans put to ſea, came up with the Carthaginians, and defeated them.

In this age, the whole life of a prince is ſcarce ſufficient for the raiſing and equipping a navy capable to make head againſt a power already poſſeſſed of the empire of the ſea: this perhaps may be the only thing which money cannot of itſelf effect; and though a great (*a*) monarch in our days ſucceeded immediately in an attempt of this kind, experience has proved to others (*b*), that ſuch an example is to be admired rather than imitated.

The ſecond Punic war made ſo much noiſe in the world, that it is known to every one. When we ſurvey attentively the croud of obſtacles which ſtarted up before Hannibal, and reflect, that this extraordinary man ſurmounted them all, we view the moſt auguſt ſpectacle that antiquity can poſſibly exhibit.

Rome was a miracle in conſtancy and reſolution after the battles of Ticinus, of Trebia, and Thraſymenus; after the defeat at Cannae, which was ſtill more fatal to them, though they ſaw themſelves abandoned by moſt of the nations in Italy, yet they would not ſue for peace; and for this reaſon, the ſenate never once receded from their antient maxims: they conducted themſelves towards Hannibal, in the ſame manner as they had before behaved with re-

(*a*) Lewis XIV. (*b*) Spain and Muſcovy.

gard to Pyrrhus, to whom they refuſed all terms of accommodation, till ſuch time as he ſhould leave Italy; and Dionyſius Halicarnaſſeus (*a*) informs us, that, when Coriolanus was treating with the Romans, the ſenate declared they would never infringe their ancient cuſtoms; that their people could not conclude a peace ſo long as the enemy ſhould continue in their territories; but that in caſe the Volſcians would think fit to retire, they then ſhould agree to any terms that were juſt and reaſonable.

Rome was ſaved by the ſtrength and vigour of its inſtitution: after the battle of Cannae, their very women were not allowed to ſhed tears: the ſenate refuſed to ranſom the priſoners, and ſent the miſerable remains of the army to carry on the war in Sicily, unrecompenſed, and deprived of every military honour, till ſuch time as Hannibal was driven out of Italy.

On the other ſide, Terentius Varro the conſul had fled ignominiouſly as far as Venuſia: this man, whoſe extraction was very mean, had been raiſed to the conſulſhip merely to mortify the nobles. However the ſenate would not enjoy the unhappy triumph: they ſaw how neceſſary it was for them to gain the confidence of the people on this occaſion; they therefore went out to meet Varro, and returned him thanks for not deſpairing of the ſafety of the commonwealth.

It is commonly not the real loſs ſuſtained in a battle, (that of the ſlaughter of ſome thouſand men) which proves fatal to a ſtate, but the imaginary loſs, the general damp which deprives it even of that ſtrength and vigour which fortune had left it.

(*a*) Antiq. Rom. l. viii.

Some things are aſſerted by all men, becauſe they have been aſſerted once: it is thought Hannibal committed an egregious error in not laying ſiege to Rome after the battle of Cannae: it muſt be confeſſed, that the inhabitants of the former were at firſt ſeized with a panic; but then the ſurprize and dread of a martial people, which always turns to bravery, is not like that of a deſpicable populace, who are ſenſible to nothing but their weakneſs: a proof Hannibal would not have ſucceeded, is, that the Romans were ſtill powerful enough to ſend ſuccours where any were wanted.

It is alſo ſaid, that Hannibal was greatly overſeen, in marching his army to Capua, where his ſoldiers enervated themſelves; but people who make theſe aſſertions ſhould conſider, that they do not go back to the true cauſe of it: would not every place have proved a Capua to a body of men, who had enriched themſelves with the ſpoils of ſo many victories? Alexander, whoſe army conſiſted of his own ſubjects, made uſe, on the like occaſion, of an expedient which Hannibal, whoſe army was compoſed wholly of mercenaries, could not employ; and this was, the ſetting fire to the baggage of his ſoldiers, and burning all their wealth and his own.

The very conqueſts of Hannibal began to change the fortune of the war: he did not receive any ſuccours from Carthage, either by the jealouſy of one party, or the too great confidence of the other. So long as he kept his whole army together, he always defeated the Romans; but when he was obliged to put garriſons into cities, to defend his allies, to beſiege ſtrong-holds, or prevent their being beſieged, he then found himſelf too weak, and loſt a great part

of his army by piece-meal. Conquests are easily made, because we atchieve them with our whole force; they are retained with difficulty, because we defend them with only a part of our forces.

CHAPTER V.

The State of Greece, *of* Macedonia, *of* Syria, *and of* Egypt, *after the depression of* Carthage.

I Imagine Hannibal did not abound in witticisms, especially in favour of Fabius and Marcellus against himself. I am sorry to see Livy strew his flowers on these enormous Colossuses of antiquity: I wish he had done like Homer, who neglects embellishing them, and knew so well how to put them in motion.

Besides, what Hannibal is made to speak ought to have common sense: but if, on hearing the defeat of his brother, he said publicly, that it was the prelude of the ruin of Carthage, could any thing have a greater tendency to drive to despair a people who had placed their confidence in him, and to discourage an army which expected such high recompences after the war?

As the Carthaginians lost every battle they fought, either in Spain, in Sicily, or in Sardinia; Hannibal, whose enemies were fortifying themselves incessantly, whilst very inconsiderable reinforcements were sent him, was reduced to the necessity of engaging in a defensive war: this suggested to the Romans the design of making Africa the seat of war. Accordingly Scipio went into that part of the world, and so great was his success, that the Carthagini-

ans were forced to recal from Italy Hannibal, who wept for grief at his ſurrendering to the Romans thoſe very plains, in which he had ſo often triumphed over them.

Whatever is in the power of a great general and a great ſoldier to perform, all this Hannibal did to ſave his country: having fruitleſsly endeavoured to bring Scipio to pacific terms, he fought a battle, in which fortune ſeemed to delight in confounding his ability, his experience, and good ſenſe.

Carthage received the conditions of peace, not from an enemy, but from a ſovereign; the citizens of it obliged themſelves to pay ten thouſand talents in fifty years, to give hoſtages, to deliver up their ſhips and elephants, and not to engage in any war without the conſent of the Romans; and in order that this republic might always continue in a dejected ſtate, the victors heightened the power of Maſiniſſa, its irreconcileable enemy.

After the depreſſion of Carthage, the Romans were ſcarce engaged but in petty wars, and obtained mighty victories; whereas before, they had obtained but petty victories, and been engaged in mighty wars.

There were in thoſe times two worlds, as it were, ſeparate from each other; in one, the Carthaginians and Romans fought; and the other was ſhaken by the feuds and diviſions which had ſubſiſted ever ſince the death of Alexander. In the latter, no regard was had (*a*) to the tranſactions of the weſtern world: for though Philip king of Macedon had concluded

(*a*) It is ſurprizing, as Joſephus obſerves in his treatiſe againſt Appion, that neither Herodotus nor Thucydides make the leaſt

a treaty with Hannibal, yet very little reſulted from it; and this monarch, who gave the Carthaginians but very inconſiderable ſuccours, juſt ſhewed the Romans that he bore them a fruitleſs ill-will.

When two mighty people are ſeen to wage a long and obſtinate war, it is often ill policy to imagine that it is ſafe for the reſt of the world to continue as ſo many idle ſpectators; for which ſoever of the two people triumphs over the other, engages immediately in new wars; and a nation of ſoldiers marches and invades nations who are but ſo many citizens.

This was very manifeſt in thoſe ages; for ſcarce had the Romans ſubjected the Carthaginians, but they immediately invaded other nations, and appeared in all parts of the earth, carrying on an univerſal invaſion.

There were at that time in the eaſt but four powers capable of making head againſt the Romans; Greece, the kingdoms of Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt: we muſt take a view of the condition, at that time, of the two firſt of thoſe powers; becauſe the Romans began by ſubjecting them.

There were at that time three conſiderable people in Greece, the Ætolians, the Achaians, and the Boeotians; theſe were ſo many aſſociations formed by free cities, which had their general aſſemblies and magiſtrates in common. The Ætolians, were martial, bold, raſh; greedy of gain, very laviſh of their promiſes and oaths; in fine, a people who warred on land in the ſame manner as pirates do at ſea. The Achaians were incommoded perpetually by

mention of the Romans though they had been engaged in ſuch mighty wars.

troubleſome neighbours or defenders. The Boeotians, who were the moſt heavy people of all Greece, but at the ſame time the wiſeſt, lived generally in peace; guided entirely by a ſenſation of happineſs and miſery, they had not genius enough to be either rouzed or miſguided by orators. What is moſt extraordinary, their republic ſubſiſted even in the midſt of anarchy (*a*).

Lacedaemon had preſerved its power, by which I mean that warlike ſpirit which the inſtitutions of Lycurgus inſpired. The Theſſalians were, in ſome meaſure, enſlaved by the Macedonians. The Illyrian kings had already been very much depreſſed by the Romans. The Acarnanians and Athamanes had been cruelly infeſted by the troops of Macedon and Ætolia ſucceſſively. The Athenians, weak in themſelves and unſupported by (*b*) allies, no longer aſtoniſhed the world, except by the flatteries they laviſhed on kings; and the orators no more aſcended the Roſtra where Demoſthenes had harangued, unleſs to propoſe the baſeſt and moſt ſcandalous decrees.

Beſides, Greece was formidable from its ſituation, its ſtrength, the multitude of its cities, the great number of its ſoldiers, its polity, manners and laws. The Greeks delighted in war; they knew the whole art of it; and, had they united, would have been invincible.

(*a*) The magiſtrates, to pleaſe the multitude, did not open the courts of juſtice: and the dying bequeathed their effects to their friends, to be laid out in feaſts. See a fragment of the xxth book of Polybius, in the *Extract of Virtues and Vices*.

(*b*) They were not engaged in any alliance with the other nations of Greece. Polyb. lib. viii.

They indeed had been terrified by the firſt Philip, by Alexander, and by Antipater, but not ſubdued; and the kings of Macedon, who could not prevail with themſelves to lay aſide their pretenſions and their hopes, made the moſt obſtinate attempts to enſlave them.

The greateſt part of Macedonia was ſurrounded with inacceſſible mountains; the inhabitants of it were formed by nature for war, courageous, obedient, induſtrious and indefatigable; and theſe qualities muſt neceſſarily have been owing to the climate, ſince the natives of it are, to this day, the beſt ſoldiers in the Turkiſh empire.

Greece maintained itſelf by a kind of balance; the Lacedaemonians were generally in alliance with the Ætolians, and the Macedonians with the Achaians; but the arrival of the Romans quite deſtroyed the aequilibrium.

As the kings of Macedonia were not able to maintain a large body of troops, the leaſt loſs was of conſequence to them; beſides, it was difficult for theſe monarchs to aggrandize themſelves; becauſe, as their ambitious views were not unknown, other nations kept a watchful eye over every ſtep they took; and the ſucceſſes they obtained in the wars, undertaken for the ſake of their allies, was an evil which theſe very allies endeavoured immediately to remedy.

But the kings of Macedonia generally poſſeſſed great talents; their monarchy was not like thoſe which proceed for ever in the ſame ſteps that were taken at the foundation of them. Inſtructed perpetually by dangers and experience, involved in all the diſputes of Greece, it was neceſſary for them

either to bribe the principal magiſtrates of cities, to raiſe a miſt before the eyes of nations, or to divide or unite their intereſts; in a word, they were obliged to expoſe, every moment, their perſons to the greateſt dangers.

Philip, who in the beginning of his reign had won the love and confidence of the Greeks, by his moderation, changed on a ſudden; he became (*a*) a cruel tyrant, at a time when he ought to have behaved with juſtice, both from policy and ambition; he ſaw, though at a diſtance, the Romans poſſeſſed of numberleſs forces; he had concluded the war to the advantage of his allies, and was reconciled to the Ætolians; it was natural he ſhould now endeavour to unite all the Greeks with himſelf, in order to prevent the Romans from ſettling in their country; but ſo far from this, he exaſperated them by petty uſurpations; and trifled away his time in examining affairs of little or no conſequence, at a time when his very exiſtence was endangered; by the commiſſion of three or four evil actions, he made himſelf odious and deteſtable to all Greece.

The Ætolians were moſt exaſperated, and the Romans ſnatching the opportunity of their reſentment, or rather of their folly, made an alliance with them, entered Greece, and armed it againſt Philip. This prince was defeated at the battle of Cynocephalae, and the victory was partly gained by the valour of the Ætolians: ſo much was he intimidated upon this, that he concluded a treaty, which was not ſo properly a peace, as the renouncing his own ſtrength; for he evacuated his garriſons in all Greece,

(*a*) See Polyb. who relates the unjuſt and cruel actions by which Philip loſt the favour of the people.

delivered up his ſhips, and bound himſelf under an obligation of paying a thouſand talents in ten years.

Polybius compares, with his uſual good ſenſe, the diſpoſition of the Roman armies with that of the (*a*) Macedonians, which was obſerved by all the kings who ſucceeded Alexander; he points out the conveniencies as well as inconveniencies of the phalanx and of the legion: he prefers the diſpoſition uſed by the Romans, in which he very probably was right, ſince all the battles fought at that time ſhew it to have been preferable.

The ſucceſs, which the Romans obtained over Philip, was the greateſt ſtep they ever took towards a general conqueſt: to make ſure of Greece, they employed all methods poſſible to depreſs the Ætolians, by whoſe aſſiſtance they had been victorious: they ordained, moreover, that every city of Greece, which had been ſubject to Philip, or any other ſovereign prince, ſhould from that time be governed by its own laws.

It is very evident, that theſe petty commonwealths muſt neceſſarily be dependent: the Greeks abandoned themſelves to a ſtupid joy, and fondly imagined they were really free, becauſe the Romans had declared them to be ſo.

The Ætolians, who had imagined they ſhould bear ſway in Greece, finding they had only brought

(*a*) A circumſtance which had contributed very much to the danger to which the Romans were expoſed in the ſecond Punic war, was, Hannibal's preſently arming his ſoldiers after the Roman manner; but the Greeks did not change either their arms or their way of fighting: and could not prevail with themſelves to lay aſide cuſtoms, by the obſervance of which they had performed ſuch mighty things.

themſelves under ſubjection, were ſeized with the deepeſt grief; and as they had always formed deſperate reſolutions, they invited, in order to correct one extravagance by another, Antiochus king of Syria into Greece, in the ſame manner as they had before invited the Romans.

The kings of Syria were the moſt powerful of all Alexander's ſucceſſors, they being poſſeſſed of almoſt all the dominions of Darius, Egypt excepted; but by the concurrence of ſeveral circumſtances, their power had been much weakened.

Seleucus, who founded the Syrian empire, had deſtroyed, towards the latter end of his life, the kingdom of Lyſimachus. During the feuds and diſtractions, ſeveral provinces took up arms; the kingdoms of Pergamus, of Cappadocia and of Bithynia, ſtarted up; but theſe petty, fearful ſtates always conſidered the depreſſion of their former maſters as the making of their own fortune.

As the kings of Syria always beheld, with a moſt invidious eye, the felicity of the kingdom of Egypt, they bent their whole thoughts to the conqueſt of that country; by this means, neglecting the eaſt, they were diſpoſſeſſed of ſeveral provinces there, and but indifferently obeyed in the reſt.

In fine, the kings of Syria poſſeſſed upper and lower Aſia; but experience has ſhewn, that in this caſe, when the capital city and the chief forces are in the lower provinces of Aſia, there is no poſſibility of maintaining the upper ones; and on the contrary, when the ſeat of the empire is in the upper provinces, the monarch weakens himſelf by maintaining the lower ones. Neither the Perſian nor Syrian empires were ever ſo powerful as that of the

Parthians, though these reigned over but part of the provinces which formed the dominions of those two powers. Had Cyrus not conquered the kingdom of Lydia; had Seleucus continued in Babylon, and let the successors of Antigonus possess the maritime provinces, the Greeks would never have conquered the Persian empire, nor the Romans that of Seleucus. Nature has prescribed certain limits to states, purposely to mortify the ambition of mortals: when the Romans stepped beyond those limits, the greatest part of them were destroyed by the Parthians (*a*); when the Parthians presumed to pass them, they were forced immediately to retire back; and in our days, such Turks, as advanced beyond those boundaries, were obliged to return whence they came.

The kings of Syria and Egypt had, in their respective dominions, two kinds of subjects, victorious nations, and nations vanquished; the former, still puffed up with the idea of their origin, were ruled with very great difficulty; they were not fired with that spirit of independence which animates us to shake off the yoke, but with that impatience which makes us wish to change our sovereign.

But the chief weakness of the kingdom of Syria sprung from that of the court, where such monarchs presided as were successors to Darius, not to Alexander. Luxury, vanity, and effeminacy, which have prevailed through all ages in the Asiatic courts, triumphed more particularly in that of Syria: the evil

(*a*) I have given the reason of this in the xvii. chapter, borrowed partly from the geographical disposition of the two empires.

infected the common people and the ſoldiers, and catched the very Romans themſelves; ſince the war, in which they engaged againſt Antiochus, is the true aera of their corruption.

Such was the condition of the kingdom of Syria, when Antiochus, who had performed ſuch mighty things, declared war againſt the Romans. But he did not conduct himſelf in it with the wiſdom which is even employed in common affairs: Hannibal requeſted, either to have the war revived in Italy, and Philip bribed; or elſe that he might be prevailed upon to ſtand neuter. Antiochus did not follow any part of this advice: he appeared in Greece with only a ſmall part of his forces, and as though he were come merely to ſee the war, not to carry it on, he followed nothing but his pleaſures, by which means he was defeated and fled out of Aſia, terrified rather than conquered.

Philip, who was dragged to this war by the Romans, as though a flood had ſwept him along, employed his whole power in their ſervice, and became the inſtrument of their victories; the pleaſure of taking vengeance of, and laying waſte Ætolia; the promiſe made him of leſſening the tribute he paid, and of leaving him the poſſeſſion of certain cities; ſome perſonal jealouſy of Antiochus; in a word, a few inconſiderable motives ſwayed his reſolutions; and not daring ſo much as to think of ſhaking off the yoke, he only conſidered how he might beſt lighten it.

Antiochus formed ſo wrong a judgment of things, as to fancy that the Romans would not moleſt him in Aſia; however, they followed him thither; he was again overcome, and, in his conſternation, conſent-

ed to the moſt infamous treaty that ever was concluded by ſo mighty a prince.

I cannot recollect any thing ſo magnanimous, as a reſolution taken by a monarch in our days (*a*), to bury himſelf under the ruins of the throne, rather than accept of terms unworthy of a king: ſo haughty was his ſoul that he could not ſtoop lower than his misfortunes had thrown him; and he was very ſenſible, that courage may, but infamy never can, give freſh ſtrength to the regal diadem.

We often meet with princes who have ſkill enough to fight a battle, but with very few that have the talents requiſite for carrying on a war; who are equally capable of making a proper uſe of fortune and of waiting for her; and who join to a frame of mind, which raiſes ſuſpicions before it executes, ſuch a diſpoſition as makes them fearleſs after they have once executed.

After the depreſſion of Antiochus, only ſome inconſiderable powers remained, if we except Egypt, which, from the advantage of its ſituation, its fertility, its commerce, the great number of its inhabitants, its naval and land forces, might have been formidable; but the cruelty of its kings, their cowardice, their avarice, their imbecillity, and their enormous ſenſualities, made them ſo odious to their ſubjects, that they ſupported themſelves, for the moſt part, by the protection of the Romans.

It was a kind of fundamental law, with regard to the crown of Egypt, that the ſiſters ſhould ſucceed with the brothers; and in order to preſerve unity in the government, the brother was married to the ſiſter. Now it is ſcarce poſſible to figure any

(*a*) Lewis XIV.

thing more pernicious in politics than such an order of succession; for as all the little domestic feuds rose so high as to disorder the state; whichsoever of the two parties had the least discontent, immediately excited against the other the inhabitants of Alexandria, a numberless multitude, always prepared to join with the first of their kings who should rouze them; so that there were for ever princes who actually reigned, and pretenders to the crown. And as the kingdoms of Cyrene and Cyprus were generally possessed by other princes of that house, who laid their respective claims to the whole; by that means the throne of these princes was ever tottering; and being indifferently settled at home, they had no power abroad.

The forces of the kings of Egypt, like those of the Asiatic monarchs, were composed of auxiliary Greeks. Besides the spirit of liberty, of honour, and of glory, which animated the latter people, they were incessantly employed in bodily exercises of every kind. In all their chief cities games were instituted, wherein the victors were crowned in the presence of all Greece, which raised a general emulation: now, in an age when combatants fought with arms, the success of which depended on their strength and dexterity, it is natural to suppose that men, thus exercised, must have had a great advantage over a croud of Barbarians, who were enlisted at random, and dragged indiscriminately into the field, as was evident from the armies of Darius.

The Romans, in order to deprive the kings of such a body of soldiery, and to bereave them, but in an easy silent manner, of their principal forces, observed two things: first, they established by in-

ſenſible degrees as a maxim, with reſpect to all the cities of Greece, that they ſhould not conclude any alliance, give any ſuccour, or make war againſt any nation whatſoever without their conſent: ſecondly, in their treaties with (*a*) kings, they forbad them to levy any forces from among the allies of the Romans, by which means, thoſe monarchs were reduced to employ their national troops only.

CHAPTER VI.

The Conduct which the ROMANS *obſerved, in order to ſubdue all nations.*

DURING the courſe of ſo mighty a proſperity, in which it is uſual for mankind to forget themſelves, the ſenate continued to act with the ſame depth of judgment; and whilſt their armies were ſpreading an univerſal terror, they would not ſuffer thoſe to riſe who were once depreſſed.

A tribunal aroſe which judged all nations: at the cloſe of every war they determined the rewards or puniſhments which every one had merited: they took away, from the vanquiſhed people, part of their lands, and gave them to their allies, in which they did two things; they engaged, in the intereſts of Rome, princes from whom they had little to fear, and much to hope; and they weakened others from whom they had nothing to hope, and every thing to fear.

(*a*) They had before obſerved this political conduct with regard to the Carthaginians, whom they obliged by the treaty concluded with them, to employ no longer auxiliary troops, as appears from a fragment of Dion.

In warring with an enemy they made uſe of their allies, but immediately extirpated the deſtroyers. Philip was overcome by the aſſiſtance of the Ætolians, who were deſtroyed preſently after, for having joined themſelves to Antiochus. This king was overcome by the aſſiſtance of the Rhodians; but after the moſt conſpicuous rewards had been beſtowed upon them, they were depreſſed for ever, upon pretence that they had demanded to have a peace concluded with Perſeus.

When the Romans were oppoſed by ſeveral enemies at the ſame time, they granted a truce to the weakeſt, who thought themſelves happy in obtaining it; conſidering it as a great advantage, that their ruin had been ſuſpended.

When they were engaged in a mighty war, the ſenate winked at wrongs of every kind, and ſilently waited the ſeaſon proper for chaſtiſement: if at any time a people ſent them the offenders, they refuſed to puniſh them, chuſing rather to conſider the whole nation as guilty, and reſerve to themſelves a uſeful vengeance.

As they made their enemies ſuffer inexpreſſible evils, very few leagues were formed againſt them; for he, who was at the greateſt diſtance from the danger, did not care to come near it.

For this reaſon war was ſeldom denounced againſt them, but themſelves always made it a ſeaſon, in the manner, and with a people, as beſt ſuited their intereſt; and among the great number of nations they invaded, there were very few but would have ſubmitted to injuries of every kind, provided they could but be ſuffered to live in peace.

As it was uſual for them to deliver themſelves

always in a magisterial way, such embassadors as they sent to nations who had not yet felt the weight of their power, were sure to meet with ill treatment, which furnished them with a sure (*a*) pretence to engage in a new war.

As they never concluded a peace with sincerity and integrity, and intended a general invasion, their treaties were properly only so many suspensions from war; they inserted such conditions in them, as always paved the way to the ruin of those states which accepted them: they used to send the garrisons out of the strong holds: they regulated the number of the land forces, or had the horses and elephants delivered up to them; and, in case this people were powerful at sea, they obliged them to burn their ships, and sometimes to remove higher up in the country.

After having destroyed the armies of a prince, they drained his treasury, by imposing a heavy tribute, or taxing him immoderately, under colour of making him defray the expence of the war: a new species of tyranny, which obliged him to oppress his subjects, and thereby lose their affection.

Whenever they granted a peace to some prince, they used to take one of his brothers or children by way of hostage, which gave them an opportunity of raising, at pleasure, commotions in his kingdom: when they had the next heir among them, it was their custom to intimidate the possessor: had they only a prince of a remote degree, they made use of him to foment the insurrections of the populace.

Whenever any prince or people withdrew their allegiance from their sovereign, they immediately in-

(*a*) See an example of this, in their war with the Dalmatians. See Polybius.

dulged them the title of (*a*) ally to the Romans; by which means they became sacred and inviolable; so that there was no monarch, how formidable soever, who could rely one moment upon his subjects, or even upon his own family.

Although the title of their ally was a kind of servitude, (*b*) yet was it very much sought after; for those who enjoyed it were sure to receive no injuries but from them, and had reason to flatter themselves such would be less grievous. Hence nations and kings were ready to undertake any kind of services, and submitted to the meanest and most abject acts, merely for the sake of obtaining it.

They had various kinds of allies; some were united to them by privileges and a participation in their grandeur, as the Latins and the Hernici; others by their very settlements, as their colonies; some by good offices, as Masiniſſa, Eumenes, and Attalus, who were obliged to them for their kingdoms or their exaltation; others by free and unconstrained treaties; and these by the long continuation of the alliance, became subjects, as the kings of Egypt, Bithynia, Cappadocia, and most of the Grecian cities; in fine, many by forced and involuntary treaties, and by the law of their subjection, as Philip and Antiochus; for every peace the Romans granted an enemy, included also an alliance with him; or, in other words, they made every nation subdued by them contribute to the depression of others.

When they permitted any cities the enjoyment

(*a*) See particularly their treaty with the Jews in the 1st book of the Maccabees, chap. viii.

(*b*) Ariarathes offered a sacrifice to the gods, says Polybius, by way of thanks for having obtained their alliance.

of their liberties, they immediately raiſed two (*a*) factions in them, one of which defended the laws and liberties of the country, whilſt the other aſſerted, that the will of the Romans was the only law; and as the latter faction was always the moſt powerful, it is plain ſuch a liberty could be but a mere name.

They ſometimes poſſeſſed themſelves of a country upon pretence of being heirs to it. They entered Aſia, Bithynia, and Libya by the laſt wills of Attalus, of Nicomedes (*b*), and of Appion; and Egypt was enſlaved by that of the king of Cyrene.

To keep great princes for ever in a weak condition, they would not ſuffer them to conclude an alliance with thoſe nations to whom they had granted theirs (*c*); and as they did not refuſe it to any people who bordered upon a powerful prince, this condition, inſerted in a treaty of peace, deprived him of all his allies.

Beſides, when they had overcome any conſiderable prince, one of the articles of the treaty was, that he ſhould not make war, upon account of any feuds of his own, with the allies of the Romans (that is to ſay, generally with all his neighbours;) but ſhould ſubmit them to arbitration, which deprived him of a military power for time to come.

And in order to keep the ſole poſſeſſion of it in their own hands, they bereaved their very allies of this force. The inſtant theſe had the leaſt conteſt, they ſent embaſſadors, who obliged them to conclude a peace: we need but conſider the manner in which they terminated the wars of Attalus and Pruſias.

(*a*) See Polybius on the cities of Greece.

(*b*) The ſon of Philopator. (*c*) This was Antiochus's caſe.

When any prince had gained such a conquest as often had exhausted him, immediately a Roman embassador came and wrested it out of his hands; among a multitude of examples, we may remember how they, with a single word, drove Antiochus out of Egypt.

Fully sensible how well the European nations were turned for war, they established as a law, that no (*a*) Asiatic monarch should be suffered to come into Europe, and there invade any people whatsoever. The chief motive of their declaring war against Mithridates (*b*) was, for his having subdued some barbarians contrary to this prohibition.

When they saw two nations engaged in war, although they were not in alliance, nor had any contest with either of them, they nevertheless appeared upon the stage of action, and like our knight-errants, always sided with the weakest: it was an (*c*) antient custom, says Dionysius Halicarnasseus, for the Romans to grant succour to all who came to implore it.

These customs of the Romans were not certain particular incidents, which happened by chance, but were so many invariable principles; and this is easy to perceive; for the maxims they put in practice against the greatest monarchs were exactly the same with those they had employed in their infant state, against the little cities which stood round them.

(*a*) The order sent to Antiochus, even before the war, for him not to cross into Europe, was made general with regard to all other kings.

(*b*) Appian. *de Bello Mithridat.*

(*c*) A fragment of Dionysius, copied from the extract of embassies, made by Constantine Porphyrogenneta.

They made Eumenes and Maſiniſſa contribute to the ſubjection of Philip and Antiochus, as they had before employed the Latins and the Hernici to ſubdue the Volſcians and the Tuſcans: they obliged the Carthaginians and the kings of Aſia to ſurrender their fleets to them, in like manner as they had forced the citizens of Antium to give up their little veſſels.

Whenever there happened any feud in a ſtate, they immediately made themſelves judges of it, and thereby were ſure of having that party only, whom they condemned, for their enemy. If princes of the ſame blood were at variance for the crown, they ſometimes declared them both kings, and by this means cruſhed the power of both; if one of them was a (*a*) minor, they declared in his favour, and made themſelves his guardians in quality of protectors of the world; for they had carried matters to ſo high a pitch, that nations and kings were their ſubjects, without knowing directly upon what right or title; it being a maxim, that the bare hearing of their names was ſufficient for a people to acknowlege them their ſovereigns.

When any ſtate compoſed too formidable a body from its ſituation or union, they never failed to divide it. The republic of Achaia was formed by an aſſociation of free cities; the ſenate declared, that every city ſhould from that time be governed by its own laws, independent on the general authority.

(*a*) To enable themſelves to ruin Syria, in quality of guardians, they declared in favour of the ſon of Antiochus, who was but a child, in oppoſition to Demetrius, who was their hoſtage, and conjured them to do him juſtice, crying, that Rome was his mother, and the ſenators his fathers.

The commonwealth of Boeotia rose likewise from a league made between several cities; but, as in the war of Perseus, one city declared for that prince, and others for the Romans, the latter received them into favour, when the common alliance was dissolved.

Macedonia was surrounded by inaccessible mountains: the senate divided it into four parts; declared those free; prohibited them every kind of alliance among themselves by marriage; carried off all the nobles into Italy, and by that means reduced this power to nothing.

Had a great monarch who reigned in our time followed these maxims when he saw a neighbouring prince dethroned, he would have employed a stronger force in his support, and have confined him to the island which continued faithful to him. By dividing the only power that could have opposed his designs, he would have drawn infinite advantages even from the misfortunes of his ally.

The Romans never engaged in far-distant wars, till they had first made an alliance with some power contiguous to the enemy they invaded, who might unite his troops to the army they sent; and as this was never considerable with regard to numbers, they always had (*a*) another in that province which lay nearest the enemy, and a third in Rome, ever ready to march at a moment's warning. In this manner they never hazarded but a small part of their forces, whilst their enemy ventured all his.

They sometimes insidiously perverted the subtilty of the terms of their language: they destroyed Carthage, upon pretence that they had promised to

(*a*) This was their constant practice, as appears from history.

preſerve the *Civitas* not the *Urbs*. It is well known in what manner the Ætolians, who had abandoned themſelves to their faith, were impoſed upon; the Romans pretended, that the ſignification of theſe words, *abandon one's ſelf to the faith of an enemy*, implied the loſs of all things, of perſons, lands, cities, temples, and even of burial places.

The Romans would even go ſo far, as to give arbitrary explanations to treaties: thus, when they were reſolved to depreſs the Rhodians, they declared, that they had formerly given them Lycia, not by way of preſent, but as a friend and ally.

When one of their generals concluded a peace, merely to preſerve his army which was juſt upon the point of being cut to pieces, the ſenate, who did not ratify it, took advantage of this peace, and continued the war. Thus when Jugurtha had ſurrounded an army of Romans, and permitted them to march away unmoleſted, upon the faith of a treaty, theſe very troops he had ſaved were employed againſt him: and when the Numantians had reduced twenty thouſand Romans juſt periſhing with hunger, to the neceſſity of ſuing for peace; this peace, which had ſaved the lives of ſo many thouſand citizens, was broke at Rome, and the public faith was eluded by (*a*) ſending back the conſul who had ſigned it.

They ſometimes would conclude a peace with a monarch upon reaſonable conditions, and the inſtant he had ſigned them, they added others of ſo injurious a nature, that he was forced to renew the war. Thus,

(*a*) After Claudius Glycias had granted the Corſicans a peace, the ſenate gave orders for renewing the war againſt them, and delivered up Glycias to the inhabitants of the iſland, who would not

when they had forced Jugurtha to (*a*) deliver up his elephants, his horſes, his treaſures, and his deſerters, they required him to ſurrender up his perſon, which being the greateſt calamity that can befal a prince, cannot for that reaſon be ever made an article of peace.

In fine, they ſet up a tribunal over kings, whom they judged for their particular vices and crimes: they heard the complaints of all perſons who had any diſpute with Philip: they ſent deputies with them by way of ſafeguard, and obliged Perſeus to appear before theſe to anſwer for certain murders and certain quarrels he had with ſome inhabitants of the confederate cities.

As men judged of the glory of a general by the quantity of the gold and ſilver carried in his triumph, the Romans ſtripped the vanquiſhed enemy of all things. Rome was for ever enriching itſelf; and every war they engaged in, enabled them to undertake a new one.

All the nations, who were either friends or confederates, quite (*b*) ruined themſelves by the immenſely rich preſents they made, in order to procure the continuance of the favours already beſtowed upon them, or to obtain greater; and half the monies which uſed to be ſent upon theſe occaſions to the Romans, would have ſufficed to conquer them.

receive him. Every one knows what happened at the Furcae Caudinae.

(*a*) They acted the ſame part with regard to Viriatus: after having obliged him to give up the deſerters, he was ordered to ſurrender up his arms, to which neither himſelf nor his army could conſent. Fragment of Dion.

(*b*) The preſents which the ſenate uſed to ſend kings were mere trifles, as an ivory chair and ſtaff, or a robe like that worn by their own magiſtrates,

Being masters of the universe, they arrogated to themselves all the treasures of it; and were less unjust robbers, considered as conquerors, than considered as legislators. Hearing that Ptolemy king of Cyprus was possessed of immense wealth, they (*a*) enacted a law, proposed by a tribune, by which they gave to themselves the inheritance of a man still living, and confiscated to their own use the estates of a confederate prince.

In a little time the greediness of particular persons quite devoured whatever had escaped the public avarice; magistrates and governors used to sell their injustice to kings: two competitors would ruin one another, for the sake of purchasing an ever-dubious protection against a rival who was not quite undone; for the Romans had not even the justice of robbers, who preserve a certain probity in the exercise of guilt. In fine, as rights, whether lawful or usurped, were maintained by money only; princes, to obtain it, despoiled temples, and confiscated the possessions of the wealthiest citizens; a thousand crimes were committed, purely for the sake of giving to the Romans all the money in the universe.

But nothing was of greater advantage to this people than the awe with which they struck the whole earth: in an instant, kings were put to silence, and seemed as though they were stupid; no regard was had to their eminence, but their very persons were attacked; to hazard a war, was to expose themselves to captivity, to death, to the infamy of a triumph. Thus kings, who lived in the midst of pomps and

(*a*) Divitiarum tanta fama erat, says Florus, ut victor gentium populus, et donare regna consuetus, socii virique regis confiscationem mandaverit. lib. iii. c. 9.

pleaſures, did not dare to fix their eyes ſtedfaſtly on the Roman people; and their courage failing them, they hoped to ſuſpend a little the miſeries with which they were threatened, by their patience and ſubmiſſive actions.

Obſerve, I intreat you, the conduct of the Romans. After the defeat of Antiochus they were poſſeſſed of Africa, Aſia, and Greece, without having ſcarce a ſingle city in theſe countries that were immediately their own. They ſeemed to conquer with no other view but to beſtow; but then they obtained ſo complete a ſovereignty, that whenever they engaged in war with any prince, they oppreſſed him, as it were, with the weight of the whole univerſe.

The time proper for ſeizing upon the conquered countries was not yet come: had the Romans kept the cities they took from Philip, the Greeks would have ſeen at once into their deſigns: had they, after the ſecond Punic war, or that with Antiochus, poſſeſſed themſelves of lands in (*a*) Africa and in Aſia, they could never have preſerved conqueſts ſo ſlightly eſtabliſhed.

It was the intereſt of the Romans to wait till all nations were accuſtomed to obey, as free and as confederate, before they ſhould attempt to command over them as ſubjects; and to let them blend and loſe themſelves, as it were, by little and little, in the Roman commonwealth.

See the treaty (*b*) which they made with the La-

(*a*) They did not dare to venture their colonies in thoſe countries; but choſe rather to raiſe an eternal jealouſy between the Carthaginians and Maſiniſſa, and to make both theſe powers aſſiſt them in the conqueſt of Macedonia and Greece.

(*b*) It is related by Dion. Hal. Lib. vi. c. 95. edit. Oxon.

tins after the victory at the lake of Regillum: it was a principal foundation of their power. There is not the most distant hint in it of any subjection on the part of the Latins.

This was a slow way of conquering: after overcoming a nation, they contented themselves with weakening it; they imposed such conditions as consumed it insensibly: if it recovered, they depressed it still more, and it became subject, without a possibility of dating the first aera of its subjection.

Thus Rome was not properly either a monarchy, or a commonwealth, but the head of a body composed of all the nations in the universe.

Had the Spaniards, after the conquest of Mexico and Peru, followed this plan, they would not have been obliged to destroy all, for the sake of preserving all.

It is a folly in conquerors to force their own laws and customs on all nations; such a conduct is of very ill consequence, for men are capable of obeying under all kinds of government.

But as Rome did not impose any general laws, the nations did not form any dangerous associations; they formed one body no otherwise than by a common obedience; and were all Romans without being countrymen.

It perhaps will be objected, that no empires founded on the laws of fiefs were ever durable or powerful. But nothing could be so contradictory as the plan of the Romans and that of the Goths; and just to mention these plans, the former was a work of strength, the latter of weakness: in the one, subjection was extreme; in the other, independence; in the Gothic states, power was lodged in the vassals,

and the right of judging only in the prince; whereas it was the reverſe in the Roman government.

CHAPTER VII.

How it was poſſible for Mithridates *to reſiſt the* ROMANS.

AMONG the ſeveral kings whom the Romans invaded, Mithridates was the only one who made a courageous defence and expoſed them to danger.

His dominions were ſituated to wonderful advantage for carrying on a war with them: they bordered on the inacceſſible countries of mount Caucaſus, peopled with ſavage nations, whom that prince could call to his aſſiſtance; they thence extended along the ſea of Pontus, which Mithridates covered with his ſhips, and he was inceſſantly purchaſing new armies of Scythians: Aſia was open to his invaſions, and he was rich, becauſe his cities, ſituated on the Pontus Euxinus, carried on an advantageous traffic with nations leſs induſtrious than themſelves.

Proſcriptions, the cuſtom of which began at this time, had forced ſeveral Romans to leave their country. Theſe were received by Mithridates with open arms, and he formed legions (*a*) into which he en-

(*c*) *Frontin. Stratagem.* lib. ii. tells us, that Archelaus, lieutenant of Mithridates, engaging againſt Sylla, poſted, in the firſt rank, his chariots armed with ſcythes, in the ſecond his phalanx, in the third his auxiliaries armed after the Roman way; mixtis fugitivis Italiae, quorum pervicaciae multum fidebat. Mithridates even made an alliance with Sertorius. See alſo Plutarch, life of Lucullus.

corporated those exiles, who proved the best soldiers in his army.

On the other side, the Romans, disordered by intestine divisions, and threatened with more imminent dangers, neglected the affairs of Asia, and suffered Mithridates to pursue his victories, or take breath after his defeats.

Nothing had contributed more to the ruin of most kings, than the manifest desire they shewed for peace: by this, they had prevented all other nations from dividing with them a danger, from which they were so anxious to extricate themselves: but Mithridates immediately made the whole world sensible, that he was an enemy to the Romans, and would be so eternally.

In fine, the cities of Greece and Asia, finding the Roman yoke grow more intolerable every day, reposed their whole confidence in this barbarous king, who invited them to liberty.

This disposition of things gave rise to three mighty wars, which form one of the noblest parts of the Roman history, and for this reason: we do not, on this occasion, read of princes already overcome by luxury and pride, as Antiochus and Tigranes; nor by fear, as Philip, Perseus and Jugurtha; but a magnanimous king, who in adversity, like a lion that gazes upon his wounds, was fired with the greater indignation upon that account.

This part of the Roman history is singular, because it abounds with perpetual and ever unexpected revolutions; for as on one side, Mithridates could easily recruit his armies, so it appeared, that in those reverses of fortune, in which kings stand in greatest need of obedience, and a strict discipline, his bar-

barian forces forſook him: as he had the art of enticing nations, and ſtirring up cities to rebellion, ſo was he likewiſe betrayed by his captains, his children and his wives; in fine, as he was ſometimes oppoſed by unexperienced Roman generals, ſo there was ſent againſt him, at other times, Sylla, Lucullus, and Pompey.

This prince, after having defeated the Roman generals, and conquered Aſia, Macedonia, and Greece; having been vanquiſhed, in his turn, by Sylla; confined by a treaty to his former limits, and harraſſed by the Roman generals; having been once more ſuperior to them, and conqueror of Aſia; driven away by Lucullus; purſued into his own country; obliged to fly for ſhelter to Tigranes, and defeated with him: finding this monarch irrecoverably loſt, and depending merely upon himſelf for ſuccour, he took ſanctuary in his own dominions, and re-aſcended the throne.

Lucullus was ſucceeded by Pompey, who quite overpowered Mithridates. He then flies out of his dominions, and croſſing the Araxes, marches from danger to danger through the country of the Lazi, and aſſembling in his way all the barbarians he met with, appeared in the Boſphorus againſt his ſon (*a*) Machares, who had reconciled himſelf to the Romans.

Although plunged in ſo deep an abyſs, he yet (*b*) formed a deſign of making Italy the ſeat of the war, and of marching to Rome at the head of thoſe nations who enſlaved it ſome years after, and by the ſame way theſe now took.

(*a*) Mithridates had made him king of the Boſphorus. News being brought of his father's arrival, he diſpatched himſelf.

(*b*) See Appian, *de Bello Mithridatico*.

Betrayed by Pharnaces, another of his ſons, and by an army terrified at the greatneſs of his enterprizes and the perils he was going in ſearch of, he died in a manner worthy a king.

It was then that Pompey, in the rapidity of his victories, completed the pompous work of the Roman grandeur: he united, to the body of its empire, countries of a boundleſs extent, which, however, heightened the Roman magnificence rather than increaſed its power; and though it appeared by the titles carried in his triumph, that he had increaſed the revenue of the public treaſury (*a*) above a third, there yet was no augmentation in power, and the public liberty was thereby only expoſed to the greater danger.

CHAPTER VIII.

Of the Diviſions which always ſubſiſted in the City.

WHILST Rome was conquering the world, a hidden war was carrying on within its walls: theſe fires were like thoſe of vulcanos, which break out the inſtant they are fed by ſome combuſtible ſubſtance.

After the expulſion of the kings, the government became ariſtocratical: the patrician families only, obtained all the employments and dignities in the (*b*) ſtate, and conſequently all (*c*) honours civil and military.

(*a*) See Plutarch in the life of Pompey; and Zenoras, lib. ii.

(*b*) The Patricians were inveſted, in ſome meaſure, with a ſacred character, and they only were allowed to take the auſpices. See in Livy, book vi. the ſpeech of Appius Claudius.

(*c*) As for inſtance, they alone were permitted to triumph, ſince they alone could be conſuls and generals.

The patricians being determined to prevent, if poſſible, the return of the kings, endeavoured to foment the reſtleſs principle which now prevailed in the minds of the people; but they did more than they would willingly have done; by attempting to inſpire them with a hatred for kings, they fired them with an inordinate thirſt for liberty. As the royal authority had devolved entirely upon the conſuls, the people found they were far from poſſeſſing that liberty they were taught to idolize; they therefore ſought for methods by which they might depreſs the conſulate; procure plebeian magiſtrates; and ſhare the Curule, or greater employments, with the nobles. The patricians were forced to comply with all the demands of the people; for in a city where poverty was the public virtue; where wealth, that clandeſtine path to power, was deſpiſed, neither birth nor dignities could beſtow any great advantages: it was therefore neceſſary for power to fall into the hands of the greater number, and for ariſtocracy to change by inſenſible degrees into a popular ſtate.

Thoſe, who are ſubordinate to a king, are leſs tortured with envy and jealouſy than ſuch as live under an hereditary ariſtocracy: the prince is at ſo great a diſtance from his ſubjects that he is ſcarce ſeen by them; and is raiſed ſo far above them, that they cannot conceive any relation capable of giving them diſguſt. But when the nobles preſide in a ſtate, they are expoſed to the eyes of all men, and are not ſeated ſo high as to prevent odious compariſons from being made perpetually; and, indeed, the people have deteſted ſenators, in this and in all ages. Such commonwealths, in which birth does not beſtow any ſhare in the legiſlature, are the happieſt

in this reſpect; for it is natural that the people ſhould not bear ſo much envy to an authority, which they beſtow on whom they think proper, and reſume at will.

The people being diſguſted at the patricians, withdrew to the ſacred hill (Mons ſacer); whither deputies being ſent, they were appeaſed: and as they all made a promiſe to aſſiſt one another, in caſe the patricians ſhould not perform their (*a*) engagement, which would have created ſeditions every moment, and diſturbed all the magiſtrates in the exerciſe of their functions; it was judged better to create an officer (*b*), who might protect the people againſt any injuſtice that ſhould be done them: but by a malady for ever incident to man, the plebeians, who had obtained tribunes merely for their own defence, employed thoſe very magiſtrates to annoy others; ſo that they ſtript, by inſenſible degrees, the patricians of all their privileges. This gave riſe to everlaſting conteſts: the people were ſupported, or rather animated, by their tribunes; and the patricians were defended by the ſenate, the greateſt part of which conſiſted of patricians, who were more inclined to favour the antient maxims, and afraid that the populace would raiſe ſome tribune to arbitrary power.

The people employed, in the defence of this magiſtrate, their own ſtrength, and the ſuperiority they had in the ſuffrages, their refuſal to march into the field, their threats to go quite away, the partiality of the laws, in fine, their judiciary ſentences againſt

(*a*) Zonares, lib. ii.

(*b*) Origin of the tribunes of the people.

thoſe who had oppoſed them too vigorouſly: the ſenate defended themſelves by their wiſdom, their juſtice, and the love they inſpired into all for their country; by their beneficence, and the prudent diſtribution of the treaſures of the commonwealth; by the veneration which the people had for the glory of the principal (*a*) families, and the virtue of illuſtrious perſonages; by religion itſelf, the antient inſtitutions, and the prohibition of days of public meeting, upon pretence that the auſpices had not been favourable; by their clients, by the oppoſition of one tribune to another; by the creation of a (*b*) dictator, the occupations of a new war, or the misfortunes and calamities which united all parties; in a word, by a paternal condeſcenſion, in granting the people part of their demands, purpoſely to make them relinquiſh the reſt; and by that ſtedfaſt max-

(*a*) The people had ſo great a veneration for the chief families, that although they had obtained the privilege of creating plebeian military tribunes, who were inveſted with the ſame power as the conſuls, they nevertheleſs always made choice of patricians for this employment. They were obliged to put a conſtraint upon themſelves, and to enact, that one conſul always ſhould be a Plebeian; and when ſome Plebeian families were raiſed to offices, the way was afterwards open to them without intermiſſion. It was with difficulty that the people, notwithſtanding the perpetual deſire they had to depreſs the nobility, depreſſed them in reality; and when they raiſed to honours ſome perſons of mean extraction, as Varro and Marius, it coſt them very great ſtruggles.

(*b*) The patricians, to defend themſelves, uſed to create a dictator, which proved of the greateſt advantage to them; but the plebeians, having obtained the privilege of being elected conſuls, could alſo be elected dictators, which quite diſconcerted the patricians. See in Livy, lib. viii. in what manner Publius Philo depreſſed them in his dictatorſhip. He enacted three laws, by which they received the higheſt prejudice.

im, of preferring the safety of the republic to the prerogatives of any order or public employment whatsoever.

In process of time, when the plebeians had depressed the patricians to such a degree, that this (*a*) distinction of families was empty and fruitless, and that both were indiscriminately raised to honours, new contests arose between the populace, whom their tribunes spirited up, and the chief families, whether patricians, or such plebeians as were styled noble, and were favoured by the senate that was composed of them: but, as the ancient manners subsisted no more; as particular persons were possessed of immense wealth, and that it is impossible but wealth must give power; these nobles made a stronger resistance than the patricians had done, which occasioned the death of the Gracchi, and of (*b*) several persons who followed their plan.

I must take notice of an office which contributed greatly to the happy polity of Rome; it was that of the censors. These numbered or surveyed the (*c*) people: farther, as the strength of the commonwealth consisted in the strictness of discipline, in the severity of manners, and the uninterrupted observation of certain customs; they corrected such er-

(*a*) The patricians reserved to themselves only a few offices belonging to the priesthood, and the privilege of creating a magistrate called interrex.

(*b*) As Saturninus and Glaucias.

(*c*) The census or survey of the citizens was a very prudent institution in it self: it was a survey of the state of their affairs, and an enquiry into their power. It was founded by Servius Tullius, before whom, according to Eutropius, book i. the census was unknown.

rors and abuſes as the legiſlative power had not foreſeen, nor the ordinary magiſtrate (*a*) could not puniſh. Some bad examples are worſe than crimes, and a violation of manners has deſtroyed more ſtates, than the enfraction of laws: in Rome, whatever might tend to introduce dangerous novelties, to create a change in the minds or affections of the citizens, and prevent, if I may uſe the expreſſion, the perpetuity of it; all diſorders and tumults, whether public or private, were reformed by the cenſors; theſe had authority to expel whomſoever they pleaſed of the ſenate; could take from a knight the horſe maintained for him at the public expence; and degrade a citizen to the rank of ſuch as contributed to the maintenance of the magiſtrates of the city, without enjoying the privileges of it; in a word, the cenſors took a view of the actual ſituation of the republic, and diſtributed the people (*b*)

(*a*) The reader may ſee in what manner thoſe were degraded who, after the battle of Cannae, were for leaving Italy; thoſe who had ſurrendered to Hannibal, thoſe who by an inſidious and falſe interpretation, had forfeited their word.

(*b*) The plebeians obtained, in oppoſition to the patricians, that the laws and elections of magiſtrates ſhould be made by the people aſſembled by tribes and not by centuries. There were thirty five tribes, each of whom gave its vote; four belonging to the city, and thirty one to the country. As there were but two profeſſions among the Romans that were honourable, war and huſbandry, the country tribes were had in greateſt conſideration; and the four remaining ones admitted into their body that contemptible part of the citizens, who, having no lands to cultivate, were, if we may ſo ſay, but citizens by halves; the greateſt part of them did not even go to war, for in the enliſting of ſoldiers the diviſion of centuries was obſerved; and thoſe, who were members of the four city tribes, were very near the ſame with thoſe who in the diviſion by centuries were of the ſixth claſs, in which no perſon was enrolled. Thus,

among their various tribes in ſuch a manner, as to prevent the tribunes and perſons of an aſpiring temper from engroſſing the ſuffrages, or the people from abuſing their power.

M. Livius, (*a*) degraded the people themſelves, and reduced thirty four tribes out of the thirty five, to the rank of thoſe who had no ſhare in the privileges of the city; for, ſaid this Roman, you firſt condemned me, and afterwards raiſed me to the conſulate and the cenſorſhip; you therefore muſt either have prevaricated once in puniſhing me, or twice in creating me conſul and afterwards cenſor.

M. Duronius, (*b*) tribune of the people, was expelled the ſenate by the cenſors, for having annulled, when in office, the law which limits the expences of feaſts.

The following inſtitution was a very wiſe one; no (*c*) magiſtrate could be turned out of his em-

it was ſcarce poſſible for the ſuffrages to be in the hands of the populace, who were confined to their four tribes, and conſequently had very little influence in the management of affairs; and this was looked upon as the bulwark of the republic: accordingly when Fabius * again ſhut up in the four city tribes the meaner ſort of the people whom Appius Claudius had diſperſed among the others, he acquired the ſurname of Maximus; but as every one committed a thouſand frauds, for the ſake of getting out of them, the cenſors had an opportunity of reforming this abuſe every five years; and they incorporated into any tribe they pleaſed, not only a citizen, but alſo bodies and whole orders. See the firſt remark of chapter ix. See alſo Livy, lib. i. Decad. i. in which the different diviſions of the people, made by Servius Tullius, were very well explained: It was the ſame body of the people, but divided in various reſpects.

(*a*) Livy, lib. xxix. (*b*) Val. Max. lib. ii.

(*c*) The dignity of ſenator was not a public office or employment.

* See Livy, B. ix.

ployment, becauſe that would have diſturbed the exerciſe of the public power; but they diveſted ſuch a man of his order and rank, and deprived, as it were, a citizen of his particular nobility.

The government of Rome was wonderful in this reſpect; ever ſince the foundation of that city, its conſtitution was ſuch, either from the genius of the people, the ſtrength of the ſenate, or the authority of certain magiſtrates, that every abuſe of power might always be reformed in it.

Carthage was deſtroyed, becauſe, when abuſes were to be retrenched, the citizens could not bear the hand even of their Hannibal. Athens fell, becauſe the errors of the people appeared ſo lovely in their own eyes, that they would not be cured of them: and among us, thoſe Italian republics which boaſt the perpetuity of their government, ought to boaſt of nothing but the perpetuity of their abuſes; nor indeed, do they enjoy greater liberty (*a*) than Rome did under the Decemviri.

The Britiſh government is one of the wiſeſt in Europe, becauſe there is a body which examines it perpetually, and is perpetually examining itſelf; and its errors are of ſuch a nature, as never to be laſting, and are frequently uſeful by rouzing the attention of the nation.

In a word, a free government, that is to ſay, one for ever in motion, cannot ſupport itſelf, unleſs its own laws are capable of correcting the diſorders of it.

(*a*) Nor even greater power.

CHAPTER IX.

Two Cauſes which deſtroyed ROME.

WHILST the ſovereignty of Rome was confined to Italy, it was eaſy for the commonwealth to ſubſiſt: every ſoldier was at the ſame time a citizen; every conſul raiſed an army, and other citizens marched into the field under his ſucceſſor: as their forces were not very numerous, ſuch (*a*) perſons only were received among the troops, as had poſſeſſions conſiderable enough to make them intereſted in the preſervation of the city; the ſenate kept a watchful eye over the conduct of the generals, and did not give them an opportunity of machinating any thing to the prejudice of their country.

But after the legions had paſſed the Alps and croſſed the ſea, the ſoldiers, whom the Romans had been obliged to leave during ſeveral campaigns in the countries they were ſubduing, loſt inſenſibly that genius and turn of mind which characterized a Roman citizen; and the generals, having armies and kingdoms at their diſpoſal, were ſenſible of their own ſtrength, and could no longer obey.

(*a*) The freedmen, and ſuch as were called *capite cenſi* (becauſe, being poſſeſſed of little or nothing, they were ſubject to the poll tax only) were not at firſt enrolled among the land-forces, except in caſes of urgent neceſſity: Servius Tullius had ranked them in the ſixth claſs, and ſoldiers were levied out of the five firſt only: but when Marius ſet out againſt Jugurtha, he enliſted all without diſtinction. Milites ſcribere, ſays Salluſt, non modo majorum neque ex claſſibus, ſed, uti cujuſque libido erat, capite cenſos pleroſque.——De Bello Jugurthin.

The ſoldiers therefore began to acknowlege no ſuperior but their general; to found their hopes on him only, and to view the city as from a great diſtance: they were no longer the ſoldiers of the republic, but of Sylla, of Marius, of Pompey, and of Caeſar. The Romans could no longer tell, whether the perſon who headed an army in a province was their general or their enemy.

So long as the people of Rome were corrupted by their tribunes only, on whom they could beſtow nothing but their power, the ſenate could eaſily defend themſelves, becauſe they acted conſiſtently and with one regular tenor; whereas the common people were continually ſhifting from the extremes of fury to the extremes of cowardice; but when they were enabled to inveſt their favourites with a formidable exterior authority, the whole wiſdom of the ſenate was baffled, and the commonwealth was undone. The reaſon why free-ſtates are not ſo permanent as other forms of government, is, becauſe the misfortunes and ſucceſſes, which happen to them, generally occaſion the loſs of liberty; whereas the ſucceſſes and misfortunes of an arbitrary government contribute equally to the enſlaving of the people. A wiſe republic ought not to run any hazard which may expoſe it to good or ill fortune; the only happineſs the ſeveral individuals of it ſhould aſpire after, is, to give perpetuity to their ſtate.

If the unbounded extent of the Roman empire proved the ruin of the republic, the vaſt compaſs of the city was no leſs fatal to it.

The Romans had ſubdued the whole univerſe by the aſſiſtance of the nations of Italy, on whom they had beſtowed various privileges at different times;

moſt of thoſe nations did not, at firſt, ſet any great value on the freedom of the city of Rome, and ſome (*a*) choſe rather to preſerve their ancient uſages; but when this privilege became that of univerſal ſovereignty; when a man, who was not a Roman citizen, was conſidered as nothing, and, with this title, was all things, the people of Italy reſolved either to be Romans, or die: not being able to obtain this by cabals and intreaties, they had recourſe to arms; and (*b*) riſing in all that part of Italy oppoſite to the Ionian ſea, the reſt of the allies were going to follow their example: Rome being now forced to combat againſt thoſe who were, if I may be allowed the figure, the hands with which they ſhackled the univerſe, was upon the brink of ruin: the Romans were going to be confined merely to their walls; they therefore granted this ſo much wiſhed-for (*c*) privilege, to allies, who had not yet been wanting in fidelity; and they indulged it, by inſenſible degrees, to all other nations.

But now Rome was no longer that city, the inhabitants of which had breathed one and the ſame ſpirit, the ſame love for liberty, the ſame hatred of

(*a*) The Æqui ſaid in their aſſemblies, thoſe in whoſe power it was to chuſe, have preferred their own laws to the freedom of the city of Rome, which was a neceſſary penalty upon ſuch as could not refuſe it. Liv. lib. ix.

(*b*) The Aſculani, the Marſi, the Veſtini, the Marrucini, the Frentani, the Hirpini, the Pompeians, the Venuſini, the Iapyges, the Lucani, the Samnites and other nations. Appian, de Bello civil. lib. 1.

(*c*) The Tuſcans, the Umbri, the Latins. This prompted ſome nations to ſubmit themſelves; and as theſe were alſo made citizens, others likewiſe laid down their arms, ſo that at laſt there remained only the Samnites, who were extirpated.

tyranny; a city in which a jealousy of the power of the senate and of the prerogatives of the great (ever accompanied with respect,) was only a love of equality. The nations of Italy (*a*) being made citizens of Rome, every city brought thither its genius, its particular interests, and its dependance on some mighty protector: Rome being now rent and divided, no longer formed one entire body, and men were no longer citizens of it, but in a kind of fictitious way; as there were no longer the same magistrates, the same walls, the same gods, the same temples, the same burying places; Rome was no longer beheld with the same eyes; the citizens were no longer fired with the same love for their country, and the Roman sentiments were obliterated.

Cities and nations were now invited to Rome by the ambitious, to disconcert the suffrages, or influence them in their own favour; the public assemblies were so many conspiracies against the state, and a tumultuous croud of seditious wretches were dignified with the title of Comitia. The authority of the people and their laws, nay that people themselves, were no more than so many chimaeras, and so universal was the anarchy of those times, that it was not possible to determine whether the people had made a law or not.

Authors enlarge very copiously on the divisions which proved the destruction of Rome, but their readers seldom discover those divisions to have been always necessary and inevitable. The grandeur of the republic was the only source of that calamity,

(*a*) Let the reader figure to himself this monstrous head, formed of all the nations of Italy, which, by the suffrage of every individual, governed the rest of the world.

and exasperated popular tumults into civil wars. Dissensions were not to be prevented, and those martial spirits, which were so fierce and formidable abroad, could not be habituated to any considerable moderation at home. Those who expect, in a free state, to see the people undaunted in war and pusillanimous in peace, are certainly desirous of impossibilities, and it may be advanced as a general rule, that whenever a perfect calm is visible, in a state that calls itself a republic, the spirit of liberty no longer subsists.

Union, in a body politic, is a very equivocal term: true union is such a harmony as makes all the particular parts, as opposite as they may seem to us, concur to the general welfare of the society, in the same manner as discords in music contribute to the general melody of sound. Union may prevail in a state full of seeming commotions; or, in other words, there may be an harmony from whence results prosperity, which alone is true peace, and may be considered in the same view, as the various parts of this universe, which are eternally connected by the action of some and the reaction of others.

In a despotic state indeed, which is every government where the power is immoderately exerted, a real division is perpetually kindled. The peasant, the soldier, the merchant, the magistrate, and the grandee, have no other conjunction than what arises from the ability of the one to oppress the other, without resistance; and if at any time a union happens to be introduced, citizens are not then united, but dead bodies are laid in the grave contiguous to each other.

It must be acknowleged that the Roman laws were too weak to govern the republic: but experience has proved it to be an invariable fact, that good laws, which raise the reputation and power of a small republic, become incommodious to it, when once its grandeur is established, because it was their natural effect to make a great people, but not to govern them.

The difference is very considerable between good laws, and those which may be called convenient; between such laws as give a people dominion over others, and such as continue them in the possession of power, when they have once acquired it.

There is at this time a republic (*a*) in the world, of which few persons have any knowlege, and which, by plans accomplished in silence and secresy, is daily enlarging its power. And certain it is, that if it ever rises to that height of grandeur for which it seems pre-ordained by its wisdom, it must inevitably change its laws, and the necessary innovations will not be effected by any legislator, but must spring from corruption itself.

Rome was founded for grandeur, and its laws (*b*) had an admirable tendency to bestow it; for which reason, in all the variations of her government, whether monarchy, aristocracy, or popular, she con-

(*a*) The Canton of Bern.

(*b*) The Roman government has been thought defective by some, because it was an intermixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and popular authority. But the perfection of a government does not consist in its conformity to any particular plan to be found in the writings of politicians, but in its correspondence to the views every legislator ought to entertain for the grandeur and felicity of a people. Was not the government of Sparta composed of three branches?

ſtantly engaged in enterprizes which required conduct to accompliſh them, and always ſucceeded. The experience of a day did not furniſh her with more wiſdom than all other nations, but ſhe obtained it by a long ſucceſſion of events. She ſuſtained a ſmall, a moderate, and an immenſe fortune with the ſame ſuperiority, derived true welfare from the whole train of her proſperities, and refined every inſtance of calamity into beneficial inſtructions.

She loſt her liberty, becauſe ſhe completed her work too ſoon.

CHAPTER X.

Of the Corruption of the ROMANS.

I AM of opinion that the ſect of Epicurus, which began to be propagated at Rome towards the cloſe of the republic, was very prejudicial to the minds and genius of the people (*a*). The Greeks had been infatuated with its doctrines long before, and conſequently, were corrupted much earlier than the Romans. We are aſſured by Polybius (*b*), that

(*a*) Cyneas having diſcourſed of the doctrines of this ſect, at the table of Pyrrhus, Fabricius ſaid, he wiſhed the enemies of Rome would all embrace ſuch kind of principles. Life of Pyrrhus.

(*b*) If you lend a talent to a Greek, and bind him to the repayment, by ten engagements, with as many ſecurities, and witneſſes to the loan, it is impoſſible to make them regard their word; whereas, among the Romans, whether it be owing to their obligation of accounting for the public and private money, they are always punctual to the oaths they have taken. For which reaſon, the apprehenſions of infernal torments were wiſely eſtabliſhed, and it is altogether irrational that they now oppoſe them. Polyb. l. vi.

oaths, in his time, could not induce any perſon to place confidence in a Greek, whereas they were conſidered by a Roman as inviolable obligations upon his conſcience.

There is a paſſage in one of Cicero's letters to (*a*) Atticus, which manifeſtly diſcovers how much the Romans had degenerated in this particular, ſince the time of Polybius.

Memmius, ſays he, imparted to the ſenate the agreement he and his fellow candidate had made with the conſuls, by which the latter ſtipulated to favour them in their ſolicitations for the conſulſhip the enſuing year; and they obliged themſelves to pay four hundred thouſand ſeſterces to the conſuls, if they did not furniſh them with three augurs, who ſhould declare they themſelves were preſent when the people made the Curiatian law (*b*), though in reality it had not been enacted; and two former conſuls, who ſhould affirm they had aſſiſted at ſigning the edict of the ſenate which regulated the ſtate of the provinces aſſigned to the preſent conſuls, notwithſtanding no ſuch edict was in being. What an admirable ſet of people do we diſcover in a ſingle contract!

As religion always furniſhes the beſt ſecurity for the rectitude of human actions, ſo there was this peculiarity among the Romans, that the love they expreſſed for their country, was blended with ſome

(*a*) Lib. iv. Let. 18.

(*b*) The Curiatian law diſpoſed of the military power, and the edict of the ſenate regulated the troops, the money, and officers, that were to be allotted to the governors: now the conſuls in order to accompliſh theſe particulars, to their own ſatisfaction, contrived a falſe law and a falſe edict of the ſenate.

particular ſentiment of devotion. That mighty city, founded in the moſt auſpicious period; the great Romulus, at once their monarch and their god; the capitol, eſteemed as eternal as the city; and the city, reputed as eternal as its founder, had anciently ſtruck ſuch impreſſions on the minds of the Romans, as might well be wiſhed to have been conſtantly retained.

The grandeur of the ſtate, in general, conſtituted the greatneſs of its particular members; but as affluence conſiſts in conduct, and not in riches; that wealth of the Romans, which had certain limitations, introduced a luxury and profuſion which had no bounds. Thoſe who had been at firſt corrupted by their opulence, received the ſame taint in their poverty, by aſpiring after acquiſitions, that no way comported with private life. It was difficult to be a good citizen, under the influence of ſtrong deſires and the regret of a large fortune that had been loſt: people, in this ſituation, were prepared for any deſperate attempt; and, as Salluſt (*a*) ſays, there was, at that time, a generation of men, who, as they had no patrimony of their own, could not endure to ſee others leſs neceſſitous than themſelves.

But as great ſoever as the corruption of Rome might then be, all its calamitous effects were not introduced among the people; for the efficacy of thoſe inſtitutions, by which they were originally eſtabliſhed, was ſo extraordinary, that they always preſerved an heroic fortitude, and devoted them-

(*a*) Ut merito dicatur genitos eſſe, qui nec ipſi habere poſſent vos familiares, nec alios pati. Fragment of Salluſt cited by Auguſtin in his book *Of the city of* GOD, l. ii. c. 18.

ſelves, with the greateſt application to war, amidſt all the ſoftenings of luxury and pleaſure; which ſeems to me, to be a circumſtance, in which they were never imitated by any nation in the world.

The Romans were not ſolicitous to improve commerce, or cultivate the ſciences, but ranked them among the attentions proper for ſlaves (*a*); we may except, indeed, ſome particular perſons, who had received their freedom, and perſiſted in their former induſtry. But their knowlege, in general, was confined to the art of war, which was the only track (*b*) by which they could arrive at promotions in the magiſtracy, and other ſtations of honour; for which reaſon, their military virtues ſubſiſted after all the reſt were extinguiſhed.

CHAPTER XI.

Of SYLLA, POMPEY, *and* CAESAR.

I Intreat the reader's permiſſion to turn my eyes from the horrors of the wars between Marius and Sylla; Appian has collected all the dreadful particulars into his hiſtory: beſides the jealouſy, ambition, and barbarity of the two chiefs, each particular Roman was infatuated with fury; the

(*a*) Cic. Offic. l. 1. cap. 42. Illiberales et ſordidi quaeſtus mercenariorum omnium, quorum operae, non quorum artes emuntur: eſt enim illis ipſa merces auctoramentum ſervitutis. The merchants, adds that author, raiſe no profit, unleſs they falſify their word. Agriculture is the nobleſt of all arts, and moſt worthy of a man in a ſtate of freedom.

(*b*) They were obliged to ſerve ten years, between the age of ſixteen years and forty ſeven. Polyb. l. vi.

new citizens (*a*), and the ancient, no longer conſidered each other as members of the ſame republic, but gave a looſe to a ſeries of hoſtilities, ſo peculiar in their nature, as to comprehend all the miſeries of a civil and foreign war.

Sylla made ſeveral good laws, and reduced the power of the tribunes; to which we may add, that the moderation or caprice, which induced him to reſign the dictatorſhip, re-eſtabliſhed the ſenate, for ſome time; but, in the fury of his ſucceſs, he ſuffered himſelf to be hurried into actions, which, in their conſequences, made it impoſſible for Rome to preſerve her liberty.

In his Aſian expedition he ruined all military diſcipline: he accuſtomed his men (*b*) to pillage, and gave them wants which they had never had: he firſt corrupted the ſoldiers, who were afterwards to corrupt their leaders.

He entered Rome with an armed force, and taught (*c*) the Roman generals to violate the Aſylum of Liberty.

He diſtributed (*d*) the lands of the citizens among

(*a*) Marius, in order to obtain a commiſſion for carrying on the war againſt Mithridates, in prejudice of Sylla's pretenſions, had, by the concurrence of Sulpicius the tribune, incorporated the eight new tribes of the people of Italy, into the ancient, which rendered the Italians maſters of the ſuffrages; and the generality of that people eſpouſed the party of Marius, whilſt the ſenate and the ancient citizens engaged in the intereſt of Sylla.

(*b*) See in *Catilin's Conſpiracy* the portrait which Salluſt draws of this army.

(*c*) Fugatis Marii copiis, primum urbem Romam cum armis ingreſſus eſt. Fragment of John of Antioch, in the *Extract of Virtues and Vices*.

(*d*) At the beginning of the wars, the lands of the vanquiſhed

his ſoldiers, and by that proceeding, corrupted them for ever; becauſe, from that moment, there was not one of the military profeſſion who did not wait for an opportunity of ſeizing the effects of his fellow-citizens.

He was likewiſe the inventor of proſcriptions, and ſet a price on the head of every man who had not embraced his party. From that time, it became impoſſible for any one to be devoted to the republic; for whilſt two ambitious men were contending for ſuperiority, thoſe who obſerved a neutrality, or were attached to the cauſe of liberty, were ſure to be proſcribed by either of the competitors who ſhould prove victorious; it therefore became prudent to engage in one of the two parties.

After him, ſays Cicero (*a*), came one, who in an impious cauſe, and a victory ſtill more infamous, not only ſeized on the effects of individuals, but involved whole provinces in the ſame calamity.

Sylla, when he reſigned the dictatorſhip, ſeemed to deſire only to live under the protection of his own laws: but this action, which ſhewed ſo much moderation, was itſelf a conſequence of his violences. He had ſettled forty-ſeven legions in different parts of Italy: theſe men, ſays Appian, imagining that their fortune depended on his life, watched for his ſafety, and were always ready (*b*) to aſſiſt or revenge him.

As the republic was fated to deſtruction, the on-

enemies were parcelled among the army, but Sylla made the ſame diviſion of thoſe which belonged to the citizens.

(*a*) Offic. lib. ii, c. 8.

(*b*) We may ſee what happened after the death of Caeſar.

ly material queſtion was, who ſhould have the credit of overwhelming it.

Two men equally ambitious, with this exception, that the one knew how to proceed directly to his purpoſe better than the other, eclipſed, by their reputation, their exploits, and their virtues all the reſt of the citizens. Pompey made the firſt appearance in the ſcene of action, and Caeſar immediately followed him.

Pompey, to render himſelf popular, had diſannulled the law of Sylla which limited the power of the people, and when he had ſacrificed the moſt ſalutary laws of his country, to his particular ambition, he obtained all he deſired, and the raſh indiſcretion of the populace was altogether unbounded in his favour.

The Roman laws had wiſely parcelled out the public power into ſeveral magiſtracies, which mutually ſupported as well as reſtrained and tempered each other; and as the power of all, who enjoyed thoſe promotions, was confined to a proper extent, every citizen was qualified for a ſtation of that nature; and the people, ſeeing numbers of ſuch perſons paſſing away in ſucceſſion, were not habituated to any particular magiſtrate among them. But, in the times we are now deſcribing, the plan of government was changed; the moſt potent competitors obtained extraordinary commiſſions from the people, which annihilated the authority of the magiſtrates, and drew all the great affairs into the hands of one man, or a few.

Was war to be proclaimed againſt Sertorius? Pompey was nominated to command the army. Were the Romans to march againſt Mithridates?

every voice called aloud for Pompey. Did it become neceſſary to tranſmit corn to Rome? the people would have given it over for loſt, had not Pompey been entruſted with the importation. Were the pirates to be deſtroyed? who ſo proper for that expedition as Pompey? and when Caeſar himſelf threatened Rome with an invaſion, the ſenators cried out, in their turn, and placed all their confidence in Pompey.

I am willing to believe (ſaid Marcus (*a*) to the people) that this Pompey, who is ſo much careſſed by the nobility, is more inclinable to ſecure your liberty, than he is to countenance their authority over you: but there was a time when each individual among you was protected by ſeveral, and not the whole body of the people by one perſon; and when it was never known, that a ſingle man either gave or took away things of ſo much conſequence.

As Rome was formed for grandeur, it became neceſſary to unite the honours and power in the ſame perſons, which in unquiet times would fix the admiration of the people on one particular citizen.

When honours are granted, the givers know exactly what they beſtow; but when power is added to the donation, they can never be certain how far it will be extended.

Immoderate preferences given to a citizen, in a republic, are always productive of neceſſary effects; they either raiſe envy in the people, or make their affection overflow all bounds.

When Pompey returned twice to Rome, in a condition to enſlave the republic, he had the moderation to diſband his armies, before he entered

(*a*) Fragment of Salluſt.

the city; and then he made his appearance with the air of a common citizen: these instances of a disinterested behaviour, which completed all his glory, did not fail, in their consequences, to make the senate always declare in his favour, whenever he attempted any thing prejudicial to the laws.

The ambition of Pompey was more unactive and gentle than that of Caesar. This warrior resolved, like Sylla, to open himself a passage to sovereign power, by arms, but Pompey grew displeased at such a method of oppression; he aspired, indeed, to the dictatorship, but was willing to owe it to the suffrages of the people; he could not resolve to usurp power, but would have been glad to have had it tendered to him as a gift.

As the favour of the people is always in a fluctuating state, there were some seasons, wherein Pompey beheld his reputation in a declining condition; (*a*) and it affected him in the most tender part, to see the very persons he despised, make advances in popularity, and then employ it against him.

This led him into three actions equally fatal; he corrupted the people with money, and fixed a price, in the elections, on the suffrage of each citizen.

He employed the vilest of the populace to incommode the magistrates, in the exercise of their functions, in hopes, that wise people, growing weary of living in a state of anarchy, would be urged by despair to create him dictator.

In a word, he united his interests, with those of Caesar and Crassus: Cato said, their union and not their enmity destroyed the republic; and in reality,

(*a*) See Plutarch.

it was then reduced to ſuch an unhappy ſtate, that it received leſs injury from civil wars than by a peace, which, as it united the views and intereſts of the leading men, ſo it naturally introduced tyranny in the government.

Pompey did not properly lend his reputation to Caeſar, but ſacrificed it to his cauſe, without knowing what he did; and Caeſar, in return, employed all the power he had received from Pompey to the prejudice of the donor, and even played off his own artifices againſt him: he raiſed troubles in the city by his emiſſaries; he made himſelf maſter of all elections; and conſuls, praetors, and tribunes purchaſed their promotions, at their own price.

The ſenate, who eaſily penetrated into Caeſar's deſigns, had recourſe to Pompey, and intreated him to undertake the defence of the republic, if that name might properly be given to a government which implored protection of one of its citizens.

I am of opinion, that what contributed moſt to Pompey's deſtruction, was the ſhame that affected him, when he grew ſenſible, that by raiſing Caeſar as he had done, he had committed a fatal overſight; but he ſuffered this conſideration to prevail as late as poſſible, and did not prepare for his defence, leſt he ſhould be obliged to acknowlege himſelf in danger. He aſſerted before the ſenate that Caeſar durſt not engage in a war, and becauſe he had made ſuch a declaration ſeveral times, he always perſiſted in repeating it.

One circumſtance ſeems to have capacitated Caeſar for any undertaking, and that was the unhappy conformity of names; the ſenate had added to his government of the Ciſalpine Gaul, all that part

of Gaul which was diſtinguiſhed by the name of Tranſalpine.

As the polities of thoſe times did not permit armies to be ſtationed near Rome, ſo neither would they ſuffer Italy to be entirely deſtitute of troops; for which reaſon, conſiderable forces were quartered in Ciſalpine Gaul, a country which extends from the Rubicon, a little river in Romania, to the Alps: but in order to ſecure the city of Rome againſt thoſe troops, the ſenate paſſed that famous edict, which is to be ſeen engraved, in the road near Rimini, by which they ſolemnly devoted to the infernal gods, and branded with ſacrilege and parricide, any perſon whatever, who ſhould preſume to paſs the Rubicon, with an army, a legion, or a ſingle cohort.

To a government of that importance as to keep the city in awe, another was added which proved ſtill more conſiderable, and that was all the Tranſalpine Gaul, which comprehended the ſouthern parts of France, where Caeſar had for ſeveral years an opportunity of proſecuting war againſt as many nations as he pleaſed; by which means his ſoldiers advanced in years as well as himſelf, and were conquered by him, in their turn, as well as the barbarians. Had Caeſar not been entruſted with the government of Tranſalpine Gaul, he could not have corrupted his troops, nor rendered his name venerable to them by ſo many victories; and had he not enjoyed Ciſalpine Gaul, Pompey might have ſtopped him at the paſs of the Alps, whereas he was compelled to retire from Italy, when the war began, which made him loſe among his own party

that reputation which, in civil wars, is the very ſoul of power.

The ſame conſternation, which Hannibal diffuſed through Rome, after the battle of Cannae, was ſpread by Caeſar over all that city, when he had paſſed the Rubicon. Pompey was ſo confounded, that he became incapable, even in the firſt moments of the war, of forming any deſign but ſuch as is uſually ſuggeſted in the moſt deſperate conjunctures. He could only retire, and truſt to flight. Accordingly he left Rome and the public treaſure; and as he was in no condition to retard the conqueror, he forſook part of his troops, abandoned all Italy and croſſed the ſea.

Caeſar's fortune has been greatly celebrated; but this extraordinary man enjoyed ſo many great qualities, without the intermixture of a defect, though he had ſeveral vicious inclinations, that he would have been victorious at the head of any army he had commanded, and would have governed in any republic that had given him birth.

When he had defeated Pompey's lieutenants in Spain, he paſſed into Greece to ſeek Pompey himſelf; and this general, who had poſſeſſed himſelf of the ſea-coaſts, and was maſter of a ſuperior force, was on the point of beholding Caeſar's army deſtroyed by miſery and famine. But as the deſire of approbation was his predominant frailty, he could not forbear giving attention to ſome vain ſpeeches (*a*) of thoſe about him, who were perpetually blaming his conduct, and mortifying him with their jeſts. This general, ſays one, would perpetuate his command, and be a new king of kings, like Agamem-

(*a*) See Plutarch's life of Pompey.

non: I assure you, replies another, we shall not eat any Tusculum figs this year. A few encounters, in which he had succeeded, quite intoxicated the heads of this senatorial host; and Pompey, to avoid censure, gave into an indiscretion which posterity will ever blame; he resolved to sacrifice all the advantages he had then obtained, and marched at the head of undisciplined troops to engage an army that had been so frequently victorious.

When the shattered remains of Pharsalia were withdrawn into Africa, Scipio, who then commanded them, refused to follow Cato's advice for protracting the war. He grew elated with a few instances of success; he risked all, and immediately lost all he had risked; and when Brutus and Cassius re-established that party, the same precipitation destroyed the republic a third time (*a*).

It is observable, that in the long course of these civil wars, the power of Rome was continually extending in foreign parts, under Marius, Sylla, Pompey, Caesar, Antony, and Augustus; and that mighty city, growing daily more formidable, completed the destruction of all the kings who presumed to resist her.

No state threatens its neighbours with conquest, so much as that which is involved in the horrors of civil war: in such a season, the nobility, the citizens, the artisans, the peasants, and, in short, the whole body of the people become soldiers; and when peace has united all the contending parties, this state en-

(*a*) This is well cleared up in Appian's history of the civil war; l. iv. The army of Octavius and Antony would have perished by famine, if their enemies had not given them battle.

joys great advantages over others, whose subjects are generally citizens. Besides, civil wars always produce great men, because, in the universal confusion which then reigns, those who are distinguished by any particular merit, have a favourable opportunity of making themselves conspicuous: each of these persons ranges himself in a suitable situation, whereas in times of peace they are stationed by others, and generally very injudiciously. We shall pass from the Romans, and enquire for instances of this truth, in nations that are more modern; and among these, France was never so formidable abroad, as after the contentions between the houses of Burgundy and Orleans, after the troubles of the league, after the civil wars in the minority of Lewis the thirteenth, and after the national dissensions in the nonage of Lewis the fourteenth. England was never so much respected as in the time of Cromwell, after the wars of the long parliament. The Germans did not gain their superiority over the Turks, till after the civil wars of the empire. The Spaniards, under Philip the fifth, and immediately after the civil wars that were kindled by the succession, invaded Sicily with such a force as astonished all Europe; and we now see the Persians rising from the ashes of a civil war, and humbling the Ottoman power.

In a word, the republic was at last enslaved, and we are not to charge that calamity on the ambition of particular persons, but should rather impute it to the disposition of man in general, whose cravings after power are always most insatiable, when he enjoys the greatest share, and who only desires the whole, because he possesses a large part.

If the ſentiments of Caeſar and Pompey had reſembled thoſe of Cato, others would have had the ſame ambitious thoughts as Pompey and Caeſar diſcovered; and ſince the republic was fated to fall, it would have been dragged to the precipice by ſome other hand.

Caeſar pardoned every mortal; but the moderation people diſcover when they have uſurped all, ſeems to be no extraordinary accompliſhment.

Though he has been much commended for being indefatigable, after the battle of Pharſalia, yet Cicero, very juſtly, accuſes him of remiſſneſs. He tells Caſſius (*a*) they never could have imagined Pompey's party would have revived ſo conſiderably in Spain and Africa; and that if they could have foreſeen that Caeſar would have amuſed himſelf in his Alexandrian war, they would not have made their peace with him as they did, but would have followed Scipio and Cato into Africa. And thus a weak paſſion for a woman made him engage in four wars, and by not foreſeeing the two laſt, he hazarded all he had gained at Pharſalia.

Caeſar governed at firſt under the uſual titles of Magiſtracy; for nothing affects mankind more than names; and as the Aſiatics abhorred thoſe of conſul and proconſul, the Europeans deteſted that of king; ſo that thoſe titles conſtituted, at that time, the happineſs or deſpair of all the earth. He made ſome overtures to have the diadem placed on his head; but when he grew ſenſible that the people diſcontinued their acclamations, he thought fit to

(*a*) Familiar letters, l. xv.

reject it. He likewise made other attempts, (*a*) and it is not to be comprehended, how he could believe that the Romans, in order to suffer him to be a tyrant, should for that reason be in love with tyranny, or could even give credit to what they themselves had done.

One day, when the senate tendered him some particular honours, he neglected to rise from his seat, and, from that moment, the gravest members of that body lost all patience.

Mankind are always most offended at any trespass on the ceremonials and punctilios they expect. If you endeavour to oppress them, it sometimes passes for a proof of the esteem you entertain for them, but a violation of their decorums is always an instance of contempt.

Caesar, who was a constant enemy to the senate, could not conceal the mean opinion he entertained of that body, who had almost rendered themselves ridiculous (*b*), when they were no longer in possession of power: for which reason even his clemency was an insult, and it became evident that he only pardoned because he scorned to punish.

(*a*) He abolished the office of tribunes of the people.

(*b*) Caesar formed the edicts of the senate himself, and subscribed them with the names of the first senators he happened to think on. Cicero, in the ninth book of his familiar letters, writes to this effect: "I have been sometimes informed that "an edict of the senate, passed by my consent, has been transmitted to Syria and Armenia, before I had any knowlege "that it was made; and several princes have sent me letters of "acknowlegement for my consent, to allow them the title of "kings, when at the same time, I was so far from knowing "them to be kings till that moment, that I even had not heard "there were any such persons in the world."

We may see, in the letters (*a*) of some great men of that time, though they passed under Cicero's name, because most of them were written by himself, into what dejection and despair persons of the first rank in the republic were sunk by this sudden revolution, which divested them of their honours, and even their employments; when the senate having no longer any functions to perform, that reputation they had acquired through all the world was now to be dispensed from the cabinet of one man. This state of affairs appears in a much better light in those letters, than in any relations of historians, and they are the most masterly representation of the ingenuous turn of mind of a set of people united by a common affliction, and give us a complete portrait of an age wherein a false politeness had not infected all society with insincerity and untruth. In a word, they are not written, like our modern letters, with a view to deceive, but are the faithful intercourse of friends who communicated all they knew.

It was hardly possible for Caesar, in his situation, to preserve his life: the generality of the conspirators against him were of his party (*b*), or had received many great obligations from him; and the reason of their intention to assassinate him, is very natural; they had gained signal advantages by his conquest; but the more their fortune improved, the greater was their share of the common calamity; and to those who have not any thing they can pro-

(*a*) See the letters of Cicero and Servius Sulpicius.

(*b*) Decimus Brutus, Caius Casca, Trebonius, Tullius Cimber, Minutius Basillus, were Caesar's friends. Appian. de bello civili. l. ii.

perly call their own, it ſeems, in ſome particulars, to be of little conſequence under what government they live.

Beſides, there was a certain law of nations, or a ſettled opinion, which prevailed in all the republics of Greece and Italy, and aſcribed the character of a virtuous man to the perſon who ſhould aſſaſſinate any one who had uſurped the ſovereign power. Rome had been extremely fond of this notion, ever ſince the expulſion of her kings; the law was very expreſs; the examples had a general approbation; the republic put a ſword into the hand of every citizen, conſtituted him their magiſtrate for a few moments, and acknowleged him for their defender.

Brutus (*a*) was bold enough to tell his friends, that, ſhould his own father return from the grave, he would ſacrifice him to the public good, with as little remorſe as he ſtabbed Caeſar; and though by the continuance of tyranny, this ſurprizing ſpirit of liberty had gradually loſt its vigor, yet the conſpiracies, at the beginning of Auguſtus's reign, were perpetually reviving.

The ancient Romans were animated by a predominant love for their country, which, acting by a variation from the common ideas of crimes and virtues, was only attentive to its own dictates, and in the fervours of its operation, entirely diſregarded friends and citizens, fathers and benefactors. Virtue ſeemed to have forgotten her own precepts with a reſolution to ſurpaſs herſelf, and when an action ſeemed too ſevere to be immediately conſidered with approbation, ſhe ſoon cauſed it to be admired as divine.

(*a*) See the letter of Brutus in the collection of Cicero's letters.

In a word, did not the guilt of Caeſar, who lived in a free government, conſiſt in placing himſelf out of the reach of all puniſhments but an aſſaſſination? and when we aſk why he was not oppoſed by open force, or the power of the laws, do we not at the ſame time demand ſatisfaction for his crimes?

CHAPTER XII.

Obſervations on the State of ROME *after the Death of* Caeſar.

SO impoſſible was it for the republic to accompliſh its re-eſtabliſhment, that a conjuncture then happened which was never known before; there was no longer any tyrant, and yet liberty was extinguiſhed; for the cauſes which had contributed to its deſtruction ſtill ſubſiſted to prevent its revival.

The aſſaſſins had only formed the plan of a conſpiracy, but had not taken any meaſures to render it effectual in the event.

When they had ſtruck the blow, they all retired to the capitol; the ſenate forbore to aſſemble, and the next day Lepidus, who was fond of commotions, took poſſeſſion of the Forum, with a band of ſoldiers at his devotion.

The veteran troops, who were apprehenſive that the immenſe donations they had received would be no longer repeated, had marched into Rome: this proceeding compelled the ſenate to approve all the acts of Caeſar, and then by a faculty of reconciling extremes, they granted a general amneſty to the

conſpirators, which produced a falſe appearance of peace.

Caeſar, a little before his death, whilſt he was preparing for his expedition againſt the Parthians, had appointed magiſtrates for ſeveral years, that he might ſecure himſelf a ſet of men who, in his abſence, would maintain the tranquillity of his government; ſo that, after his death, the party who had eſpouſed his intereſt were in a condition to ſupport themſelves for a conſiderable time.

As the ſenate had ratified all the acts of Caeſar without any reſtriction, and as the conſuls were intruſted with the execution of them, Antony, who was then one of thoſe magiſtrates, got poſſeſſion of Caeſar's book of accompts, gained upon his ſecretary, and made him inſert, in that book, all the articles he thought proper, by which means the dictator reigned more imperiouſly than when he was living; for what he could never have accompliſhed, Antony had the dexterity to effect; great ſums of money, which Caeſar would never have beſtowed, were diſtributed among the people by Antony, and every man, who had any ſeditious deſigns againſt the government, were ſure to find a ſudden gratuity in Caeſar's books.

It unfortunately happened that Caeſar, to make his expedition effectual, had amaſſed prodigious ſums, and depoſited them in the temple of Ops; Antony diſpoſed of theſe as he thought fit, by the expedient of his book.

The conſpirators had, at firſt, determined to caſt the body of Caeſar into the Tyber, (*a*) and might

(*a*) That action would not have been unprecedented; for when Tiberius Gracchus was ſlain, Lucretius the edile, who was

have executed that design without any interruption; for in those seasons of astonishment which succeed unexpected events, every intention becomes practicable: this however did not take effect, and we shall now relate what happened on that occasion.

The senate thought themselves under a necessity of permitting Caesar's funeral obsequies to be performed; and indeed they could not decently forbid them, as they had never declared him a tyrant. Now the Romans, in conformity to a custom established among them, and much boasted of by Polybius, always carried in their funeral processions, the images which represented the ancestors of the deceased, and made an oration over the body. Antony, who charged himself with this last province, unfolded the bloody robe of Caesar to the view of all the people, read to them the particulars of his will, in which he had left them extraordinary legacies, and then wrought them into such violent emotions, that they immediately fired the houses of the conspirators.

Cicero, who governed the senate in this whole affair (*a*), makes no scruple to acknowlege that it would have been much better to have proceeded with vigour, and even to have exposed themselves to destruction, though indeed it was not probable that such a fate would have attended them; but he alleges for his excuse, that as the senate was then assembled, they had no opportunity in their favour; and he adds, that those who are sensible of the importance even of a moment, in affairs wherein the

afterwards called Vespillo, threw his body into the Tyber. *Aurel. Victor. de Viris illust.*

(*a*) Letters to Atticus, lib. xiv. c. 6.

people have so considerable a part, will not be surprized at his conduct in that transaction.

Another accident happened at this time: when the people were celebrating funeral games in honour of Caesar, a comet with long flaming hair appeared for the space of seven days, which made them believe the soul of Caesar was received into heaven.

It was very customary for the people of Greece and Asia, to erect temples (*a*) to the kings and even the proconsuls who had governed them; and they were indulged in this practice, because it was the greatest evidence they could possibly give of their abject servitude. Nay the Romans themselves might, in their private temples where their Lares were deposited, render divine honours to their ancestors; but I cannot remember, that from the time of Romulus to Julius Caesar, any Roman (*b*) was ever ranked among the gods of the republic.

The government of Macedonia was assigned to Antony, but he was desirous of changing it for that of Gaul, and the motives which so induced him are very evident; Decimus Brutus, who governed Cisalpine Gaul, having refused to resign that province to Antony, he was resolved to deprive him of it by force. This produced a civil war, in which the senate declared Antony an enemy to his country.

Cicero, to accomplish the destruction of Antony his mortal enemy, was so injudicious as to employ

(*a*) See more on this subject, in the letters of Cicero to Atticus, l. v. and the remark of the Abbe de Mongaut.

(*b*) Dion relates that the Trimviri, who all expected the same deification, took all imaginable care to enlarge the honours paid to Caesar.

all his intereſt for the promotion of Octavius, and inſtead of defacing the idea of one Caeſar in the minds of the people, he placed two before their eyes.

Octavius, in his conduct to Cicero, acted like a man who knew the world; he flattered, he praiſed, he conſulted him, and employed every engaging artifice, which vanity never diſtruſts.

Great affairs are frequently diſconcerted, becauſe thoſe who undertake them ſeldom confine their expectations to the principal event, but look after ſome little particular ſucceſs which ſoothes the indulgent opinion they entertain of themſelves.

I am inclined to think, that, if Cato had reſerved himſelf for the republic, he would have given a very different turn to affairs. Cicero had extraordinary abilities for the ſecond claſs, but was incapable of the firſt. His genius was fine, but his ſoul ſeldom ſoared above the vulgar. His characteriſtic was virtue; that of Cato glory (*a*). Cicero always beheld himſelf in the firſt rank; Cato never allowed his merit a place in his rememberance. This man would have preſerved the republic for his own ſake; the other, that he might have boaſted of the action.

I might carry on the parallel by adding, that when Cato foreſaw, Cicero was intimidated; and when the former hoped, the latter was confident: Cato beheld things through a ſerene medium; Cicero viewed them through a glare of little paſſions.

Antony was defeated at Modena, where the two

(*a*) Eſſe quam videri bonus malebat; itaque quo minus gloriam petebat, eo magis illam aſſequebatur. Salluſt. bell. Catil.

conſuls, Hirtius and Panſa, loſt their lives: the ſenate, who thought themſelves ſuperior to their tumultuous affairs, began to think of humbling Octavius, who now ceaſed his hoſtilities againſt Antony, marched his army to Rome, and cauſed himſelf to be declared conſul.

In this manner did Cicero, who boaſted that his robe had cruſhed the arms of Antony, introduce an enemy into the republic, the more formidable, becauſe his name was much dearer to the people, and his pretenſions, to all appearance, better founded (*a*).

Antony, after his overthrow, retired into Tranſalpine Gaul, where he was received by Lepidus. Theſe two men entered into an aſſociation with Octavius, and gave up to each other the lives of their friends and their enemies (*b*). Lepidus continued at Rome, whilſt the other two went in queſt of Brutus and Caſſius, and found them in thoſe parts where the empire of the world was thrice contended for in battle.

Brutus and Caſſius killed themſelves with a precipitation not to be vindicated; and it is impoſſible to read this period of their lives, without pitying the republic which was ſo abandoned. Cato cloſed the tragedy with his own murder; and theſe, in ſome meaſure, opened it with theirs.

Several reaſons may be aſſigned for this cuſtom of ſelf-deſtruction, which ſo generally prevailed among the Romans; the progreſs of Stoiciſm which

(*a*) He was Caeſar's heir, and his ſon by adoption.

(*b*) So inveterate was their cruelty, that they commanded every individual among the people to rejoice at the proſcriptions on pain of death. Dion.

encouraged it; the eſtabliſhment of triumphs and ſlavery, which induced ſeveral great men to believe they ought not to ſurvive a defeat; the advantages accruing to the accuſed, who put an end to life rather than ſubmit to a tribunal, which condemned their memory to infamy (*a*), and their goods to confiſcation; a point of honour, more rational, perhaps, than that which now prompts us to ſtab our friend for a geſture or an expreſſion; in a word, the convenience (*b*) of heroiſm, which gave every one the liberty of finiſhing his part on the ſtage of the world, in what ſcene he pleaſed.

We might add, the great facility of putting ſuch a principle in execution: the ſoul all attentive to the action ſhe is preparing to commit, to the motives which determine her reſolution, to the dangers ſhe avoids by it, does not properly behold death, becauſe paſſion makes itſelf felt, but always blinds the eyes.

Self-love, and a fondneſs for our preſervation, changes itſelf into ſo many ſhapes, and acts by ſuch contrary principles, that it leads us to ſacrifice our exiſtence for the very ſake of exiſtence; and ſuch is the eſtimate we make of ourſelves, that we conſent to die by a natural and obſcure ſort of inſtinct which makes us love ourſelves even more than our lives.

(*a*) Eorum qui de ſe ſtatuebant, humabantur corpora, manebant teſtamenta; pretium feſtinandi. Tac. An. vi.

(*b*) If Charles I. and James II. had been educated in a religion which would have permitted them to deſtroy themſelves, the one wou'd not have ſubmitted to ſuch a death, nor the other to ſuch a life.

CHAPTER XIII.

AUGUSTUS.

SEXTUS POMPEIUS poſſeſſed Sicily and Sardinia, was maſter at ſea, and ſaw himſelf at the head of a great multitude of fugitives, and perſons devoted to death by proſcriptions, whoſe laſt hopes depended on their valour. Octavius contended with him, in two very laborious wars; and after a variety of ill ſucceſs, vanquiſhed him by the abilities of Agrippa.

Moſt of the conſpirators ended their lives in a miſerable manner, and it was natural that perſons who headed a party, ſo frequently haraſſed by wars, in which no quarter was afforded, ſhould die a violent death. That event was however interpreted into a conſequence of divine vengeance, which puniſhed the murderers of Caeſar, and in its turn proſcribed their cauſe.

Octavius gained over the ſoldiers of Lepidus to his own intereſt, and diveſted him of his power in the triumvirate; he even envied him the conſolation of paſſing the remainder of his days in obſcurity, and compelled him to appear as a private man, in the aſſemblies of the people.

It is impoſſible for any one to be diſpleaſed at the humiliation of this Lepidus; he was the moſt depraved citizen in all the republic, a conſtant promoter of diſturbances, and one who perpetually formed fatal ſchemes, wherein he was obliged to aſſociate with people of more ability than himſelf. A modern author (*a*) has thought fit to be large in his

(*a*) The Abbe de St. Real.

commendation, and cites Antony, who, in one of his letters, repreſents him as an honeſt man. But he, who had that character from Antony, could not have much title to it from other perſons.

I believe Octavius is the only man, of all the Roman generals, who ever gained the affections of the ſoldiers, by giving them perpetual inſtances of a natural timidity of ſpirit. The ſoldiers, at that time, were more affected with the liberality of their commanders, than their valour; perhaps it was even fortunate for him, that he was not maſter of any qualities which could procure him the empire, and that his very incapacity ſhould be the cauſe of his promotion to it, ſince it made him the leſs dreaded. It is not impoſſible that the defects which threw the greateſt diſhonour on his character were the moſt propitious to his fortune. If he had diſcovered, at firſt, any traces of an exalted ſoul, all mankind would have been jealous of his abilities; and if he had been ſpirited by any true bravery, he would not have given Antony time to launch into all the extravagancies which proved his ruin.

When Antony was preparing to march againſt Octavius, he aſſured his ſoldiers, by a ſolemn oath, that he would reſtore the republic; which makes it evident, that even they were jealous of the liberty of their country, though they were the perpetual inſtruments of its deſtruction; for an army is the blindeſt and moſt inconſiderate ſet of people in the world.

The battle of Actium was fought, Cleopatra fled, and drew Antony after her. It evidently appeared by the circumſtances of her future conduct, that

ſhe afterwards betrayed him (*a*); perhaps that incomprehenſible ſpirit of coquetry, ſo predominant in her ſex, tempted her to practiſe all her arts to lay a third ſovereign of the world at her feet.

A woman, to whom Antony had ſacrificed the whole world, betrayed him; many captains and kings, whom he had raiſed or made, failed him; and, as if generoſity were connected with ſervitude, a company of gladiators remained heroically faithful to him. Load a man with benefits, the firſt idea you inſpire him with is to find ways to preſerve them; they are new intereſts which you give him to defend.

The moſt ſurprizing circumſtance in thoſe wars is, that one battle ſhould generally decide the difference, and that one defeat ſhould be irreparable.

The Roman ſoldiers were not, properly, under the prevalence of any party ſpirit; they did not fight for any particular acquiſition, but for ſome particular perſon; they only knew their commander, who engaged their ſervice by prodigious hopes; but when he was once defeated, and conſequently no longer in a condition to accompliſh his promiſes, they immediately revolted to the other ſide. The provinces did not embark in the quarrel, with any greater ſincerity, for it was of little conſequence to them, whether the ſenate or the people prevailed; and therefore, when one of the generals loſt the day, they declared for the other; for every city was obliged to juſtify itſelf before the conqueror, who having engaged himſelf to the ſoldiery, by immenſe promiſes, was conſtrained to ſacrifice, to their avidity, thoſe countries which were moſt obnoxious.

(*a*) Dion. l. li.

We have been afflicted, in France, with two ſorts of civil war; one had religion for its pretext, and was of long duration, becauſe the motive which firſt enflamed it continued to ſubſiſt after victory; the other could not properly be ſaid to have any motive, but was rather kindled by the caprice or ambition of ſome great men, and was ſoon extinguiſhed.

Auguſtus (for that was the name offered by flattery to Octavius) was careful to eſtabliſh order, or rather a durable ſervitude; for when once the ſovereignty has been uſurped in a free ſtate, every tranſaction, on which an unlimited authority can be founded, is called a regulation; and all inſtances of diſorder, commotion, and bad government, are repreſented as the only expedients to preſerve the juſt liberty of the ſubject.

All the Roman citizens, who were ever actuated by ambitious views, have attempted to introduce a kind of anarchy in the republic; and Pompey, Craſſus, and Caeſar, ſucceeded to a miracle. They authorized an impunity for all public crimes, and aboliſhed every inſtitution calculated to prevent the corruption of manners, and every regulation accommodated to the beſt politics; and as good legiſlators endeavour to improve their fellow citizens, theſe, on the contrary, were indefatigable to lead them into a degeneracy from every virtue. With this view they gave a ſanction to the pernicious cuſtom of corrupting the people by money, and when any perſons were accuſed of undue practices for obtaining places of truſt, the delinquents corrupted the judges who were to decide the cauſe. They interrupted the elections by every violent

proceeding, and even intimidated the tribunal itself. The authority of the people was reduced to annihilation; witneſs Gabinus, (*a*) who, after he had reinſtated Ptolemy by force of arms, on his throne, contrary to the inclinations of the people, very coldly demanded a triumph.

Theſe leading men, in the republic, endeavoured to make the people diſguſted at their own power, and to become neceſſary themſelves, by rendering the inconveniences of a republican government as diſagreeable as poſſible. But when Auguſtus had eſtabliſhed himſelf in the ſupremacy, his polities were employed to reſtore order, that the people might be ſenſible of the happineſs of being ruled by one man.

When Auguſtus was at the head of an armed power, he dreaded the revolt of his ſoldiers and not the conſpiracies of the citizens; for which reaſon he laviſhed all his careſſes on the former, and was altogether inhuman to the latter: but when his arms had accompliſhed a peace, he was apprehenſive of conſpiracies, and the idea of Caeſar's untimely death being always preſent to his remembrance, he reſolved to vary from his conduct that he might avoid his fate. We ſhall now give the reader a complete key to the whole life of Auguſtus: he wore a coat of mail, under his robe, in the ſenate-houſe; he refuſed the title of dictator; and whereas Caeſar inſolently affirmed the republic to be nothing, and that his word alone were the laws, Auguſtus was perpetually expatiating on the dignity of

(*a*) Caeſar made war with the Gauls, and Craſſus with the Parthians, without any previous deliberation of the ſenate, or any decree of the people. Dion.

the ſenate and his veneration for the republic. He was ſolicitous therefore to eſtabliſh ſuch a form of government as ſhould be moſt ſatisfactory, without incommoding his particular intereſt, and changing it into an ariſtocracy with relation to the civil, and into a monarchy with reſpect to the military adminiſtration; rendering it, by theſe means, an ambiguous ſyſtem of government, which, being unſupported by its own power, could ſubſiſt no longer than the ſovereign pleaſed, and conſequently was a monarchy in all its circumſtances.

A queſtion has been ſtarted, whether Auguſtus had a real inclination to diveſt himſelf of the empire. But is it not apparent, that, had he been in earneſt, he might eaſily have effected his deſign? but his whole proceeding, in that affair, was a mere artifice; becauſe, though he expreſſed a deſire every ten years, to be eaſed of the mighty load that encumbered him, yet he always thought fit to bear it. Theſe were little refinements of low cunning, calculated to induce the people to give him what, in his opinion, he had not ſufficiently acquired. I form my thoughts in this particular, by the whole life of Auguſtus; and though mankind are frequently fanciful and inconſiſtent, they are ſeldom known to renounce, in one moment, any enjoyment that has engaged the attention of all their life. Every action of Auguſtus, and each of his various regulations, viſibly tended to the eſtabliſhment of monarchy. Sylla reſigned the dictatorſhip, but amidſt all his violent proceedings, a republican ſpirit is apparent in every part of his conduct; all his regulations, though executed with a tyrannical air, had an aſpect to ſome certain form of a common-

wealth. Sylla, who was a man of an impetuous temper, precipitated the Romans into liberty. Auguſtus, who was a ſmooth and ſubtile tyrant (*a*), led them gently into ſlavery. When the republic regained its power, under Sylla, all the people exclaimed againſt tyranny; and whilſt this became fortified, under Auguſtus, liberty was the general boaſt.

The cuſtom of triumphs, which had ſo much contributed to the greatneſs of Rome, was aboliſhed by Auguſtus, or more properly, this honour became the prerogative of ſovereignty (*b*). The greateſt part of thoſe cuſtoms, which prevailed under the emperors, derived their origin from the republic (*c*); and it will be proper to bring them together, that the ſimilitude may be more apparent. That perſon alone, under whoſe auſpices a war had been conducted, was intitled to demand a triumph (*d*): now wars

(*a*) I uſe this word in the ſenſe of the Greeks and Romans, who gave this name to all thoſe who had ſubverted a democracy; for in all other particulars, Auguſtus was a lawful prince, after the law enacted by the people: lege regia, quae de ejus imperio lata eſt, populus ei et in eum omne imperium tranſtulit. Inſtit. lib. i.

(*b*) Triumphal ornaments were all the honours now granted to any particular general. Dion. in Aug.

(*c*) The Romans having changed their government, without ſuſtaining any invaſion from an enemy, the ſame cuſtoms continued as were practiſed before the alteration of the government, the form of which ſtill remained, though the eſſentials were deſtroyed.

(*d*) Dion. in Aug. l. 54. acquaints us that Agrippa neglected, out of modeſty, to give the ſenate an account of his expedition againſt the people of the Boſphorus, and even refuſed a triumph; ſince which time, it was not granted to any perſon of his claſs; but it was a favour Auguſtus intended to afford Agrippa, though

were always carried on under the auſpices of the generaliſſimo, and conſequently of the emperor, who was the generaliſſimo of all the forces.

As conſtant war was the reigning principle of the republic, the maxim under the emperors was altogether pacific. Victories were conſidered as ſo many opportunities of introducing diſorder by armies, who might fix too great a valuation on their ſervices. Thoſe who were advanced to any command were apprehenſive of engaging in enterprizes of too great importance; they found it neceſſary to aim at glory with moderation, and were to engage the emperor's notice, and not raiſe his jealouſy; in a word, they were not to appear before him with a luſtre, which his eyes could not bear.

Auguſtus was very cautious (*a*) of inveſting any one with the rights of a Roman citizen; he made laws (*b*) to prevent the enfranchiſement of too many ſlaves (*c*), and by his will recommended the obſervation of theſe two maxims, with a diſſuaſive againſt extending the empire by new wars.

Theſe three particulars were very well connected; for when all war was diſcontinued, there was no need either of new citizens or enfranchiſements.

When Rome was in a conſtant ſtate of war, ſhe was under a perpetual neceſſity of recruiting her inhabitants. At the beginning, part of the people were tranſplanted thither from the conquered cities, and in proceſs of time ſeveral citizens of the neigh-

Antony would not allow it to Ventidius, the firſt time he conquered the Parthians.

(*a*) Sueton. in Auguſt.

(*b*) Juſtin. Inſtitut. l. i. et Suet. in Aug.

(*c*) Dion in Aug.

bouring towns came to Rome to obtain a ſhare in the rights of ſuffrage, and eſtabliſhed themſelves there in ſuch numbers, that upon the complaints of the allies, the Romans were obliged to remand them back. Multitudes at laſt arrived from the provinces; the laws favoured marriages, and even rendered them neceſſary. Rome, in all her wars, gained a prodigious number of ſlaves, and when the riches of the citizens became immenſe, they bought theſe unhappy people from all parts, and, from a principle of generoſity, avarice or ambition, enfranchiſed them without number (*a*). Some intended by this proceeding to reward the fidelity of their ſlaves, others had a view by it to receive, in their name, the corn which the republic diſtributed among the poor citizens. In a word, others deſired to have their funeral ſolemnity graced with a long train of attendance crowned with flowers. The people were generally compoſed of perſons who had received their freedom, ſo that the lords of the univerſe, not only in their original, but through the greateſt part of ſucceeding times, were of ſervile extraction.

The number of the populace being chiefly collected out of ſlaves, who had been enfranchiſed, or the ſons of ſuch, became very incommodious, and were therefore tranſplanted in colonies; by which means the ſtate effectually ſecured the obedience of the provinces. There was a general circulation of mankind, through the world. Rome received them in the ſtate of ſlaves, and ſent them away Romans.

Auguſtus, under the pretence of ſome tumults in the elections, placed a garriſon and a governor

(*a*) Dionyſ. Halicarnaſſ. l. iv.

in the city, made the legions perpetual, ſtationed them upon the frontiers, and eſtabliſhed particular funds for their pay. To which we may add, that he gave orders for the veterans to receive their donations in money (*a*), and not in lands.

Many unhappy conſequences reſulted from the diſtribution of land after the time of Sylla. The citizens property in their eſtates grew precarious, and if all the ſoldiers of one cohort were not ſettled in the ſame place, they became diſſatisfied with their allotments, neglected the cultivation of their lands, and degenerated into dangerous citizens: but if they were diſtributed in entire legions, the ambitious could raiſe armies againſt the republic in a moment.

Auguſtus likewiſe eſtabliſhed fixed proviſions for the naval power, which was never done before his time; for as the Romans were maſters of the Mediterranean, and as all navigation was then confined to that ſea, they had not any enemy to fear.

Dion obſerves, very judiciouſly, that after the emperors had aſſumed the ſovereign power, it became very difficult to write the hiſtory of thoſe times. All tranſactions were induſtriouſly concealed, the diſpatches from the provinces were tranſmitted to the cabinets of the emperors, and we know little more than what either the folly or raſhneſs of tyrants divulged, or ſuch events as fall within the conjectures of hiſtorians.

(*a*) He ordered that the Praetorian ſoldiers ſhould have five thouſand drachmas a piece after ſixteen years ſervice, and the others three thouſand drachmas after twenty years. Dion. in Aug.

CHAPTER XIV.

TIBERIUS.

AS a river, ſometimes, with a ſlow and ſilent progreſs, undermines the banks that have been thrown up to reſtrain its current, and at laſt overwhelms them in a moment, and ſheds an inundation over the fields they formerly preſerved; in the ſame manner, the ſupreme authority, which gained an inſenſible growth under Auguſtus, bore down all before it in the ſucceeding reign of Tiberius.

A law at that time ſubſiſted, which made it treaſon to form any injurious attempt againſt the majeſty of the people: Tiberius aſſumed to himſelf the interpretation and enforcement of this law, and extended it not only to the caſes for which it was originally calculated, but to every conjuncture that could poſſibly be favourable to his hatred or ſuſpicions. And now, not only actions, but words and ſigns, and even thoughts were adjudged by this ſtandard; for thoſe expreſſions which drop from the overflowing of the heart, in the converſation of intimate friends, are always ſuppoſed to be their real ſentiments. All freedom was therefore baniſhed from their feaſts, diffidence reigned among relations, there was no fidelity among the ſlaves: the gloomy diſpoſition and inſincerity of the prince were diffuſed through all ranks of men; friendſhip had the diſrepute of a dangerous quickſand; a fine genius paſſed for a ſhining indiſcretion, and virtue itſelf was only conſidered as an affectation, which

officiously reminded the people of their lost happiness.

No tyranny can have a severer effect than that which is exercised under the appearance of laws, and with the plausible colours of justice; when the executors of cruel power would, if we may use the expression, drown the unhappy wretches on the very plank that before saved them amidst the troubled waves.

As a tyrant is never destitute of instruments to accomplish his designs, so Tiberius always found the senate tractable enough to condemn (*a*) as many persons as he could possibly suspect; and this venerable body sunk at last into a degeneracy too low to be described. The senators even courted servitude, to gain the favour of Sejanus; and the most illustrious among them abandoned themselves to the dishonourable profession of informers.

It seems easy to discover several causes of that slavish disposition, which then prevailed in the senate. When Caesar had entirely crushed the party who declared for the republic, all the friends, as well as enemies he then had in the senate, concurred with equal unanimity, to remove the bounds with which the laws had limited his power, and at the same time they agreed to render him unparalleled honours; some came into these compliances with a view to please him, others intended by such means to make him odious. Dion informs us, that some even proposed that he might have the liberty to enjoy as ma-

(*a*) Before the time of the emperors, the senate confined their attention to public affairs, and never decided the causes of private persons in a full body.

ny women as he ſhould deſire. This obſequious conduct freed him from all ſuſpicions of the ſenate, and conſequently was the cauſe of his aſſaſſination; but then it prevented, in the ſucceeding reigns, all flattery from riſing to ſuch wild and unexampled heights as might have created diſſaffection in the minds of the people.

Before Rome ſubmitted to the dominion of one man, the riches of the nobility, in what manner ſoever acquired, were certainly immenſe, but thoſe grandees were diveſted of the greateſt part of their treaſures by the emperors (*a*). The ſenators were no longer reſorted to by thoſe great and wealthy clients, who were the ſources of their patrons affluence. The provinces produced nothing conſiderable, except for Caeſar; and eſpecially when they were under the government of his praefects, whoſe office had ſome reſemblance to that of the intendants in France. However, though the fountain from whence all this opulence flowed was at laſt exhauſted, the expences were continued in their former profuſion, and the track being once marked out, the men of rank could only purſue it now, by the emperor's favour.

Auguſtus had deprived the people of their legiſlative capacity, and aboliſhed all their juriſdiction with reſpect to public offences, but he ſtill left them the power of electing magiſtrates. Tiberius, who dreaded the aſſemblies of a people ſo numerous, diveſted them even of this privilege, and transferred

(*a*) The great men were impoveriſhed even in the time of Auguſtus, and no longer ſolicited for the office of aedile or tribune of the people, and many of them had not any inclination to have a ſeat among the ſenators.

it to the ſenate (*a*), or rather to himſelf. Now it is impoſſible to conceive the abject lowneſs to which the declenſion of the people's power ſunk the ſpirits of the grandees: when dignities were in the diſpoſal of the populace, the magiſtrates, who ſollicited their intereſt, practiſed a number of mean condeſcenſions; but theſe were intermixed with a certain magnificence that in ſome meaſure concealed them: for inſtance, they exhibited pompous games and recreations, they diſtributed ſums of money, and quantities of corn among the people, and ſometimes regaled them with ſplendid feaſts. But though the motive was low, the manner ſeemed auguſt, becauſe it always comports with a great man to obtain the favour of the people by liberality; but when that people had nothing to beſtow, and the prince, in the name of the ſenate, diſpoſed of all employments, they were deſired as well as obtained in a diſhonourable manner, and could only be compaſſed by adulation, infamy, and a hateful train of crimes, that were made neceſſary arts by the iniquity of the age.

It does not indeed appear that Tiberius had any intention to make the ſenate contemptible, and he complained of nothing ſo much, as the propenſity of that body to ſlavery. His life was filled with diſſatisfaction on that account, but he reſembled the generality of mankind, and was fond of contradictory enjoyments. His general politics were inconſiſtent with his particular paſſions; he would willingly have ſeen a free ſenate, who by their con-

(*a*) Tacit. Annal. l. i. Dion. l. liv. They were afterwards re-eſtabliſhed, and then diſannulled by Caligula.

duct might have created a veneration for his government; but then he was alſo deſirous of a ſenate who would every moment be tractable to his fears, his jealouſies, and his averſions. In a word, the politician was perpetually ſubordinate to the man.

We have already intimated, that the people had formerly obtained from the patricians the privilege of electing, from their own body, a ſet of magiſtrates, who were to protect them from the inſults and injuſtice that might be intended againſt them; and, in order to capacitate thoſe magiſtrates for the exerciſe of ſuch a power, their perſons were declared ſacred and inviolable, and whoever ſhould preſume to treat a tribune injuriouſly, either by actions or language, was condemned by the law to ſuffer death on the ſpot. Now when the emperors were inveſted with the tribunitial power, they obtained the ſame prerogatives, and it was upon this principle that ſuch a number of people were deprived of their lives: from this ſource flowed the impunity with which informers flouriſhed in their profeſſion; and hence it was, that the accuſation of treaſon, that crime, ſays Pliny, which was charged on thoſe to whom no real offence could be imputed, was at laſt extended to any one whom the wantonneſs of tyranny pointed out.

I am inclinable however to believe, that ſome of thoſe titles of accuſation were not ſo ridiculous as they appear at preſent, and can never be perſuaded that Tiberius would have cauſed a man to be accuſed for ſelling to one, who bought his houſe, a ſtatue of the emperor; that Domitian ſhould condemn a woman to die for undreſſing herſelf before his image; or that he ſhould proceed with the ſame ſe-

verity againſt a citizen of Rome, for cauſing a deſcription of all the earth to be delineated on the walls of his apartment; if ſuch actions as theſe had not called up an idea in the minds of the Romans very different from that they now excite in us. For my part I am of opinion, that as Rome had changed the form of its government, thoſe actions which now appear inconſiderable to us, might, when they were committed, have a very different aſpect; and I judge in this manner, from my reflection on what is now cuſtomary in a nation which cannot with any juſtice be ſuſpected of tyranny, and yet it is a capital crime there to drink to the health of a certain perſon.

I cannot omit any circumſtance which tends to give a clear repreſentation of the Roman genius. That people were ſo habituated to obedience, and ſo conſtantly placed their happineſs in homaging their maſters, that after the death of Germanicus, they were affected with ſuch inconſolable ſorrow and deſpair, as never appears in our contemporaries. The deſcriptions given by hiſtorians (*a*) of a deſolation, ſo public, ſo univerſal and immoderate, deſerve a reader's curioſity; and it is certain, that this ſcene of grief was not affected, ſince a whole people are never known to practiſe ſo much flattery and diſſimulation.

The Romans, who had now no longer any ſhare in the government, and were chiefly compoſed of perſons who had received their freedom, or ſuch indolent and uninduſtrious people who lived at the expence of the public treaſure, were now ſenſible of nothing but their imbecillity, and afflicted them-

(*a*) See Tacitus.

ſelves like children or women, who from a principle of weakneſs abandon themſelves to ſorrow. Theſe people were politically indiſpoſed, they placed all their fears and hopes in the perſon of Germanicus, and when he was ſnatched from them by an untimely death, they ſunk into deſpair.

No people are ſo apprehenſive of calamity as thoſe whom the miſery of their condition ſhould rather diſcharge from all fear, and who ought to ſay with Andromache, *Would to heaven I had any enjoyment I could dread to loſe!* there are at this day, in Naples, fifty thouſand men, who have no food but herbs, and whoſe whole clothing conſiſts of a few miſerable rags; and yet theſe people, who are the moſt wretched creatures upon earth, diſcover a dreadful conſternation at the leaſt irruption of Veſuvius, and are ſo infatuated as to fear they ſhall be miſerable.

CHAPTER XV.

Remarks on the Emperors from Caius Caligula *to* Antoninus.

CALIGULA ſucceeded Tiberius, and it was ſaid of him, that there never was a better ſlave, nor a worſe maſter: and indeed theſe two circumſtances are very conſiſtent; for the ſame turn of mind, which inclines a perſon to be ſtrongly affected at unlimited power in his ſovereign, makes him to be no leſs in love with it, when he riſes to empire himſelf.

Caligula reſtored the aſſemblies of the people, which Tiberius had prohibited; and aboliſhed the

arbitrary law and conſtructions of treaſon eſtabliſhed by that emperor: from which proceeding we may obſerve, that the beginnings of a bad reign ſometimes reſemble the concluſion of a good one; for a wicked prince may, from a principle of contradiction to the motives of his predeceſſor's conduct, be ſpirited to actions which the other performed from a virtuous inducement; and we owe to this very principle a number of good as well as bad regulations.

But what did the Romans gain by theſe plauſible beginnings? Caligula diſannulled the law which conſtituted the circumſtantials of treaſon, but then he deſtroyed thoſe who diſpleaſed him, by a military ſeverity; and his vengeance, inſtead of pointing at ſome particular ſenators, hung over all their heads, like a ſword that threatened them with extermination at one blow.

This formidable tyranny of the emperors aroſe from the diſpoſition of the Romans in general; who, as they were ſuddenly enſlaved to an arbitrary government, and were hardly ſenſible of any interval between dominion and ſubjection, were not prepared for ſuch a tranſition by any gentle ſoftenings. The fierce and untractable diſpoſition ſtill remained, and the citizens were uſed in the ſame manner they themſelves had treated their conquered enemies, and were governed altogether upon the ſame plan. When Sylla made his public enterance into Rome, he was ſtill the Sylla who had done the ſame in Athens, and he governed with an uniform imperiouſneſs. As to us who are natives of France, and have ſunk into ſubjection, by inſenſible degrees, if we are

deſtitute of laws, we are at leaſt governed by engaging manners.

The conſtant view of the combats of gladiators inſpired the Romans with extraordinary fierceneſs; and it was obſervable that Claudius became more diſpoſed to ſhed blood, by being habituated to thoſe ſpectacles. The example of this emperor, who was naturally of a gentle diſpoſition, and yet degenerated into ſo much cruelty at laſt, makes it evident, that the education in thoſe times was very different from our own.

The Romans, being accuſtomed to tyrannize over human nature, (*a*) in the perſons of their children and ſlaves, had a very imperfect idea of that virtue we diſtinguiſh by the name of humanity. Whence proceeds the ſavage caſt of mind ſo remarkable in the inhabitants of our colonies, but from their conſtant ſeverity to an unfortunate claſs of mankind? when barbarity prevails in civil government, what natural juſtice or harmony of manners can be expected from the individuals?

We are fatigued and ſatiated with ſeeing in the hiſtory of the emperors ſuch an infinite number of people whom they deſtroyed for no other end than to confiſcate their goods: our modern accounts furniſh us with no ſuch inſtances of inhumanity. This difference, as we have already intimated, is to be aſcribed to the milder caſt of our manners, and the civilizing reſtraints of a more amiable religion. We may likewiſe add, that we have no opportunity of pillaging the families of ſenators who have ravaged the world, and we derive this advantage from the

(*a*) See the inſtitutes of Juſtinian, where they treat of the power of parents and maſters.

mediocrity of our fortunes, which are conſequently in a ſafer ſituation. In a word, we are not conſiderable enough to be plundered (*a*).

That claſs of the Roman people who were called Plebeians had no averſion to the worſt of their emperors; for ſince they had no longer any ſhare of empire themſelves, nor were any more employed in wars, they became the moſt contemptible and degenerate people in the world; they looked upon commerce and the ſciences as only proper for ſlaves, and the diſtributions of corn which they received made them neglect the cultivation of their lands: they had been familiarized to public games and ſplendid ſpectacles, and ſince they had no longer any tribunes to obey, or magiſtrates to elect, thoſe gratifications, which they were only permitted to enjoy, became neceſſary to them, and their indolence and inactivity ſtimulated their reliſh of thoſe indulgencies.

Caligula, Nero, Commodus, Caracalla, were lamented by the people for their very folly; for whatever theſe loved, the others were as madly fond of, in their turn, and not only contributed their whole power, but even devoted their own perſons to thoſe pleaſures; they laviſhed all the riches of the empire with the greateſt prodigality, and when theſe were exhauſted, the people, without the leaſt emotion, beheld all the great families pillaged. They enjoyed the fruits of tyranny without the leaſt intermixture of uneaſineſs, becauſe their low obſcurity was

(*a*) The duke of Braganza had an immenſe eſtate in Portugal; and when he firſt revolted, the king of Spain was congratulated by his nobility, for the rich confiſcation he was to derive from that event.

their protection. Such princes have a natural antipathy to people of merit and virtue, because they are sensible their actions are disapproved by such persons. The contradiction (*a*) and even the silence of an austere citizen were insupportable to them; and as they grew intoxicated with popular applause, they at last imagined their government constituted the public felicity, and consequently that it could be censured by none but disaffected and ill-disposed persons.

When an emperor at any time discovered his strength and activity, as when Commodus (*b*) for instance, in the presence of a vast assembly of the people, slew several wild beasts with a facility peculiar to him, he naturally raised the admiration of the soldiers as well as the populace, because strength, and pliancy of limbs, were at that time considered as necessary qualifications in the military art.

We have no longer a just idea of bodily exercises, and a man who practises them with any ex-

(*a*) As the antient austerity of manners could not suffer the licentiousness of theatrical representations, the minds of virtuous men continued to be filled with contempt for those who exercised that profession.

(*b*) Though the gladiators were selected from the dregs of the people, and followed the most infamous profession that was ever tolerated; for none but slaves or malefactors were compelled to devote themselves to death in combats at the funerals of the grandees; yet the fondness of the people for these exercises which had such a resemblance to those of war, became so immoderate, that we cannot help calling it a species of madness. Emperors, senators, men of distinguished birth, and even women appeared upon the arena in the amphitheatre; nec virorum modo pugnas, sed et foeminarum, says Suetonius in the life of Domitian. The Romans were as much delighted too with wrestlers.

traordinary application, appears contemptible in our opinion, becauſe the generality of theſe exerciſes produce nothing more than a little exterior agreeableneſs; whereas among the ancients, all their exerciſes, even dancing itſelf, became incorporated into their martial diſcipline.

We may likewiſe add, that, even among us, an affected maſterſhip, in the weapons we employ in war, is conſidered as a ridiculous attainment, becauſe, ſince the cuſtom of duelling became ſo prevailing, fencing has been treated as the ſcience of boiſterous wranglers or bullies.

Thoſe who cenſure Homer, for his uſual manner of celebrating the ſtrength or activity of his Heroes, muſt likewiſe think Salluſt (*a*) very ridiculous, when he praiſes Pompey, for running, leaping, and carrying a burden better than any other man.

Caligula was a true ſophiſt in cruelty, for as he equally deſcended from Antony and Auguſtus, he declared he would puniſh the conſuls if they celebrated the day appointed to commemorate the victory at Actium, and that they ſhould likewiſe feel his ſeverity if they neglected to honour that event; and Druſilla to whom he accorded divine honours, being dead, it was a crime to bewail her becauſe ſhe was a goddeſs, and as great an offence to forbear that ſorrow becauſe ſhe was his ſiſter.

We have now aſcended an eminence from whence we may take a view of human affairs; when we trace in the Roman hiſtory, ſuch a variety of wars, and their prodigal effuſion of human blood; when

(*a*) Cum alacribus ſaltu, cum velocibus curſu, cum validis recte certabat. Fragm. of Salluſt cited by Vegetius l. i. c. 10.

we view so many once flourishing nations depopulated, and see such a diversity of shining actions and triumphant processions; when we trace the masterly strokes of politics, sagacity, and fortitude, so conspicuous in that people, and reflect on their advances to universal monarchy by schemes so judiciously concerted, so successfully supported, and so happily accomplished; to what view are all these mighty preparations directed? why truly to satiate the ambition of five or six monsters! is it possible then, that the senate could divest so many kings of their power, only to plunge themselves into the most abject slavery to one of their unworthy citizens, and to exterminate itself by its own edicts? did it rise to such a height of grandeur, to drop more splendidly into ruin, and do the sons of men only labour to augment their power, that they may fall, by their own combinations, into better hands!

When Caligula was assassinated, the senate assembled to form a new model of government, and, whilst they were engaged in such deliberations, a party of soldiers rushed in to plunder the palace, and found, in some obscure place, a man trembling with fear; this man was Claudius, and they immediately saluted him emperor.

Claudius completed the subversion of the ancient form of government, by intrusting the dispensation of justice to his officers: the principal motive to the wars of Marius and Sylla, was to determine the competition of the senators and the equestrian (*a*) order for this prerogative, and it was now wrested from both parties by the arbitrary fan-

(*a*) See Tacitus.

cy of a weak man. Surprizing event, indeed, of a diſpute which had ſet the world in flames!

When the reign of a prince ſucceeds the diſſolution of a republic, no authority can be more abſolute than his own, for he then poſſeſſes all that power which before was diſtributed among the people, who exerciſed it without any limitations; and for this reaſon the kings of Denmark are the moſt deſpotic ſovereigns in Europe.

The people were altogether as abject and unmanly as the ſenate, though they once were animated with ſuch a martial ſpirit, that, when armies were levied in the city, before the time of the emperors, they gained the military diſcipline upon the ſpot, and immediately marched to the enemy. In the civil wars of Vitellius and Veſpaſian, Rome became a prey to the ambitious, and was full of timorous citizens, who were ſtruck with conſternation by any party of ſoldiers, who could firſt approach them.

The emperors themſelves were in no better a ſituation; for as the right of electing a ſovereign was not appropriated to any ſingle army, it generally happened, that, when an emperor was choſen by one body of ſoldiers, that circumſtance alone was ſufficient to diſcredit him with the others, who immediately ſet up a competitor to oppoſe him.

As the grandeur therefore of the republic proved fatal to that form of government, ſo the mighty extent of the empire was altogether as pernicious to the monarchs. If the territories they were to defend had been confined to moderate limits, thoſe ſovereigns might have been effectually ſerved by

one principal army; and the ſoldiers, when they had once elected their emperors, would have been dutiful enough to acquieſce in their choice.

The ſoldiers were attached to the family of Caeſar, under which they enjoyed every advantage that a revolution would have procured them. The time came, that the great families of Rome were all exterminated by that of Caeſar, which itſelf became extinct in the perſon of Nero. The civil power, which had been continually depreſſed, was unable to balance the military; each army wanted to make an emperor.

Let us here compare the times: when Tiberius began his reign, wherein did he not employ the ſenate (*a*)? he was informed that the armies of Illyrium and Germany had mutinied: he granted ſome of their demands, and maintained, that it belonged to the (*b*) ſenate to judge of the reſt. He ſent to them deputies of that body. Thoſe, who have ceaſed to fear the power, may ſtill reſpect the authority. When it had been repreſented to the ſoldiers, that in a Roman army the children of the emperors, and the deputies of the ſenate, ran the riſk of (*c*) their lives, they might relent; and even proceed ſo far as to puniſh (*d*) themſelves: but when the ſenate was entirely depreſſed, its example moved no one. In vain did (*e*) Otho harangue his ſoldiers, to

(*a*) Tacitus Annal. Lib. i.

(*b*) Caetera ſenatui ſervanda. Ibid.

(*c*) See the oration of Germanicus. Ibid.

(*d*) Gaudebat caedibus miles, quaſi ſemet abſolveret: Tacitus, ibid. The privileges which had been extorted, were afterwards revoked. Tacitus, ibid.

(*e*) Tacitus, Lib. i.

talk to them of the dignity of the ſenate: in vain did (*a*) Vitellius ſend the principal ſenators to make his peace with Veſpaſian: they did not, for one moment, pay to the orders of the ſtate that reſpect which they had ſo long loſt. The armies looked on theſe deputies as the moſt abject ſlaves of a maſter whom they had already rejected.

It was an ancient cuſtom at Rome, for thoſe who obtained a triumph, to diſtribute ſome money to each ſoldier: it was not much (*b*). In the time of the civil wars theſe gratuities were augmented (*c*). Formerly they were made with the money taken from the enemy; in theſe unhappy times, they gave that of the citizens, and the ſoldiers would have a ſhare where there was no booty: Theſe diſtributions had taken place only after a war; Nero made them in a time of peace: the ſoldiers were uſed to them, and they raged againſt Galba, who boldly told them, that he knew to chooſe, but not to buy them.

Galba, Otho, and Vitellius, (*d*) made a very tranſient appearance in the imperial ſcene. Veſpaſian, who, like them, was elected by the army, devoted

(*a*) Idem. Lib. iii.

(*b*) See in Livy the ſums diſtributed in the ſeveral triumphs. It was the humour of the generals to carry a great deal of money into the public treaſury, and give but little to the ſoldiers.

(*c*) Paulus Æmilius, at a time, when the greatneſs of the conqueſts had occaſioned theſe liberalities to be augmented, gave only one hundred denarii to each private man; but Caeſar gave two thouſand, and his example was followed by Antony and Octavius, by Brutus and Caſſius. See Dio and Appian.

(*d*) Suſcipere duo manipulares imperium populi Romani transferendum, et tranſtulerunt, Tacit. l. i.

all his reign to the re-eſtabliſhment of the empire, which had been ſucceſſively poſſeſſed by ſix tyrants, all equally cruel, and moſt of them exceedingly furious and untractable, generally very weak, and, to complete the public calamity, profuſe even to infatuation.

Titus, who ſucceeded his father, was the darling of the people; but Domitian preſented to their view an uncommon monſter, more inhuman in his diſpoſition, or at leaſt more implacable, than any of his predeceſſors, becauſe he was more timorous.

His favourite freemen, and, according to ſome hiſtorians, the empreſs herſelf, finding his friendſhip as dangerous as his averſion, and that he allowed no bounds to his ſuſpicions and accuſations, turned their thoughts to a ſucceſſor, and choſe the venerable Nerva.

Nerva adopted Trajan, who proved the moſt accompliſhed prince in all hiſtory; it was a happineſs to be born under his reign, which bleſſed the empire with more proſperity and true glory than it had ever enjoyed before. He was an admirable ſtateſman, and a moſt accompliſhed general; the native ſweetneſs of his diſpoſition inclined him to univerſal humanity; and his unclouded penetration guided him through the beſt and pureſt tracts of government; he was actuated by a noble ſoul, to whoſe embelliſhment every virtue had contributed; his conduct was free from all extremes, and his amiable qualities were tempered with that exact proportion, that the brightneſs of one was never loſt in the luſtre of another. To ſum up all, he was the beſt qualified of mankind, to do honour to human nature, and to repreſent the divinity on earth.

He accomplished Caesar's project of invading the Parthians, and was very successful in his wars with that mighty people; any monarch but himself would have sunk under the weight of such an enterprize, where danger was always present, and from whence the source of his necessary supplies was at a vast distance; in a word, where he could not be sure victory itself could save him from destruction.

The difficulty consisted in the situation of the two empires, and the military discipline of both nations. If he directed his march through Armenia towards the sources of Tygris and Euphrates, he was sure to be incommoded with a mountainous and impracticable country, through which no convoy of provision could pass, so that the army would be half destroyed, before they could penetrate into Media (*a*). On the other hand, if he should strike out a lower tract towards the south, through Nisibis, he would find himself bewildered in a ghastly desert that separated the two empires; and if he intended to proceed still lower and march through Mesopotamia, he was then to cross a large country that was either uncultivated or laid under water; and as the Tygris and Euphrates flowed from north to south, he could not gain a passage into the country without quitting those rivers, which if he did, he must inevitably perish.

As to the manner practised by the two nations in making war, the strength of the Romans consist-

(*a*) The country did not produce any trees large enough to be wrought into engines proper for the siege of towns. Plut. life of Antoninus.

ed in their infantry, which was the moſt firm and beſt diſciplined body of ſoldiers in the world.

The Parthians, on the contrary, had no infantry, but then their horſe were admirable, and always combated at ſuch a diſtance as placed them out of the reach of the Roman army, and the javelin was ſeldom launched far enough to wound them. Their own weapons conſiſted of a bow, and many formidable ſhafts, and they rather beſieged an army than gave it battle; they were purſued to no purpoſe in their flight, for that was the ſame with them as an engagement. They carried off all the inhabitants of the country, and only left garriſons in their fortified places; and when theſe were taken, the conquerors were obliged to deſtroy them. The Parthians likewiſe ſet fire to all the country that lay round the Roman army, and did not leave them the leaſt blade of herbage. In a word, they managed their wars in a manner very like that which is now practiſed on the ſame frontiers.

We may add to theſe diſadvantages, that the Illyrian and German legions, which were drawn out for this war, were no way capable to ſuſtain it, (*a*) becauſe the ſoldiers, who were accuſtomed to plentiful food in their own country, periſhed in theſe regions for want of many neceſſaries.

The Parthians by theſe means had accompliſhed that, for the preſervation of their liberty, which had hitherto been impracticable to all other nations, againſt the victorious power of the Romans: but they owed this advantage not to any reſiſtleſs valour, but to their inacceſſible ſituation.

Adrian gave up the conqueſt of Trajan, and

(*a*) See Herodian's life of Alexander.

made Euphrates the boundary of his empire; and indeed it was ſurprizing that the Romans after ſuch a ſeries of war ſhould loſe nothing but what they were deſirous to quit; and thus they reſembled the ocean, whoſe expanſion is never leſſened but when it retires of itſelf.

This conduct of Adrian occaſioned great diſſatisfaction among the people. It was recorded in the ſacred book of that nation (*a*), that when Tarquin intended to build the capitol, he found the place moſt commodious for his purpoſe filled with the ſtatues of other deities, upon which he employed his ſkill in augury to diſcover if they were inclinable to reſign their places to Jupiter, and they all conſented, except Mars, Hebe, and Terminus. This proceeding gave birth to three religious opinions, namely, that Mars would never reſign his place to any other being; that the Roman youth would be always invincible; and that their god Terminus would never recede from his ſtation; the contrary of which was however verified in the reign of Adrian.

CHAPTER XVI.

Conſiderations on the State of the Empire from ANTONINUS *to* PROBUS.

IN this period the Stoics propagated their doctrines in the empire with great popularity; and it ſeems as if nature herſelf had been induſtrious to produce this admirable ſect, which reſembled thoſe

(*a*) Auguſtin. *de Civit. Dei.* l. iv. c. 23 & 29.

plants the earth cauſes to ſpring up in places never viſited by the ſun-beams.

This ſect furniſhed the Romans with their beſt emperors; none but Marcus Aurelius could extinguiſh the rememberance of the firſt Antonine who adopted him; and we find ourſelves affected with a ſecret pleaſure when we ſpeak of this emperor. We cannot read his life without ſome impreſſions of tenderneſs, and grow inclinable to think better of ourſelves, becauſe the hiſtory of that prince makes us entertain a more favourable opinion of mankind.

The wiſdom of Nerva, the glory of Trajan, the valour of Adrian, and the virtue of the two Antonines, gained them the veneration of the ſoldiers; but when a ſet of new monſters became their ſucceſſors, the abuſe of military government appeared in its full enormity; and the ſoldiers, who had expoſed the empire to ſale, aſſaſſinated the emperors for the ſake of new gratuities.

It has been a conceived opinion that there is a certain prince in the world, who for the ſpace of fifteen years has been endeavouring to aboliſh the civil government in his dominions, and to ſubſtitute the military in its room. I have no intention to make odious reflections on ſuch a deſign, and ſhall only obſerve, that from the nature of things in general, two hundred guards may be a better ſecurity to a prince than four thouſand; and beſides, an armed people are of all others the moſt dangerous to be oppoſed.

Commodus ſucceeded his father Marcus Aurelius, and was a monſter who gave a looſe to all his own paſſions, and thoſe of his courtiers. The perſons,

who delivered the world from ſuch a barbarian, transferred the imperial dignity to the venerable Pertinax, who was ſoon aſſaſſinated by the praetorian bands.

The empire was then expoſed to auction, and Didius Julian carried it by a number of magnificent promiſes. This proceeding exaſperated the whole body of the people; for though the empire had been frequently bought, it had never been ſold upon credit before. Peſcennius Niger, Severus, and Albinus, were ſaluted emperors, and Julian, not being in a condition to pay the immenſe ſums he had promiſed, was abandoned by the ſoldiers.

Severus defeated Niger and Albinus: he was maſter of extraordinary qualities, but wanted that ſweetneſs of diſpoſition, which in princes is the moſt amiable quality they can poſſeſs.

The power of the emperors might eaſily appear more tyrannical than that of modern princes; for as their dignity was a conjunction of the various authorities in the Roman magiſtracy, ſuch as dictators, for inſtance, tribunes of the people, proconſuls, cenſors, ſupreme pontiffs, and ſometimes conſuls, they frequently aſſumed the diſpenſation of diſtributive juſtice, and it was eaſy for them to create ſuſpicions that they had oppreſſed thoſe whom they condemned; for the people uſually judge of the abuſe of power, by the greatneſs of its extent; whereas the kings of Europe, being legiſlators and not executors of the law, ſovereign princes but not judges, are conſequently diſcharged from the exerciſe of an authority that might prove odious; and have conſigned the infliction of puniſhments to magiſtrates, whilſt they reſerved to themſelves the di-

ſtribution of pardons and other popular acts of mercy.

The unhappy cuſtom of proſcribing, introduced by Sylla, was ſtill practiſed under the emperors; and the prince muſt have been diſtinguiſhed by ſome virtue, if he diſcountenanced that ſevere proceeding; for as the miniſters and favourites turned their thoughts to confiſcations at the beginning of a reign, they were always repreſenting to their ſovereign the neceſſity of puniſhments, and the dangerous effects of clemency.

Few emperors have ever been more jealous of their authority than Tiberius and Severus, and yet they ſuffered themſelves to be governed in a moſt diſhonourable manner, the one by Sejanus and the other by Plautian.

When Severus gave full play to his proſcriptions, a great body of Niger's (*a*) army retired for ſafety to the Parthians (*b*) and perfected them in every part of military diſcipline wherein they were any way defective; they habituated them to the Roman weapons, and even taught their workmen how to make that martial equipage; in conſequence of which, that people, who till then had uſually limited their exploits to defenſive wars (*c*), were generally aggreſſors for the future.

It is very remarkable, that in the long ſeries of thoſe civil wars that were continually raging, the

(*a*) Herodian's life of Severus.

(*b*) This fatality continued in the reign of Alexander. Artaxerxes, who re-eſtabliſhed the Perſian empire, made it formidable to the Romans, becauſe their ſoldiers either through caprice or a libertine diſpoſition deſerted in great multitudes to the king of Perſia.

(*c*) Namely the Perſians, who followed their example.

chiefs, who were supported by the legions of Europe, generally defeated the leaders of the Asiatic legions (*a*); and we read, in the history of Severus, that he could not take the city of Atra in Arabia, because the European legions having mutinied, he was obliged to employ those of Syria.

This difference became evident, when the levies were first made (*b*) in the provinces, and it appeared as considerable in the legions, as it did in the nations out of which they were raised, and who by nature or education were more or less formed for war.

Another unhappy consequence likewise ensued from these provincial levies; for the emperors, who were generally elected out of the soldiery, were for the most part strangers, and sometimes the worst of Barbarians. Rome was now no longer mistress of the world, but received laws from the whole universe.

Each emperor brought with him some peculiarity from his own country, relating to fashions, manners, politics, or religion; and Heliogabalus had even

(*a*) Severus defeated the Asiatic legions of Niger, Constantine those of Licinius: Vespasian, though proclaimed by the armies of Syria, made war against Vitellius only with the legions of Moesia, Pannonia, and Dalmatia. Cicero, when he was at his province, wrote to the senate, that they should not reckon on the levies raised in this country. Constantine defeated Maxentius, says Zozimen, by his cavalry only. See hereafter chap. xxiv.

(*b*) Augustus fixed the legions to particular stations in the provinces. The levies were originally raised at Rome, after that among the Latins, in Italy next, and last of all in the provinces.

formed a resolution to destroy every object of religious veneration in Rome, and to banish all the gods from their temples, that he might place his own in their room.

This circumstance, even considered as independent on the secret operations of the Deity, which are obvious to his omniscience alone, greatly contributed to the establishment of Christianity; for nothing was now strange in the empire, and the people were prepared to relish every new custom which the emperors were inclinable to introduce.

It is well known, that the Romans received the gods of other nations into their city; but then they received them with the air of conquerors, and carried them in their triumphal processions: but when strangers attempted to establish them by their own authority, they were immediately rejected. It is likewise notorious, that the Romans gave foreign deities the names of such of their own gods as were most conformable to the others, in their attributes; but when the priests of other countries would introduce the adoration of their divinities, under their proper names, among the Romans, they were not permitted to accomplish that design; and this was the greatest obstacle to the progress of Christianity.

Caracalla, who succeeded Severus, may be called not only a tyrant, but the destroyer of mankind: Caligula, Nero and Domitian limited their barbarities to Rome; but this monster endeavoured to extend his fury through the world like a pestilence.

Severus amassed prodigious treasures by the exactions of a long reign, and his proscriptions of

thoſe who declared for his competitors in the empire.

Caracalla, having commenced his reign with murdering his brother Geta with his own hands, purchaſed with thoſe riches a connivance at his crime, from the ſoldiers who had an extraordinary regard for Geta; but the liberalities of Caracalla had ſuch an effect upon them, that they declared they had taken oaths to both the children of Severus, and not to one alone.

The immoderate treaſures which have been gathered by princes have commonly produced fatal effects: they generally corrupt the ſucceſſor, who grows dazzled with the luſtre they diffuſe; and if they happen not to pervert his heart, they miſguide his mind, and cauſe him to form plans of mighty enterprizes, by the miniſtration of a power that is only accidental, always tranſitory and unnatural, and an empty inflation inſtead of a real grandeur.

Caracalla augmented the ſoldiers pay; Macrinus wrote to the Senate, that this augmentation amounted to (*a*) ſeventy millions of drachms (*b*). This prince ſeems to have magnified things; and if we compare our ſoldiers pay now-a-days with the reſt of our public expences, and ſuppoſe that they kept the ſame proportion among the Romans, we ſhall ſee that this ſum was exceſſive.

Here we ſhould enquire what was a Roman ſoldier's pay. We learn from Oroſius, that Domitian

(*a*) Seven thouſand myriads. Dion. in *Macrinus*.

(*b*) The Attic drachm was the ſame with the Roman denarius, the eighth part of an ounce, and the ſixty-fourth part of our marc.

raiſed (*a*) it a fourth from what it was before. And it appears from a ſoldier's ſpeech in Tacitus, that (*b*) at the death of Auguſtus it was ten ounces of braſs per day. We find in Suetonius (*c*), that Julius Caeſar doubled the pay of his time. In Pliny (*d*), that at the ſecond Punic war it was diminiſhed one fifth. It was then in the firſt Punic war (*e*) about ſix ounces of copper; in the ſecond (*f*), about five ounces; at ten, under Julius Caeſar; and thirteen and a third, under Domitian (*g*). I ſhall make here ſome reflections.

The pay which the republic might eaſily advance, when it was only a ſmall ſtate, when it engaged in a new war every year, and received the ſpoils of it as often; it was not able to raiſe, without running in debt, under the firſt Punic war, when it carried its arms beyond Italy, when it maintained a long war, and ſupported great armies.

In the ſecond Punic war the pay was reduced

(*a*) He raiſed it in proportion as ſeventy-five is to an hundred.

(*b*) Annal. lib. 1.

(*c*) Life of Julius Caeſar.

(*d*) Hiſt. Nat. xxxiii. 13. Inſtead of giving ten ounces of copper for twenty, they paid ſixteen.

(*e*) A ſoldier, in the *Moſtellaria* of Plautus, ſays it was three aſſes; which can be underſtood only of aſſes of ten ounces. But if the pay was exactly ſix aſſes in the firſt Punic war, it was not diminiſhed in the ſecond a fifth, but a ſixth, and the fraction was omitted.

(*f*) Polybius, who reduces the pay to Greek money, differs only by a fraction.

(*g*) See Oroſius and Suetonius in *Domitian*. They ſay the ſame thing under different words. I have reduced the terms to ounces of braſs, that I might be underſtood, without having recourſe to the ſeveral ſpecies of the Roman money.

to five ounces of braſs; and this diminution might be made without danger at a time when moſt of the citizens were aſhamed to receive pay, and were willing to ſerve at their own charge.

The treaſures of Perſia (*a*), and of ſo many other kings, which flowed into Rome, put an end to taxes there. In ſuch public and private opulence, they had the prudence not to enlarge the former payment of five ounces of braſs.

Though even from this pay they made a deduction for corn, cloths, and arms, ſtill it was ſufficient, becauſe they enrolled only thoſe citizens, who had patrimonies of their own.

Marius having enrolled people of no ſubſtance, and his example being afterwards followed, Julius Caeſar was obliged to augment the pay.

This augmentation having been continued after the death of Caeſar, they were obliged, under the conſulſhip of Hirtius and Panſa, to re-eſtabliſh taxes.

The weakneſs of Domitian, adding one fourth to this pay, was a great blow to the State, the unhappineſs of which was not that it brought in luxury in general, but infuſed it among people of that condition who ought to be ſupplied with no more than the bare neceſſities which nature requires. Laſtly, by Caracalla's final augmentation, the empire was thrown into ſuch a condition, that, not being able to ſubſiſt without ſoldiers, it could not ſubſiſt with them.

Caracalla, to ſoften the horror of his fratricide, inſtituted divine honours to his brother Geta; and, what was very peculiar, he himſelf received the ſame

(*a*) Cic. offic. lib. ii.

deification from Macrinus, who after he had cauſed him to be ſtabbed, and was deſirous of appeaſing the praetorian bands, who regretted the death of a prince whoſe liberalities they had ſo often enjoyed, erected a temple, and eſtabliſhed a prieſthood of Flamins in his honour.

This preſerved his memory from all degrading imputations, (*a*) and the ſenate not daring to cenſure him, he was not ranked among the tyrants, like Commodus, who had not done more to deſerve that title than himſelf.

As to the two great emperors Adrian and Severus (*b*), one eſtabliſhed and the other relaxed the military diſcipline, and the events exactly correſponded with their cauſes: the reigns which ſucceeded that of Adrian were a ſeries of happineſs and tranquillity; but after the death of Severus, nothing was ſeen but a ſucceſſion of calamities and horror.

Caracalla had confined himſelf to no limitations in his prodigality to the ſoldiers, and in that particular he acted conformably to the ſentiments of his father, who, on his death-bed, adviſed him to enrich the army and diſregard all the reſt of mankind.

But theſe politics could be only accommodated to one reign; for the ſucceſſor, being no longer able to continue thoſe expences, was ſoon aſſaſſinated by the army: ſo that the emperors who were eminent for wiſdom, were always murdered by the ſoldiers; and thoſe, whoſe lives were infamous, were

(*a*) Ælius Lampridius in vita Alexandri Severi.

(*b*) See the abrigement of Xiphil. in the life of Adrian, and Herodian in the life of Severus.

deſtroyed either by the conſpiracies or edicts of the ſenate.

When a tyrant ſuffered himſelf to be entirely influenced by the army, and left the citizens expoſed to their licentious depredations, ſuch injurious proceedings could not be extended beyond the period of one reign; becauſe the ſoldiers, in conſequence of their devaſtations, impoveriſhed the people, and defeated themſelves of their pay by that event. It therefore became neceſſary to reform the military diſcipline, which was a project always fatal to the perſons who preſumed to attempt it.

When Caracalla loſt his life by the treachery of Macrinus, the ſoldiers, in deſpair at the death of a prince whoſe liberality had been diſpenſed to them with an unlimited flow, elected Heliogabalus (*a*), and when he, by his proſtitution to infamous pleaſures, and the lawleſs extravagancies he ſuffered the army to commit, grew contemptible even in their eyes, they diſpatched him by an aſſaſſination. The ſame fate attended Alexander, who was preparing to reſtore the true military diſcipline, and threatened to puniſh the ſoldiers for their miſconduct (*b*).

In this manner a tyrant, who, inſtead of being ſollicitous for his ſafety, affected an ability to be criminal, periſhed with the fatal advantage of being murdered a few days before another who would willingly have been a better man.

After the death of Alexander, the imperial dignity was transferred to Maximin, who was the firſt

(*a*) At this time every one thought himſelf good enough to riſe to empire. See Dial. lxxix.

(*b*) See Lampridius.

emperor of Barbarian extraction, and had been diſtinguiſhed by his ſtrength and gigantic ſtature.

This prince and his ſon were likewiſe ſlain by the ſoldiers. The two firſt Gordians periſhed in Africa: Maximus, Balbinus, and the third Gordian were maſſacred: Philip, who had cauſed the young Gordian to be deſtroyed, was himſelf ſlain with his ſon; and Decius, who was choſen to ſucceed him, was murdered in his turn by the treaſon of Gallus (*a*).

The Roman empire was improperly ſo denominated at that time, and might rather be called an irregular commonwealth, nearly reſembling the Ariſtocracy of Algiers, where the militia, who are inveſted with the ſovereign power, elect and depoſe the magiſtrate they call the Dey; and it may perhaps be taken for a general rule, that a military government is, in ſome reſpects, a republic rather than a monarchy.

But leſt any one ſhould imagine the ſoldiers had no other ſhare in the government than what they extorted by their diſobedience and inſurrections, let it be aſked, whether the orations, in which the emperors addreſſed themſelves to the army, were not at laſt very correſpondent to thoſe which the

(*a*) Caſaubon obſerves, on the Hiſtoria Auguſta, that during the period of 160 years which it comprehends, there were ſeventy perſons, who juſtly or otherwiſe, had the title of Caeſar. Adeo erant in illo Principatu, quem tamen omnes mirantur, comitia Imperii ſemper incerta. So uncertain, to the aſtoniſhment of all, were the elections in that empire. Which circumſtance ſufficiently manifeſts the difference between the Roman government and that of France, where, for the long ſpace of twelve hundred years, no more than ſixty three kings have reigned.

conſuls and tribunes formerly made to the people? and though the ſoldiers had no particular place to aſſemble in, nor were under the regulation of any certain forms; though the temper of their minds was not uſually ſerene, their proceedings conſiſting of action rather than deliberation, did they not however diſpoſe of the public fortune with a ſovereign authority? what was an emperor but the miniſter of a violent and tumultuous government, and did not the ſoldiers elect him for their own particular convenience?

When the army aſſociated into the empire (*a*) Philip, the praetorian prefect of the third Gordian, this prince claimed the exerciſe of an undivided command, but did not ſucceed in his pretenſions; he then requeſted the army to divide the power equally between them, but to as little effect; he next intreated them to leave him the title of Caeſar, and was ſtill refuſed; he afterwards ſolicited them to create him praetor of the praetorian bands, and met with the uſual repulſe; till at laſt he was reduced to plead for his life. The army, in the inſtance before us, exerciſed the ſupreme magiſtracy in their ſeveral deciſions.

The Barbarians were at firſt unknown to the Romans, and for ſome time afterwards only incommodious; but at laſt they became formidable to them, by an event altogether unparalleled at that time, and which perhaps may never be equalled hereafter. Rome had ſo effectually extinguiſhed all nations, that when ſhe at laſt was vanquiſhed in her turn, the earth ſeemed to produce a new race of mankind, to accompliſh her deſtruction.

(*a*) See Julius Capitolinus.

Thoſe princes who have large dominions ſeldom find them bordered by any territories conſiderable enough to be the objects of their ambition; and ſhould there be any ſuch, they would naturally be ſwallowed up in a ſeries of conqueſt. We will ſay they are bounded then by ſeas and mountains, and vaſt deſerts, whoſe ſterility rendered them contemptible. The Romans for this reaſon ſuffered the Germans to range in their foreſts and gloomy wilds, and let the northern nations ſhiver amidſt the polar ſnow; and yet thoſe inhoſpitable regions produced a people, who at laſt enſlaved the conquerors of the world.

In the reign of Gallus a mighty collection of nations, who afterwards became more celebrated, ſpread their ravages through all Europe, and the Perſians, having invaded Syria, abandoned their conqueſts only to preſerve their booty.

We no longer ſee any of thoſe ſwarms of Barbarians which the north formerly ſent out. The violences of the Romans had made the people of the South retire into the North: while the force which confined them, ſubſiſted, they remained there: when it was weakened, they diſperſed themſelves into all parts (*a*). The ſame thing happened ſome ages after. The conqueſts and tyrannies of Charlemagne had again forced the nations of the South into the North: as ſoon as this empire was weakened, they poured a ſecond time from the North into the South. And if at preſent a prince made the ſame ravages in Europe, the nations driven into the North, with their backs to the limits of

(*a*) This may ſerve for an anſwer to the famous queſtion, Why the North is no longer ſo populous as formerly?

the univerſe, would maintain their ground, till the moment they ſhould overrun and conquer Europe a third time.

The miſerable diſorders, which had ſo long been ſpringing up in the ſeveral ſucceſſions of the emperors, were now come to their fatal maturity, and that period which was concurrent with the cloſe of Valerian's reign, and the duration of that of his ſon Gallienus, produced thirty pretenders to the empire, the greateſt part of whom being ſwept away by their mutual contentions, their devaſtations were limited to a ſhort reign; and they gained nothing durable but the appellation of the thirty tyrants.

Valerian having been taken priſoner by the Perſians, and his ſon Gallienus neglecting the public affairs, the Barbarians penetrated into all parts, and the empire was now in the ſame condition it was afterwards reduced to in the weſt (*a*), at the cloſe of another century, and it would then have felt its laſt convulſions, had not a happy conjunction of events interpoſed for its preſervation.

The terrible confuſion in ſucceeding to the empire being come to its height, we find at the end of the reign of Valerianus, and during that of Gallienus his ſon, no leſs than thirty pretenders to the throne, moſt of whom having got poſſeſſion of it, and reigned for a very ſhort time, were called the Tyrants.

Odenatus, prince of Palmyra, and one of the Roman allies, diſloged the Perſians, who had invaded the greateſt part of Aſia: Rome furniſhed an ar-

(*a*) An hundred and fifty years after this event, the Barbarians invaded the empire in the reign of Honorius.

my of its own citizens, and they effectually delivered it from the Barbarians who came to pillage their city: an innumerable army of Scythians, who put to sea in a fleet of five thousand ships entirely perished by storms, fatigue and famine, and even by their formidable grandeur; and Gallienus being at last slain, Claudius, Aurelian, Tacitus, and Probus, who happily succeeded him, and were four extraordinary princes, snatched the empire from the verge of ruin.

CHAPTER XVII.

Changes in the STATE.

THE emperors, to prevent the continual treasons of the army, associated into the government proper persons in whom they might confide; and Diocletian, under pretext of the weight and multiplicity of the public affairs, established a law, that there should always be two emperors and as many Caesars. He judged, that, by this proceeding, the four principal armies, being possessed by the partners in the empire, would naturally intimidate one another, and that the inferior armies being too weak to have any thoughts of raising their chiefs to the imperial dignity, their custom of election would be gradually discontinued, and entirely abolished at last. Besides, the dignity of the Caesars being always subordinate, that power, which, for the security of the government, was in the participation of four, would be exercised in its full extent by no more than two.

The soldiers were likewise restrained from their exorbitances by considering, that as the riches of

particular perſons as well as the public treaſure were conſiderably diminiſhed, the emperors were in no condition to offer them ſuch large donations as formerly, and conſequently the gratuities would be no longer proportionable to the danger of a new election.

We may add to this, that the prefects of the praetorian bands, whoſe power and employments rendered them the grand viſiers of thoſe times, and frequently tempted them to murder their emperors, in order to raiſe themſelves to the throne, were greatly reduced by Conſtantine, who diveſted them of all but their civil functions, and augmented their number to four inſtead of two.

The lives of the emperors began now to be in greater ſecurity, and they might reaſonably expect to die peaceably in their beds. This circumſtance ſeems in ſome meaſure to have ſoftened the diſpoſitions, and they no longer ſhed human blood with the barbarous prodigality of their predeceſſors. But as the immenſe power they ſtill poſſeſſed muſt needs have ſome particular tendency, it began to manifeſt itſelf in a ſpecies of tyranny leſs glaring than the former. The ſubjects were no longer affrighted with inhuman maſſacres, but then they were haraſſed by unjuſt ſentences and forms of judicature, which ſeemed to defer death only to render life itſelf uncomfortable. The court governed, and was likewiſe ſwayed in its turn, by a greater variety of artifices and a more exquiſite train of political refinements, which were conducted with greater ſilence than uſual. In a word, inſtead of an unterrified diſpoſition to form a bad action, and a cruel

precipitation to commit it, thoſe gigantic iniquities ſhrunk into the vices of weak minds, and could only be called languid crimes.

A new train of corruption was now introduced; the firſt emperors purſued pleaſures, but theſe ſunk into ſoftneſs. They ſhewed themſelves with leſs frequency to the ſoldiers, were more indolent and fonder of their domeſtics, more devoted to the palace, and more abſtracted from the empire.

The poiſon of the court grew more malignant in proportion to the diſguiſe it aſſumed. All direct terms were diſuſed in diſcourſe, and diſtant inſinuations became the dialect of the palace. Every ſhining reputation was ſullied, and the miniſters as well as the officers of the army were perpetually left to the diſcretion of that ſort of people, who, as they cannot be uſeful to the ſtate themſelves, ſuffer none to ſerve it with reputation and glory. In a word, that affability of the firſt emperors, which alone qualified them for an inſight into their affairs, was now intirely diſcarded. The prince had no informations, but what were conveyed to him by the canal of a few favourites, who being always in concert together, and even when they ſeemed to diſagree in their opinions, were only in the province of a ſingle perſon to their ſovereign.

The reſidence of ſeveral emperors in Aſia, and their perpetual competition with the kings of Perſia, made them form a reſolution to be adored like thoſe monarchs; and Dioclefian, though others ſay Galerius, publiſhed an edict to that effect.

This pompous imitation of the Aſiatic pride being once eſtabliſhed, the people were ſoon habituated to ſuch a ſpectacle; and when Julian would have

regulated his conduct by a modeſt ſimplicity of manners, that proceeding, which was no more than a renovation of the ancient behaviour, was imputed to him as a reproachful inattention to his dignity.

Though ſeveral Emperors had reigned after Marcus Aurelius, yet the empire was undivided; and as the authority of thoſe princes was acknowleged in all the provinces, it was but one power, though exerciſed by many perſons.

But Galerius (*a*) and Conſtantius Chlorus, being at variance with each other, divided the empire in reality; and this example, which was afterwards followed by Conſtantine, who purſued the plan of Galerius and not that of Dioclefian, introduced a cuſtom which might be called a revolution rather than a change.

We may likewiſe add, that the ſtrong deſire of Conſtantine to be the founder of a new city, and an impulſe of vanity to diſtinguiſh it by his own name, determined him to transfer the ſeat of empire to the eaſt. Though Rome was far from being ſo ſpacious within the walls as it is at preſent, yet the ſuburbs were prodigiouſly extenſive (*b*): Italy was filled with ſeats of pleaſure, and might properly be called the garden of Rome. The huſbandmen were in Sicily, Africa, and Egypt (*c*); but the gardeners

(*a*) See Oroſius, l. vii. and Aurelius Victor.

(*b*) Expatiantia tecta multas addidere urbes, ſays Plin. Nat. Hiſt. lib. iii.

(*c*) Corn, ſays Tacitus, was formerly exported from Italy to the diſtant provinces, and it is not a barren land now; but we cultivate Africa and Egypt, and chooſe to expoſe the lives of the Roman people to danger.

lived altogether in Italy. The lands were generally cultivated by the ſlaves of the Roman citizens, but when the ſeat of empire was eſtabliſhed in the eaſt, all Rome was in a manner tranſplanted to that ſituation. Thither did the grandees ſend their ſlaves, or, in other words, the greateſt part of the people, and Italy was almoſt exhauſted of its inhabitants.

It was Conſtantine's intention that the new city ſhould not be inferior in any particular to the old one; and therefore he took care to have it ſufficiently ſupplied with corn, commanding all the harveſt of Egypt to be ſent to Conſtantinople, and conſigning that of Africa to Rome, which does not ſeem to have been a very judicious proceeding.

Whilſt the republic ſubſiſted, the people of Rome, who were then the ſovereigns of all other nations, became naturally intituled to a proportion of the tribute: this circumſtance induced the ſenate to ſell them corn, at firſt, for a low price, and afterwards to make a gratuitous diſtribution of it among them; and when monarchy itſelf was introduced, this latter cuſtom was ſtill continued, though entirely oppoſite to the principles of that form of government. It is true, the abuſe remained unrectified through an apprehenſion of the inconveniencies that would have riſen from its diſcontinuance; but when Conſtantine founded a new city, he eſtabliſhed the ſame cuſtom without the leaſt appearance of reaſon.

When Auguſtus had conquered Egypt, he conveyed the treaſure of the Ptolemies to Rome; and this proceeding occaſioned much the ſame revolution, which the diſcovery of the Indies afterwards effected in Europe, and which ſome ridiculous ſchemes have ſince accompliſhed in our time. The

revenue was doubled at Rome, (*a*) and as that city continued to abſorb all the riches of Alexandria, which was itſelf the repoſitory of the treaſures of Africa and the Eaſt; gold and ſilver by theſe means became very common in Europe, and the people were able to pay very conſiderable taxations even in money.

But when the empire was afterwards divided, all theſe riches flowed in a full tide to Conſtantinople; and we may add to this unhappy circumſtance, that the mines in Germany (*b*) had not then been opened; that thoſe of Italy (*c*) and Gaul were very few and inconſiderable, and that the mines of Spain (*d*) had not been worked ſince the Carthaginians loſt that country, or at leaſt they were not ſo productive as formerly. Italy itſelf was now a continued waſte of forſaken gardens, and conſequently could not be in any condition to draw money from the Eaſt, whilſt the Weſt at the ſame time was drained of all its wealth, by the oriental merchants who ſupplied the inhabitants with their neceſſary commodities. Gold and ſilver, by theſe means, became

(*a*) Sueton. in Auguſt. Oroſ. l. vi. Rome often met with theſe revolutions. I have before obſerved that the treaſures brought thither from Macedonia ſuperſeded all farther tribute. Cicero in his *Offices*, l. ii.

(*b*) Tacitus, De moribus Germanorum, declares this in expreſs terms. Beſides we know pretty near the time in which moſt of the mines of Germany were opened. See Thomas Sefreiberus of the origin of the mines of the Harts. Thoſe of Saxony are thought to be leſs antient.

(*c*) See Pliny Nat. Hiſt. xxxvii. 77.

(*d*) The Carthaginians, ſays Diodorus, underſtood very well the art of making an advantage of them; and the Romans that of hindering others from making ſuch advantage.

extremely ſcarce in Europe, and yet the emperors extorted the ſame pecuniary tributes as formerly, which completed the general deſtruction.

When a government has been eſtabliſhed in one certain form, and its political circumſtances are adjuſted to a particular ſituation, it is generally prudent to leave them in that condition; for the ſame cauſes which have enabled ſuch a ſtate to ſubſiſt, though they may frequently be complicated and unknown, will ſtill continue to ſupport it; but when the whole ſyſtem is changed, remedies can only be accommodated to the inconveniencies viſible in the theory, whilſt others, which nothing but experience can point out, are lurking without oppoſition, in the new plan.

For theſe reaſons, though the empire grew already too great, yet it was effectually ruined by the diviſions into which it was parcelled, becauſe all the parts of this vaſt body had for a long ſeries of time been arranged ſo as to become ſettled and ſteady, and were compacted by a mutual dependency through the whole.

Conſtantine, (*a*) after he had weakened the capital, proceeded to impair the frontiers by drawing off thoſe legions who were ſtationed on the banks of great rivers, and diſtributing them into the provinces. This innovation was extremely prejudicial in more inſtances than one; for as the bar-

(*a*) This account of Conſtantine's proceedings no way contradicts the eccleſiaſtical writers, who declare they confine themſelves to thoſe actions of this prince which had any relation to religion, without concerning themſelves with the political tranſactions in that reign. Euſeb. Life of Conſtantine, l. i. c. 9. Socrates, l. i. c. 1.

rier which comprehended ſo many nations was now removed; ſo the ſoldiers (*a*) paſſed all their time, and grew effeminate in the circus and the theatres (*b*).

When Julian was ſent by Conſtantius into Gaul, he found that fifty towns on the Rhine (*c*) had been taken by the Barbarians, that the provinces were all plundered, and that there was now no more than the ſhadow of a Roman army, which fled at the very mention of the enemies name.

This prince by his wiſdom, (*d*) and perſeverance, joined with oeconomy, conduct, and valour, and proſpered by a noble ſeries of heroic actions, chaſed the Barbarians out of their new ſettlements, and his name became a terror as long as he lived (*e*).

The ſhortneſs of the reigns, the divers political parties, the different religions, the particular ſects of thoſe religions, have occaſioned the characters of the emperors to come down to us extremely diſfigured; of which take only two examples: that Alexander, who is ſuch a coward in Herodian, ap-

(*a*) Zozimus, l. ii.

(*b*) After the eſtabliſhment of Chriſtianity, the combats of gladiators were very ſeldom exhibited, and Conſtantine prohibited them by his authority; but this barbarous cuſtom was not entirely aboliſhed till the time of Honorius. The Romans retained nothing of their ancient ſhews, but what tended to emaſculate their minds and allure them to pleaſure. In former times, the ſoldiers before they took the field were entertained with a combat of gladiators, to familiariſe them to the ſight of blood and weapons of war, and to inſpire them with intrepidity when they engaged the enemy. Jul. Capit. Life of Maximus and Balbinus.

(*c*) Ammian Marcellin. l. xvi, xvii, and xviii.

(*d*) Ammian Marcellin. ibid.

(*e*) See the noble panegyric made by Ammianus Marcellinus on this prince, l. xxv.

pears full of courage in Lampridius; Gratian, ſo much extolled by the Orthodox, Philoſtorgius compares to Nero.

No prince ſaw the neceſſity of reſtoring the ancient plan more than Valentinian. His whole life was employed in fortifying the banks of the Rhine, making levies, raiſing caſtles, placing troops in proper ſtations, and furniſhing them with ſubſiſtence on thoſe frontiers; but an event, that afterwards happened, determined his brother Valens to open the Danube, and that proceeding was attended with very dreadful conſequences.

That tract of land which lies between the Palus Maeotis, the mountains of Caucaſus and the Caſpian ſea, was inhabited by a numerous people who compoſed great part of the nation of the Huns or that of the Alans. The ſoil was exceeding fertile; the inhabitants were fond of wars and robberies; and were always either on horſeback or in their chariots, and wandered about the country wherein they were incloſed: they ſometimes made depredations on the frontiers of Perſia and Armenia; but the ports of the Caſpian ſea were eaſily guarded, and it was difficult for them to penetrate into Perſia, by any other avenues; and as they imagined it impracticable to croſs the Palus Maeotis, they were altogether unacquainted with the Romans; ſo that whilſt other nations of Barbarians ravaged the empire, theſe confined them within the limits which their ignorance had drawn around them.

It has been the opinion of ſome, (*a*) that the ſlime which was rolled down by the current of the Tanais, had by degrees formed a kind of incruſta-

(*a*) Zozimus, l. 4.

tion on the surface of the Cimmerian Bosphorus, over which these people are supposed to have passed. Others (*a*) inform us, that two young Scythians being in full pursuit of a hind, the terrified creature swam over that arm of the sea, upon which the youths, immediately following her in the same track, were exceedingly astonished to find themselves in a new world; and at the return to the old one, they gave their countrymen (*b*) a particular account of the strange lands, and, if I may be indulged in the expression, the inviting Indies they had lately discovered.

Upon this information, an innumerable body of Huns immediately passed those streights; and, meeting first with the Goths, made that people fly before them. It should seem as if these mighty countries poured their nations out precipitately upon one another, and that Asia had acquired a new weight to make it ponderate equal to the European power.

The Goths in consternation presented themselves on the banks of the Danube, and with a suppliant air intreated the Romans to allow them a place of refuge. The flatterers (*c*) of Valens improved this conjuncture, and represented it as a fortunate conquest of a new people, who by the accession of their numbers would defend and enrich the empire.

Valens ordered (*d*) them to be admitted into his

(*a*) Jornandes de rebus Geticis. The Miscellaneous Hist. of Procopius.

(*b*) Vide Sozomen. l. 6.

(*c*) Ammian Marcellin. l. 29.

(*d*) Several of those who had received these orders abandoned themselves to a brutal passion for some of the male refugees; others were enshared by the beauty of the young Barbarians of the other sex, and became the captives of their female slaves;

territories, upon delivering up their arms, but his officers ſuffered them to repurchaſe with their money as many as they pleaſed; they were afterwards diſtributed into ſeveral allotments of land; but the Goths, (*a*) contrary to the cuſtom of the Huns, did not cultivate the portions of ground aſſigned them. They were even left deſtitute of the promiſed ſupplies of corn, and were ready to periſh amidſt a land of plenty; they were armed for war, and yet unjuſtly inſulted. In conſequence of theſe provocations they ravaged all the country from the Danube to the Boſphorus; they deſtroyed Valens and all his army, and repaſſed the Danube only to quit the hideous ſolitude they had effected by their devaſtations (*b*).

a third ſort were corrupted by preſents in money, linen habits, and fringed mantles; and all their thoughts only tended to enrich their houſes with ſlaves, and to ſtock their farms with cattle. Hiſt. of Dexippus.

(*a*) See the Gothic hiſtory by Priſcus, who has ſet this difference of cuſtoms in a clear light. It may be aſked perhaps, how it was poſſible for nations who never cultivated their lands, to be ſo powerful, when thoſe of America are ſo very weak: It is becauſe people who follow a paſtoral life are furniſhed with a better ſubſiſtence, than thoſe who live by the chace.

It appears by the account given by Ammianus Marcellinus, that the Huns in their firſt ſettlements did not manure their lands, and only ſubſiſted on their flocks and herds in a country that abounded with rich paſtures, and was watered with many rivers; ſuch is the practice of the inhabitants of little Tartary, which is part of the ſame country. And it is probable that the nations we have been ſpeaking of, having, after their migrations from their native land, ſettled in countries that afforded little or no paſturage for their cattle, applied themſelves to the cultivation of the ſoil.

(*b*) See Zozimus l. iv. See alſo Dexippus's Extract of the Embaſſies of Conſtantine Porphyrogenitus.

CHAPTER XVIII.

An Account of ſome new Maxims received by the ROMANS.

SOmetimes, the puſillanimous ſpirit of the emperors (*a*), and frequently the defenceleſs ſtate of the empire made the people employ their money to appeaſe the nations who threatened to invade them; but the deſired peace could never be effectually purchaſed, becauſe thoſe who ſold it could, whenever they pleaſed, oblige the Romans to buy it again.

It is much better to hazard an unſucceſsful war, than to part with great ſums for a precarious peace; for a prince is always reſpected when it is known he will make a long reſiſtance before he can be vanquiſhed.

Beſides, ſuch gratifications as theſe were changed into tribute at laſt, and though they were free at the beginning, they became neceſſary in the event, and paſſed for an acquired property: for which reaſon, when an emperor refuſed them to ſome particular people, or was not diſpoſed to give them ſo much as they demanded, they immediately declared themſelves his mortal enemies. To produce an inſtance or two, from a thouſand: the army, which Julian led againſt the Perſians, (*b*) was purſued in its retreat from the Eaſt, by the Arabians, to whom the cuſtomary tribute had been refuſed: and in a ſhort

(*a*) At firſt they gave all to the ſoldiers; afterwards all to the enemy.

(*b*) Ammian. Marcellin. l. 24.

time afterwards, in the reign of Valentinian, the Germans (*a*), who had been offered more inconsiderable presents than usual, grew exasperated at that disobliging frugality, and these northern people, being already influenced by a point of honour, avenged themselves of this pretended insult, by a cruel war.

All those nations who surrounded the empire in Europe and Asia, exhausted it by degrees of its riches; and as the Romans derived their grandeur and power from the gold and silver, which flowed into the empire from the coffers of so many kings; they now grew weak and despicable, (*b*) because the same gold and silver was drained from them by other nations.

The misconduct of politicians is not always voluntary, but happens frequently to be the unavoidable consequence of their particular situation, and therefore one inconvenience is generally the offspring of another.

The army, as we have already declared, became

(*a*) Idem l. 26.

(*b*) You would willingly be rich, *said Julian to his mutinous army*, there is Persia for your purpose, let us march thither; for, believe me, all the riches of the Roman republic are now no more; our poverty is owing to those who persuaded our princes to purchase peace from the Barbarians. Our treasury is exhausted, our cities are in ruins, and our provinces look dreadful with desolation. An emperor who knows no riches but those of the mind is not ashamed to acknowlege a virtuous and irreproachable poverty. You may revolt if you are so disposed; for my part, either death shall relieve me, for I scorn a life of which the least fever can deprive me, as effectually as my sword; or I will retire from the world, for I have not passed my days in such a manner as to be incapable of a private life. Amm. Marcell. l. xxiv.

very expenſive to the ſtate, and the ſoldiers had three ſorts of advantages; their ordinary pay, donations of recompence after their ſervices, and accidental liberalities, which were often claimed as ſtated properties by a body of men who had both princes and people in their power.

The inability of the people, to furniſh theſe expences, obliged them to employ a leſs chargeable ſoldiery, and treaties were ſtruck up with barbarous nations, who had neither the luxury of the Roman army, nor the ſame ſpirit and pretenſions.

There was another advantage, beſides this; for as the Barbarians poured their troops into a country with the greateſt precipitation, the Romans being unprovided for their reception, and finding it ſometimes difficult to raiſe levies in the provinces, were obliged to hire another party of Barbarians, who were always mercenary, and eager for battle and plunder. This expedient had its uſe in the preſent emergency, but when that was over, the Romans found it as difficult to rid themſelves of their new allies, as of their enemies themſelves.

The ancient Romans never ſuffered the auxiliary troops to out-number their own, in their armies (*a*); and though their allies might properly be reputed their ſubjects, yet they had no inclination to let thoſe ſubjects be better warriors than themſelves.

But in the latter times, this proportion of the auxiliaries was not only diſregarded, but even the national troops were compoſed of Barbarian ſoldiers.

(*a*) This obſervation is made by Vegetius, and it appears from Livy, that if the auxiliaries ſometimes exceeded the Romans in number, the ſuperiority was very inconſiderable.

Thus were cuſtoms eſtabliſhed, quite oppoſite to thoſe which had rendered the Romans maſters of the world, and as the genius of their former politics always prompted them to reſerve the military art to themſelves, and exclude their neighbours from any participation of its principles, they now extinguiſhed it in their own people, and eſtabliſhed it among foreigners.

Take this compendium of the Roman hiſtory: they ſubdued all nations, by their maxims, but when they had ſo far ſucceeded, their republic could not ſubſiſt any longer; the plan of their government muſt be changed, and maxims, contrary to the firſt, being then introduced, they were diveſted of all their grandeur.

Fortune never interpoſes in the government of this world, and we may be convinced of this truth by the Romans, who enjoyed a continual ſeries of proſperity when they regulated their conduct by one invariable plan; but they ſuffered an uninterrupted train of calamities, when they acted upon different principles. There are a ſet of general cauſes, either moral or phyſical, which operate in every monarchy, and either raiſe and maintain it, or elſe involve it in ruin. All accidental conjunctures are ſubordinate to theſe cauſes; and if the hazard of a battle, which in other words is no more than a particular cauſe, has been deſtructive to a ſtate, ſome general cauſe preſided and made a ſingle battle be the inevitable ruin of that ſtate. In a word, the tendency of the main principle draws after it all the particular incidents.

We are ſenſible, that for two centuries paſt, the Daniſh troops have been generally defeated by the

Swedes; we may therefore conclude, that, independent of the bravery of the two nations, and the chance of war, either their civil or military government is disconcerted, by some secret flaw which produces this effect, and I am of opinion it may easily be discovered.

In a word, the Romans lost their military discipline, and even neglected it in their very arms. Vegetius (*a*) acquaints us, that the soldiers finding them too ponderous, obtained the emperor Gratian's permission to quit their coats of mail; and soon after their helmets; and when their bodies were thus defenceless, they grew attentive to nothing but flight.

The same author adds, they had lost the art of fortifying their camp, and that by this negligence they were easily overwhelmed by the Barbarian horse.

The cavalry of the first Romans was not numerous, it was but the eleventh part of a legion, and often less, and what is extraordinary, was made less use of by them than by us, who are obliged to carry on so many sieges, where cavalry is of little service. When the Roman empire was in its decay, their forces consisted of little else but cavalry. I imagine, as a nation improves in the knowlege of the military art, it trusts the more to its infantry; and as that science decreases, it increases its cavalry in proportion: the reason is, because the infantry, whether light or heavy, is nothing without discipline, whereas, the cavalry is always of use

(*a*) De re militari, l. i. c. 20.

even in its diſorder (*a*). The action of the latter conſiſts chiefly in its impetuoſity and ſudden ſhock; that of the former in its reſiſtance and impenetrable firmneſs, which is not ſo much action as reaction. Laſtly, the force of the cavalry is momentaneous; that of the infantry of longer duration; now there is need of diſcipline to continue it in a perſevering ſtate.

The Romans arrived at univerſal monarchy not only by the arts of war, but likewiſe by their wiſdom, their perſeverance, their paſſion for glory, and their heroic love for their country: and when even theſe virtues diſappeared under the emperors, and they had only the art military among them, yet this alone, notwithſtanding the weakneſs and tyranny of their princes, enabled them to preſerve their former acquiſitions. But when corruption had at laſt inſinuated itſelf among the ſoldiery, they became the prey of every nation.

An empire, founded by arms, muſt likewiſe have arms for its ſupport. But as a people, when their ſtate is in confuſion, are at a loſs how to rectify their civil diſorders; in the ſame manner, when they enjoy a profound peace, and are reſpected for their power, they never imagine this calm ſcene may change, and conſequently neglect their military force, from whence as they have nothing more to hope, ſo they fanſy they have all things to fear, and ſometimes proceed ſo far as to weaken that baſis of their welfare.

(*a*) The cavalry of the Tartars, without obſerving any of our military maxims, has at all times performed great things. See the Hiſtories, and particularly thoſe of the conqueſt of China.

It was an inviolable law among the Romans, that whoever abandoned his poſt, or quitted his arms in the combat, ſhould be puniſhed with death. Julian and Valentinian had reinforced the ancient penalties in this particular; but the Barbarians who were taken into the Roman pay (*a*), and were accuſtomed to make war in the manner now practiſed by the Tartars, who flie in order to rally, and are more ſollicitous for plunder than martial reputation, were incapable of conforming to ſuch ſevere regulations.

The diſcipline of the ancient Romans was ſo ſtrict, that they have had generals who ſentenced their own children to die, for gaining a battle without their orders: but when they were intermixed with the Barbarians, they contracted, from that aſſociation, the ſame ſpirit of independency which marks out the character of thoſe nations; and ſuch who read the wars of Beliſarius with the Goths will ſee a general very frequently diſobeyed by his officers.

Sylla and Sertorius amidſt the fury of civil wars would rather die than connive at any thing from whence Mithridates might derive the leaſt advantage; but in the ſucceeding times, when a miniſter (*b*) or any grandee imagined it would be favourable to his avarice, his revenge, or ambition to ad-

(*a*) They would not ſubmit to the Roman diſcipline. See Ammianus Marcellinus l. xviii. who relates it as an extraordinary circumſtance, that they condeſcended in one inſtance to pleaſe Julian, who intended to fortify ſeveral places belonging to the ſtate.

(*b*) This was not to be wondered at in that mixture of nations, who had been uſed to a wandering life, and had no knowlege of any country of their own, ſince entire bodies of them

mit the Barbarians into the empire, he immediately permitted them to give a looſe to their depredations.

No ſtates are more neceſſitated for tributes, than thoſe which are weak, becauſe this circumſtance obliges them to augment their charges in proportion to the people's inability to defray them; and therefore the tributes in the Roman provinces became inſupportable.

It would not be improper to read Salvian's (*a*) account of the horrible exactions that were made upon the people. The citizens were ſo harraſſed by the farmers of the revenue, that they were obliged either to ſeek refuge among the Barbarians, or ſurrender their liberty to the firſt of their inſatiable countrymen who would accept of ſuch a preſent.

This may account for the relations we find in our French hiſtory, of the patience with which the Gauls ſupported a revolution calculated to eſtabliſh that ſhocking diſtinction between a gallant nation, and a community of ſervile wretches; I ſay, between a nation who retained their liberty and military privileges, and an ignoble body of people. The Barbarians, in making ſo many citizens ſlaves to till the earth, that is, the country to which they were attached, introduced no ſervices which were not more cruelly exacted before (*b*).

would frequently ſide with the enemy who had conquered them, even againſt their own nation. See Procopius's account of the Goths under Vitiges.

(*a*) See his whole fifth book, de Gubernatione Dei. See alſo, in the account of the Embaſſy, written by Priſcus, the ſpeech of a Roman who had ſettled among the Huns, on his happineſs in that country.

(*b*) See Salvian, lib. v. and the laws of the Code, and the Digeſt on them.

CHAPTER XIX.

Some Particulars of the Grandeur of Attila. *The eſtabliſhment of the Barbarians accounted for. Reaſons why the Weſtern Empire was overturned, before that in the Eaſt.*

AS Chriſtianity was eſtabliſhed when the empire was in a declining condition, the profeſſors of this religion reproached the Pagans for that decay, and theſe retorted the charge on the religious doctrines of their antagoniſts. The Chriſtians replied, that Diocleſian (*a*) ruined the empire by aſſociating his three collegues; becauſe each emperor would be altogether as expenſive, and maintained as great armies as could have ſubſiſted had there been but one ſovereign; in conſequence of which, thoſe who furniſhed the contributions being unequally proportioned to the number of the receivers, the charge became ſo exceſſive, that the lands were forſaken by the huſbandmen, and for want of cultivation lay waſte, and were covered with wild and barren foreſts.

The Pagans, on the other hand, were perpetually exclaiming againſt the ſtrange innovations in religion, introduced by their adverſaries and never heard of till thoſe days; and as the overflowings of the Tyber, and other prejudicial effects of nature, were, in the flouriſhing ſtate of Rome, aſcribed to the diſpleaſure of the Gods; ſo the calamities of declining Rome were imputed to a religious novelty, and the ſubverſion of the ancient altars.

(*a*) Lactantius, De morte perſecutorum.

Symmachus the prefect, in a letter (*a*) to the emperors, relating to the altar of Victory, attacked the Christian religion with arguments extremely popular, and consequently very seducing, and had art enough to set them off with all the plausibility invention could furnish.

" What circumstance, says he, can lead us more " effectually to the knowlege of the Gods, than the " experience of our former prosperity? we ought " to be faithful to such a series of ages, and pursue " the same track in which our fathers so happily " followed their ancestors. Imagine Rome herself " speaks to you in this manner: O imperial princes! " compassionate fathers of your country! look with " eyes of veneration on those years of mine, where- " in I always conformed to the ceremonies of my " predecessors. Those sacred institutions have made " the universe obedient to my laws. These were " the allies that chased Hannibal from my walls, and " drove the Gauls in confusion from the capitol. " We fervently ask peace for the gods of our coun- " try, nay we solicit it in the anguish of our souls, " for our compatriot deities! we have no inclina- " tion to engage in disputes which are only proper " for idle persons, and we would express ourselves " in the language of supplication, and not of war."

Symmachus was answered by three celebrated authors. Orosius composed his history to prove there had always been calamities in the world, as great as those complained of by the Pagans. Salvian likewise writ his book (*b*), wherein he maintains, that the ravages of the Barbarians were to be imputed to the

(*a*) Letter of Symmach. l. x. 4.
(*b*) Of God's Government.

degenerate behaviour of the Chriſtians: and St. Auſtin (*a*) demonſtrates, that the city of heaven is very different from that city on earth, in which the ancient Romans received, for a few human virtues, a recompence as vain as the virtues themſelves.

We have already obſerved that part of the politics of the ancient Romans conſiſted in dividing all the powers that gave them any umbrage; but that ſcheme was defeated in after times, and Rome could not prevent Attila from conquering all the northern nations; he extended his victories from the Danube to the Rhine, demoliſhed all the forts and military works on the banks of thoſe rivers, and made both the empires tributary.

Theodoſius, ſays he (*b*), with an inſolent air, is deſcended from a father as noble as mine; but the moment I compelled him to pay tribute to me, he fell from the grandeur of his extraction, and became my vaſſal; and therefore it is unjuſt in him to act like a baſe ſlave, and endeavour to prejudice his maſter by treachery.

"An emperor, ſaid he, upon another occaſion, "ought not to be a liar; he promiſed one of my "ſubjects to give him the daughter of Saturnilus in "marriage; and I will immediately declare war "againſt him, if he preſumes to depart from his "word; but if the diſobedience of thoſe about him "put it out of his power to be punctual, I will "march to his aſſiſtance."

It is not to be imagined that Attila was induced by any moderation and lenity of temper, to let the

(*a*) Of the city of God.

(*b*) Hiſtory of the Goths, and relation of the embaſſy written by Priſcus. This emperor was Theodoſius the younger.

Romans ſubſiſt; he only conformed himſelf to the genius of his nation, which prompted them to awe, and not to conquer foreign ſtates. This prince retiring from the ſplendor of majeſty to his manſion built of wood, according to the repreſentation of Priſcus (*a*), though at the ſame time he was lord of all the barbarous nations, and in ſome degree maſter of the chief part of thoſe who were civilized (*b*), was one of the greateſt monarchs recorded in hiſtory.

Ambaſſadors were diſpatched to his court, both from the eaſtern and weſtern empires of the Romans, to receive his laws and implore his favour. Sometimes he commanded them to deliver up the Huns who had deſerted from his armies, or the Roman ſlaves who had eſcaped from the vigilance of his officers. At other times he would not be ſatisfied till ſome miniſter of the emperor was ſurrendered into his power. He charged the empire of the eaſt with a tribute of two hundred thouſand pounds of gold; he received the yearly ſum allowed to a Roman general, and ſent thoſe he intended to reward to Conſtantinople, that they might be gratified to their utmoſt wiſh, making by this means a conſtant traffic of the apprehenſions of the Romans.

(*a*) Hiſtory of the Goths. Hae ſedes regis barbariem totam tenentis; haec captis civitatibus habitacula praeponebat. This was the manſion in which the monarch of all the Barbarian nations reſided; this the habitation which he preferred to the ſtately cities he had conquered. Jornandes de Rebus Geticis.

(*b*) It appears by the account given by Priſcus, that the court of Attila had ſome thoughts of ſubjecting even the Perſians.

He was feared by his ſubjects (*a*), but we have no reaſon to believe they entertained any averſion to his perſon: he was ſurprizingly fierce and impetuous, and at the ſame time exceeding politic and artful. He appeared violent in his rage, but had a ſufficient preſence of mind to know when to pardon an offence or defer a puniſhment, as the circumſtances were more or leſs agreeable to his intereſt. War was never his choice, when he could derive ſufficient advantages from peace. He was faithfully ſerved even by the kings who were ſubordinate to his power; and had collected into his own conduct all the ancient ſimplicity of the northern manners. In a word, we can never ſufficiently admire this gallant ſovereign of a people, whoſe very children were warmed with enthuſiaſtic rage, at the relation of their father's bravery; whilſt thoſe fathers ſhed manly tears, becauſe they were incapacitated by age to imitate their martial children.

All the barbarian nations, after his death, were divided into ſeveral independent bodies; but the Romans were then ſo weak, that the moſt inconſiderable people were in a condition to moleſt them.

The empire was not ruined by any particular invaſion, but ſunk gradually under the weight of the ſeveral attacks made upon it, after that general aſſault it ſuſtained in the time of Gallus. It ſeemed indeed, to be re-eſtabliſhed, becauſe none of its territories were diſmembered from the main body; but it was ſtooping to its fall by ſeveral degrees of declenſion, till it was at once laid low in the reigns of Arcadius and Honorius.

(*a*) Jornandes and Priſcus have drawn the character of this prince, and deſcribed the manners of his court.

In vain did the Romans chaſe the Barbarians from their ſettlements in the empire; that people, without any compulſion would have retired, to depoſite their ſpoils in their own country. With as little ſucceſs did Rome endeavour to exterminate that nation, ſince her cities were ſtill ſacked (*a*), her villages conſumed with flames, and her families either ſlaughtered or diſperſed.

When one province had been waſted, the Barbarians who ſucceeded the firſt ravagers, meeting with nothing for their purpoſe, proceeded to another. Their devaſtations at firſt were limited to Thrace, Myſia, and Pannonia, and when theſe countries were ruined, they deſtroyed Macedonia, Theſſaly and Greece; from thence they expatiated to Noricum. The empire, that is to ſay, thoſe tracts of land which were not depopulated, was continually ſhrinking, and Italy at laſt became the frontiers.

The reaſon why the Barbarians eſtabliſhed themſelves in no fixed ſettlements in the reign of Gallus and Gallienus, was becauſe the countries about them had ſomething left that was worth plundering.

Thus the Normans, who in ſome meaſure reſembled the conquerors of the empire, ravaged France for ſeveral centuries, and when at laſt they could find no more booty, they thought fit to accept of a depopulated province, and parcelled it into (*b*) ſeveral properties.

(*a*) The Goths were a very deſtructive nation, they deſtroyed all the huſbandmen in Thrace, and cut off the hands of every charioteer. Byzantine hiſtory of Malchus, in the extract of the embaſſies.

(*b*) See the chronicles, collected by Andrew du Cheſne, the

Scythia in thoſe times, lying waſte and uncultivated (*a*), the inhabitants were frequently ſubject to famine, and ſubſiſted in a great meaſure by their commerce with the Romans (*b*), who furniſhed them with proviſions from the provinces bordering on the Danube. The Barbarians in return gave them the booty and priſoners they had taken, and the gold and ſilver which the Romans paid them for their friendſhip. But when the empire could no longer afford them a ſufficient tribute for their ſubſiſtence (*c*), they were obliged to fix themſelves in ſome ſettlement.

The weſtern empire was deſtroyed before that in the eaſt, for theſe reaſons.

When the Barbarians paſſed the Danube, they found themſelves blocked up on the left hand by the Boſphorus of Thrace, the city of Conſtantinople, and all the forces of the eaſtern empire. This

condition of this province, towards the end of the ninth or beginning of the tenth century. Script. Norman. Hiſt. Veteres.

(*a*) The Goths, as we have intimated, did not cultivate their lands.

The Vandals called them Trulli, which was the name of a ſmall meaſure, becauſe they once ſold them ſuch a meaſure of corn very dear, in a famine. Olimpiodor. in Biblioth. Phot. l. xxx.

(*b*) Priſcus relates in his hiſtory, that markets were eſtabliſhed by treaties on the banks of the Danube.

(*c*) When the Goths ſent to deſire Zeno to receive Theuderic the ſon of Triarius into his alliance, on the terms accorded by him to Theuderic the ſon of Balamer, the ſenate, being conſulted on this occaſion, ſaid the revenues of the empire were not ſufficient to ſupport two Gothic nations, and that the alliance of only one of them was to be conſented to, Malchus's *Hiſtory, in the extract of the Embaſſies.*

made it neceſſary for them to bend their march to the right towards Illyria, and ſo proceed weſtward. That part of the country was crouded with a vaſt conflux of ſeveral nations; and, as the paſſages into Aſia were the beſt guarded, the whole body of the people bore with a full tide into Europe, whereas the forces of the Barbarians were ſeparated in their firſt invaſion.

The empire being parcelled out into two great portions (*a*), the eaſtern emperors, who were then in alliance with the Barbarians (*b*), would not break it to aſſiſt the princes of the weſt: this diviſion of the adminiſtration, ſays Priſcus (*c*), was very prejudicial to the affairs of the weſt. Thus the Romans of the eaſt refuſed thoſe of the weſt a naval armament (*d*), becauſe they had entered into alliance with the Vandals. The Viſigoths, in conjunction with Arcadius, made an irruption into the weſt, and Honorius (*e*) was obliged to fly to Ravenna: laſtly, Zeno, to get rid of Theodoric, perſuaded him to fall upon Italy, which had been already laid waſte by Alaric.

There was a very ſtrict alliance (*f*) between Attila and Genſeric, king of the Vandals. The laſt ſtood in fear of the Goths (*g*); he had married his

(*a*) This partition of the empire was very prejudicial to the affairs of the weſtern Romans. Priſcus, l. ii.

(*b*) Honorius was informed, that the Viſigoths had made a deſcent into the weſtern empire, after an alliance with Arcadius. Procop. of the Vandal war.

(*c*) Lib. ii.

(*d*) Priſcus, ibid.

(*e*) Procopius, in his war with the Vandals.

(*f*) Priſcus, l. ii.

(*g*) See Jornandes, De rebus Get. c. xxxvi.

ſon to a daughter of their king; and afterwards ſlitting her noſe, had ſent her back to her father. For which reaſon he united with Attila. The two empires, enſlaved by theſe two potentates, had no power to ſhake off their chains. The ſituation of that of the weſt was more particularly deplorable: it had no forces at ſea (*a*), they being all diſperſed in Egypt, Cyprus, Phoenicia, Ionia, and Greece, the only countries where at that time commerce ſubſiſted. The Vandals and other nations attacked the weſt from all ſides; an embaſſy came from Italy to Conſtantinople, ſays Priſcus (*b*), repreſenting that it was impoſſible they ſhould keep their ground, unleſs peace was made with the Vandals.

Thoſe that preſided in the weſt were not miſtaken in their politics. They judged it neceſſary to ſave Italy, which was in ſome reſpects the head, and in others the heart of the empire. They removed the Barbarians to the extremities, and ſettled them there. The deſign was well laid, and as well executed. Theſe nations aſked for nothing but ſubſiſtence: they gave them the plains, and reſerving to themſelves the mountainous parts of the country, the defiles, the paſſes over rivers, and the ſtrong forts upon them, they kept in their own hands the ſovereignty. It is probable theſe people would have been forced to have become Romans; and the facility with which theſe ravagers were themſelves deſtroyed by the Franks, by the Greeks, and the Moors, is a proof of this conjecture. This whole ſyſtem was overthrown by one revolution more fa-

(*a*) This appeared more eſpecially in the war between Conſtantinus and Licinius. (*b*) Priſcus, l. ii.

tal than all the reſt: the army of Italy, compoſed of ſtrangers, demanded that which had been granted to nations ſtill greater ſtrangers: it formed under Odoacer an ariſtocracy, which claimed the thirds of the lands in Italy; and this was the moſt fatal blow to the empire.

Amongſt ſo many misfortunes it is natural to enquire with a melancholy curioſity after the fate of Rome: it was, we may ſay, without defence, and could eaſily be ſtarved by an enemy. The extent of its walls made it almoſt impracticable for the inhabitants to defend them; and, as it was ſituated in a plain, it might be ſtormed without much difficulty. Beſides this, no recruits were to be expected, for the number of people was ſo extremely diminiſhed, that the emperors were obliged to retire to Ravenna, a city once fortified by the ſea, as Venice is at this time.

The Romans, being generally abandoned by their princes, began to take the ſovereign power into their own hands, and ſtipulated for their ſafety by treaties (*a*), which is the moſt likely method of acquiring the ſupreme authority (*b*).

Armorica and Brittanny, ſeeing themſelves forſaken, began to regulate themſelves by their own laws.

This was the fatal period of the weſtern empire. Rome aſcended to ſuch a height of grandeur, becauſe the ſcenes of her former wars opened ſucceſ-

(*a*) In the time of Honorius, Alaric, who beſieged Rome, obliged that city to enter into an alliance with him, even againſt the emperor, who was in no condition to oppoſe it. Procop. War of the Goths, l. i. Zozi. l. 6.

(*b*) Zozim. l. 6.

ſively, and by an incredible felicity of affairs ſhe was never attacked by one nation till another had been firſt deſtroyed; but Rome itſelf was overpowered at laſt, becauſe ſhe was invaded at once by all the nations around her.

CHAPTER XX.

1. *The Conqueſts of* Juſtinian. 2. *Some Account of his Government.*

AS this vaſt body of people broke all at once like a flood into the empire, they mutually incommoded one another, and all the politics of thoſe times conſiſted in ſetting them at variance together: this was a circumſtance eaſy to accompliſh, their avarice and fierce diſpoſition greatly contributing to make it practicable. The largeſt part of them was therefore deſtroyed before they could fix themſelves in any ſettlement; and this was the reaſon why the empire of the eaſt ſtill ſubſiſted for ſome time.

The northern regions were likewiſe exhauſted at laſt, and no longer poured out thoſe innumerable armies they originally produced; for after the firſt invaſion by the Goths and Huns, and eſpecially ſince the death of Attila, theſe people and their ſucceſſors appeared in the field with force, much inferior to the former in number.

When the nations, who aſſembled together in the form of an army, were diſtributed into peaceful partitions of lands, much of their martial vivacity was abated; and as they were ſcattered through

the countries they had conquered, they were expoſed themſelves to the ſame invaſions.

In this ſituation of affairs, Juſtinian undertook the recovery of Africa and Italy, and accompliſhed the ſame deſigns which the French ſo happily executed againſt the Viſigoths, the Burgundians, the Lombards and the Saracens.

When Chriſtianity was firſt planted among the Barbarians, the Arian ſect was predominant in the empire, and Valens ſent prieſts to them, who were their firſt apoſtles. Now in the interval from their converſion to their eſtabliſhment, this ſect fell into diſreputation among the Romans; for which reaſons, when the Barbarians of this perſuaſion found all the country orthodox, and could never inſinuate themſelves into the affections of the people, it was eaſy for the emperors to incommode them.

We may likewiſe add, that the Barbarians being unqualified for the ſiege of towns, and much more ſo for their defence, ſuffered the walls to drop into ruins. Procopius informs us, that Beliſarius found all the Italian cities in this condition; and thoſe of Africa had already been diſmantled by Genſeric (*a*), with a Gothic view of fortifying the inhabitants.

The generality of theſe northern people, after they had eſtabliſhed themſelves in the provinces of the ſouth, ſoon degenerated into the unmanly ſoftneſs of thoſe regions, and became incapable of the fatigues of war (*b*). The Vandals were emaſculated with pleaſures; a luxuriant table, an effeminate habit, the delicacy of baths, the enervating lull of muſic, gay dances, florid gardens and ſplendid

(*a*) Procop. war of the Vandals, l. i.
(*b*) Procop. war of the Vandals, l. ii.

theatres, were now become their neceſſary gratifications.

They no longer diſquieted the Romans (*a*), ſays Malchus (*b*), when they diſcontinued thoſe armies which Genſeric perpetually kept prepared for any expedition, and with which he prevented the vigilance of his enemies, and aſtoniſhed all the world with the rapidity of his enterprizes.

The cavalry of the Romans, and that of the Huns their auxiliaries, were very expert at drawing the bow; but that of the Goths (*c*) and Vandals fought only with the ſword and lance, and were unpractiſed in the diſtant combat; for which reaſon Beliſarius aſcribes part of his ſucceſs to this difference (*d*).

Juſtinian received ſignal ſervices from the Huns, a people from whom the Parthians ſprung, and theſe deſcendants combated like their anceſtors. When the Huns loſt all their power by the diviſions which the great number of Attila's children occaſioned, they ſerved the Romans in the quality of auxiliaries, and formed their beſt cavalry.

Each of theſe barbarous nations (*e*) was diſtin-

(*a*) In the time of Honorius.

(*b*) Byzantine hiſtory, in the extract of the embaſſies.

(*c*) See Procopius Hiſt. of the wars of the Vandals, l. i. and his war of the Goths, l. i. The Gothic bowmen fought on foot, and were but indifferently diſciplined.

(*d*) The Romans, having ſuffered their infantry to be weakened, placed all their force in the horſe, and the more ſo becauſe they were obliged to ſpring ſuddenly to every part to check the incurſions of the Barbarians.

(*e*) A remarkable paſſage of Jornandes tells us all theſe diſcriminating circumſtances, having occaſion to mention the battle between the Gepidae and the ſons of Attila.

guiſhed by their particular manner of combating as well as by their arms. The Goths and Vandals were formidable at the drawn ſword; the Huns were admirable bow-men; the Suevi were ſerviceable infantry; the Alans were heavily armed, and the Heruli were a flying troop. The Romans ſelected, from all theſe people, the different bodies of troops which were ſerviceable to their deſigns, and fought againſt one nation with the joint advantage of all the reſt.

It is remarkable, that the weakeſt nations have been thoſe that made the greateſt eſtabliſhments; we ſhould be much deceived, if we judged of their force by their conqueſts. In this long train of irruptions, the Barbarians, or rather the ſwarms which iſſued from them, were vanquiſhers or vanquiſhed; every thing depended on circumſtances: and while one great nation was defeated or engaged, a body of new adventurers finding a country open carried deſolation into it. The Goths, who by reaſon of the diſadvantage of their arms were obliged to fly before ſo many nations, ſettled in Italy, Gaul, and Spain; the Vandals, too weak to keep their poſſeſſion in Spain, paſſed into Africa, where they founded a great empire.

Juſtinian could not fit out more than fifty ſhips againſt the Vandals, and when Beliſarius embarked, he had but five thouſand ſoldiers. This was undoubtedly a bold expedition; and Leo who before that time had ſent againſt the ſame people a fleet of all the ſhips in the eaſt, and manned with a hundred thouſand ſoldiers, could not conquer Africa, and was even in danger of loſing the whole empire.

These great fleets have been as little successful as very numerous and armies; for as they impoverish and unpeople a state, so, should the expedition be of a considerable length, or any misfortune befal them, they can neither be succoured nor recruited; and if one part be lost, the other becomes insignificant; because ships of war, as well as transports, cavalry, infantry, ammunition, in a word, all the particulars, have a necessary dependance on the whole. The tardiness of an enterprize makes those who engage in it always find the enemy prepared to receive them: besides such an expedition is seldom made in a proper season, and generally overtaken by the stormy months, because such a vast number of preparations are hardly ever completed till the season is too far advanced.

Belisarius invaded Africa, and very advantagiously supplied himself with provisions from Sicily, in consequence of a treaty made with Amalasonta queen of the Goths. When he was sent to attack Italy, he took notice that the Goths received their subsistence from Sicily, and therefore began his expedition with the conquest of that island, by which proceeding he at the same time starved his enemies, and plentifully supplied his own army with all accommodations.

Belisarius took Carthage, Rome, and Ravenna, and sent the kings of the Goths and Vandals captives to Constantinople, where the ancient triumphs were renewed after a long interval of years (*a*).

The extraordinary qualities of this great man (*b*) naturally account for his success. A general, who

(*a*) Justinian only granted him a triumph for Africa.

(*b*) See Suidas under the article Belisarius.

was maſter of all the maxims of the firſt Romans, was then at the head of ſuch an army as that brave people anciently compoſed.

Virtues that are very ſhining are generally concealed or loſt in ſervitude; but the tyrannical government of Juſtinian could not oppreſs the grandeur of that ſoul nor the noble ſuperiority of ſuch a genius.

Narſes the eunuch was thrown into this reign to make it ſtill more illuſtrious: as he had received his education in the palace, he was honoured with a greater ſhare of the emperor's confidence; for princes always eſteem their courtiers the moſt faithful of their ſubjects.

On the other hand, the irregular conduct of Juſtinian, his profuſions, tyranny and rapine, his intoxicating fondneſs for building, changing and reforming, his inconſtancy in his deſigns, a ſevere and weak reign, made ſtill more incommodious by a lingering old age, were a train of real calamities, intermixed with unprofitable ſucceſs, and a falſe glitter of unſubſtantial glory.

Theſe victories were not the effect of any ſolid power ſubſiſting in the empire, but reſulted from the lucky conjunction of ſome particular circumſtances, and were ſoon rendered ineffectual; for whilſt the army was purſuing its fortunate beginnings, a new ſwarm of barbarous nations paſſed the Danube, and ſpread deſolation through Illyria, Macedonia, and Greece, and the Perſians in four invaſions weakened the empire with incurable wounds (*a*).

The more rapid theſe conqueſts appeared, the

(*a*) The two empires ravaged each other the more, becauſe they had no hopes of ſecuring their conqueſts.

leſs durable was their foundation; and Italy and Africa were hardly wreſted from the enemy, before it became neceſſary to recover them a ſecond time by new victories.

Juſtinian had taken from the theatre a (*a*) woman who had long proſtituted herſelf to immodeſt pleaſures, and ſhe governed him with an authority that has no parallel in hiſtory, perpetually intermixing his affairs with the paſſions and fanciful inconſiſtences of her ſex: in conſequence of which ſhe defeated the victorious progreſs of his arms, and diſconcerted the moſt favourable events.

The eaſtern people were always accuſtomed to a plurality of wives in order to deprive the ſex of that ſtrange aſcendant they maintain over man in our climates; but at Conſtantinople the prohibition of polygamy made the empire ſubject to the will of a female, or, in other words, threw a natural weakneſs into the government.

The people of Conſtantinople had for many years been divided into two factions, denominated the Blue and the Green: they derived their original from the approbation uſually given in the theatres to ſome particular actors; and when races were exhibited in the circus, the charioteers who were dreſſed in green diſputed the prize with thoſe who were habited in blue, and each of theſe ſpectators became intereſted even to madneſs, in the competition of thoſe colours.

Theſe two factions being diffuſed through all the cities of the empire proportioned their animoſities to the rank and grandeur of thoſe cities, or, as we

(*a*) The empreſs Theodora.

may juſtly ſay, to the indolence and idle lives of the generality of the people.

But though ſuch diviſions are always neceſſary in a republic, and may be conſidered as eſſential to its ſupport, they are infallibly deſtructive to an arbitrary government, becauſe they can only change the perſon of the ſovereign, but never contribute to the eſtabliſhment of the laws or the diſcontinuance of abuſes.

Juſtinian who favoured the faction of the Blue (*a*), and denied all juſtice to the Green, increaſed the mutual inveteracy of both parties, and conſequently ſtrengthened them in the ſtate.

Theſe contending parties proceeded ſo far as even to diſannul the authority of the magiſtrates: the Blues were in no apprehenſion of the laws, becauſe the emperor protected them againſt their ſeverity; and the Greens (*b*) began to diſregard them, becauſe they could not defend them from inſults.

All the bands of friendſhip, affinity and gratitude, were cut aſunder, and whole families deſtroyed each other: every villain who intended to be remarkably wicked belonging to the faction of the Blue, and every man who was either robbed or aſſaſſinated was a partiſan for the Green.

We may add, that the government was, if poſſible, more cruel than ſenſeleſs, and the emperor, not ſatisfied with the general injuſtice of loading his ſub-

(*a*) This political diſtemper was of ancient date, for Suetonius tells us, that Caligula, becauſe he was attached to the Green faction, hated the people, who applauded the other.

(*b*) The reader may form a good idea of the ſpirit of thoſe times, by conſulting Theophanes, who relates a long converſation in the theatre between the emperor and the Greens.

jects with exceſſive impoſitions, reſolved to ruin them in their private affairs by all imaginable tyrannies.

I am far from entertaining an implicit belief of all the particulars related by Procopius in his ſecret hiſtory, becauſe the pompous commendations he, in his other works, beſtows on this prince, may make his veracity a little queſtionable in this, where he paints him out as the moſt ſtupid and inhuman tyrant that ever lived.

On the other hand there are two circumſtances which incline me to pay ſome regard to this ſecret hiſtory; for in the firſt place, the particulars ſeem better connected with the aſtoniſhing weakneſs which diſcovered itſelf at the latter end of this reign, and in thoſe of the ſucceeding emperors.

The other circumſtance is that monument, which ſtill exiſts among us, and is a collection of the laws of this emperor, which in the courſe of a few years preſent us with greater variations than are to be found in our laws for the three laſt centuries of our monarchy.

Theſe variations (*a*) generally relate to matters of ſo little importance, that we can ſee no reaſons to induce a legiſlator to make them, unleſs we refer to the Secret Hiſtory for a ſolution, and acknowlege that this prince expoſed his judgments and his laws equally to ſale.

But the political ſtate of the government received the greateſt injury from his project of eſtabliſhing a general uniformity of opinion in matters of

(*a*) See the Inſtitutes of Juſtinian.

religion, and in circumſtances that rendered his zeal as indiſcreet as poſſible.

The ancient Romans fortified their empire by indulging all ſorts of religious worſhip; but their poſterity deſtroyed it by rooting out the various ſects, whoſe doctrines were not predominant.

Theſe ſects were compoſed of entire nations, ſome of which, as the Jews and Samaritans, had retained their ancient religion after they were conquered by the Romans, others were diſperſed through the country, as the followers of Montanus, in Phrygia, the Manichees, the Sabbatarians, the Arians, in the other provinces; beſides which, the generality of the people in the country continued in idolatry, and were infatuated with a religion as groſs as their underſtandings.

Theſe ſects Juſtinian cauſed to be extirpated, by the military as well as the civil power; and the perſecuted people, revolting in their own defence, he thought himſelf obliged to exterminate them from the empire; in conſequence of which he depopulated ſeveral provinces, and whilſt he imagined himſelf increaſing the number of the faithful, he was only diminiſhing the race of mankind.

Procopius aſſures us that Paleſtine, by the deſtruction of the Samaritans, was changed into a deſert; and this proceeding was the more ſingular, becauſe the very zeal which weakened the empire, in order to eſtabliſh religion, ſprung out of the ſame quarter from whence the Arabians afterwards ſallied with an intention to ſubvert it.

But nothing could be more aggravating, than that the emperor, whilſt he was ſo averſe to all toleration himſelf, ſhould yet diſagree with the em-

preſs in the moſt eſſential points; he followed the council of Chalcedon, and ſhe favoured its oppoſers; whether, as Evagrius ſays (*a*), they were ſincere in this proceeding or not, is uncertain.

When we read Procopius's deſcription of Juſtinian's buildings, and the forts and other places of defence he erected in all parts, it naturally raiſes in our minds the idea of a flouriſhing ſtate; but that idea happens to be very deluſive.

The ancient Romans had none of theſe fortifications, but placed all their ſecurity in their armies, which they diſtributed along the banks of rivers, and raiſed towers at proper diſtances for the logement of the ſoldiers.

Afterwards indeed, when they had but very indifferent armies, and frequently none at all, the frontiers (*b*) could not defend the countries they limited, and therefore it became neceſſary to ſtrengthen them; the conſequence of which was, they had more fortifications, and leſs force; many places for retreat, and very few for ſecurity; the country was only habitable about the fortifications, and theſe were built in all parts. The condition of the em-

(*a*) L. iv. c. 10.

(*b*) Auguſtus eſtabliſhed nine ſuch frontiers, the number of which encreaſed in the following reigns, when the Barbarians began to appear in ſeveral parts; and Dion. l. lv. ſays, that, in his time, when Alexander was emperor, there were thirty, as appears by the Notitia Imperii written ſince the reigns of Arcadius and Honorius: there were fifteen even in the eaſtern empire, and the number was perpetually increaſing. Pamphylia, Lycaonia, and Pyſidia were made frontiers, and the whole empire was covered with fortifications, till at laſt Aurelian was obliged to fortify Rome itſelf.

pire reſembled that of France in the time of the (*a*) Normans, which was never ſo defenceleſs as when all its villages were girt round with walls.

We may venture to affirm therefore, that the whole catalogue of Juſtinian's forts, which fills ſeveral pages in Procopius, only exhibits to us ſo many monuments of the weakneſs of the empire.

CHAPTER XXI.

Diſorders in the Eaſtern Empire.

THE Perſians, during this period, were in a much happier ſituation than the Romans; they had little reaſon to be apprehenſive of the northern people (*b*), becauſe that part of mount Taurus which extends between the Caſpian and Euxine ſeas ſeparated them from thoſe nations, and they effectually ſhut up a very narrow paſs, (*c*) which was the only practicable avenue for the cavalry; in every other part the Barbarians were obliged to deſcend from frightful precipices (*d*) and to quit their horſes in which all their military ſtrength conſiſted; and beſides theſe impediments they were blocked in by the Araxes, a river of great depth, and which flows from weſt to eaſt, all the paſſages of which were eaſy to be defended.

With all theſe advantages the Perſians were in perfect tranquillity with reſpect to the eaſtern nations; on the ſouth they were bounded by the ſea;

(*a*) And the Engliſh.
(*b*) The Huns.
(*c*) Called the Caſpian Streights.
(*d*) Procopius of the Perſian war, l. i.

and the Arabian princes, who were partly their allies, and partly in confederacy with the Romans, were totally engaged in pillaging one another. The Perſians therefore had none whom they could properly call their enemies but the Romans. We are ſenſible, ſaid an ambaſſador of Hormiſdas (*a*), that the Romans are engaged in ſeveral wars, and are at variance with almoſt all nations, whilſt we, as they well know, have no hoſtilities with any people but themſelves.

The Perſians had cultivated the military art to as great a degree as it was neglected by the Romans. Beliſarius ſaid to his ſoldiers, the Perſians are not your ſuperiors in courage, and only ſurpaſs you in the diſcipline of war.

They had likewiſe the ſame ſuperiority in the cabinet as they preſerved in the field, and demanded tribute of the Romans, under a pretence that they maintained garriſons in the Caſpian ſtreights, as if each nation had not a right to guard its frontiers. They obliged them to pay for peace, and every ceſſation of arms; and did not ſcruple to make them purchaſe the very time employed either in negotiations, or war.

The Avari having croſſed the Danube, the Romans, who had ſeldom any troops to oppoſe them, being engaged againſt the Perſians when they ſhould have given battle to the Avari, and having full employment from theſe when they ought to have faced the Perſians, were ſtill obliged to ſubmit to a tribute; and thus the majeſty of the empire bowed down before all nations.

(*a*) Menander's Embaſſies.

Juſtin, Tiberius, and Maurice were very ſedulous to defend the empire; the laſt of theſe princes had ſome virtues, but they were all ſullied by an avarice almoſt incredible in a great monarch.

The king of the Avari offered to reſtore all his Roman priſoners to Maurice, if he would ranſom them at an inconſiderable price for each man; and this propoſal being rejected, he cauſed them all to be inhumanly murdered. The Roman army was greatly exaſperated at this proceeding, and the faction of the Greens making an inſurrection at the ſame time, a centurion named Phocas was raiſed to the imperial dignity, and he ordered Maurice and his children to be put to death.

The hiſtory of the Grecian empire, for ſo we ſhall denominate the monarchy of the Romans for the future, is little more than a ſeries of revolts, ſeditions, and perfidy. The ſubjects had no idea of the loyalty due to princes, and there were ſo many interruptions in the ſucceſſion of the emperors, that the title of Porphyrogenitus, which ſignifies one born in the apartment where the empreſs repoſed, was an appellation which few princes of the ſeveral imperial families could with any propriety aſſume.

All the paths that could be ſtruck out to empire were unexceptionable; and the candidates were conducted to the diadem by the clergy, the ſenate, the peaſants, the inhabitants of Conſtantinople, and the people of the provincial cities.

Chriſtianity being now the prevailing religion of the empire, was intermixed with ſeveral ſucceſſive hereſies, which called aloud for condemnation. Arius having denied the divinity of the Word; the Macedonians that of the Holy Spirit; Neſtorius the

unity of the perſon of Jeſus Chriſt; the Eutychians his two natures; the Monothelites his two wills; it became neceſſary to convene councils againſt them: but their deciſions not being univerſally received, ſeveral emperors who had been ſeduced into theſe heretical opinions, relapſed into the ſame perſuaſions after they had been condemned; and as no nation was ever ſo implacable againſt heretics as the Greeks, who even imagined themſelves polluted when they converſed with any of that claſs, or had any cohabitation with them, ſeveral emperors, in conſequence of that popular averſion, loſt the affections of their ſubjects, and the people became perſuaded that princes who were ſo frequently rebellious againſt God, could never be choſen by providence to be their ſovereigns.

A new opinion, formed by an idea that it was unlawful to ſhed Chriſtian blood, and which daily grew more popular when the Mohammedans appeared upon the ſtage of military action, was the cauſe that offences, in which religion was not directly intereſted, were puniſhed with great moderation. Thoſe who had ſpirited up an inſurrection, or framed any attempt againſt the perſon of the prince, were only ſentenced to loſe their eyes, to have their hair or noſes cut off, or to ſuffer ſome other mutilation. As theſe offences might be committed with very little hazard, they might likewiſe be attempted without much courage (*a*).

A certain veneration for the regalia of imperial majeſty drew the eyes of all the people on thoſe

(*a*) Zeno greatly contributed to this mean relaxation of juſtice. See the Byzantine hiſtory of Malchus, cited in the extracts of the embaſſies.

who preſumed to wear them, and it was criminal to be either habited in purple, or to keep it in a wardrobe; but when a man had once the reſolution to appear in that dreſs, the multitude immediately flocked after him, becauſe their reſpect was more attached to the apparel than the perſon.

Ambition received greater provocatives ſtill, from the ſurprizing infatution of thoſe times; and there was hardly a man of any conſiderable conſequence who could not accommodate to himſelf ſome prediction that promiſed him the empire.

As the indiſpoſitions of the mind are generally incurable (*a*), judicial aſtrology and the art of pointing out futurity by objects ſeen in a baſon of water, ſucceeded among the Chriſtians, to the ſolemn impoſture of divination by the entrails of victims or the flight of birds, which had been aboliſhed with paganiſm its parent; and vain promiſes became the motives to moſt of the raſh actions of particular perſons, and conſtituted the wiſdom of the councils of princes.

The calamities of the empire daily increaſing, it was natural to impute ill ſucceſs in war and diſhonourable treaties in peace to the injudicious conduct of thoſe at the helm.

One revolution was now pregnant with another, and the effect itſelf became a cauſe: and as the Greeks had ſeen ſuch a ſucceſſion of different families on the throne, they were not devoted to any; and ſince fortune had created ſo many emperors out of all claſſes of people, no birth was ſo obſcure, and no merit ſo inconſiderable as to be deſtitute of hope.

(*a*) See the life of Andronicus Comnenus, compiled by Nicetas.

Several examples, which had been familiar to the nation, modelled the genius of the people in general, and formed a ſyſtem of manners which reigned as imperiouſly as the laws.

It ſhould ſeem that great enterprizes, among us, are more impracticable than they were to the ancients; it is very difficult to conceal them, becauſe intelligence is now become ſo manageable, that every prince has miniſters in each court, and traitors may poſſibly be lurking in all the cabinets of majeſty.

The invention of poſts has given wings to information, and can immediately waft it to all parts.

As great undertakings are not to be accompliſhed without money, and as merchants are maſters of it ſince the invention of bills of exchange; their affairs are always connected with the ſecrets of ſtate, and they neglect nothing to penetrate into thoſe depths.

The fluctuations in exchange, without any viſible cauſe, entice numbers of people to ſearch after it, and ſome of them find it at laſt to their coſt.

The invention of printing, which has put books into the hands of all the world; the improvements in engraving, which have made geographic charts ſo common; in a word, the eſtabliſhment of political papers, give every individual a knowlege of the general intereſt, ſufficient enough to inſtruct him in all the private tranſactions.

Conſpiracies in a ſtate are now become very difficult, becauſe ſince the eſtabliſhment of poſts, all the ſecrets of particular perſons are in the power of the public.

Princes may act with promptitude, becauſe all

the power of the ſtate is in their poſſeſſion. Conſpirators muſt proceed with caution, becauſe they are deſtitute of expedients; and ſince at preſent all tranſactions are more eaſily diſcovered, thoſe who form deſigns againſt a government are generally detected before they can adjuſt their ſchemes.

CHAPTER XIII.

The Weakneſs of the Eaſtern Empire.

PHOCAS, amidſt the general confuſion of affairs being unſettled in his new dignity, Heraclius came from Africa, and cauſed him to be murdered; at the ſame time he found the provinces invaded and the legions deſtroyed.

As ſoon as this prince had, in ſome meaſure, remedied theſe diſaſters, the Arabians quitted their own country, to extend the empire and religion which Mohammed had founded by their co-operation.

No people ever made ſo rapid a progreſs: for they immediately conquered Syria, Paleſtine, Egypt, and Africa, and then turned their hoſtilities againſt the Perſians.

God permitted his religion to be laid low, in ſo many places where it once had been predominant; not that it now ceaſed to be the object of his providential care, but becauſe it always either in its ſtate of glory or depreſſion produces its natural effect, which is the ſanctification of the ſoul.

The welfare of religion has no ſimilitude to the proſperity of empires, and we are told by a celebrated author, that it may well be diſtempered,

ſince malady itſelf is the true ſtate of a Chriſtian; to which we may add, that the humiliations and diſperſion of the church, the deſtructions of her temples, and the perſecutions of her martyrs, are eminent ſeaſons of her glory; but when ſhe appears triumphant to the eyes of the world, ſhe is generally ſinking in adverſity.

We are not to have recourſe to enthuſiaſm alone to clear up this memorable event of the Arabian conqueſts, which ſpread through ſo many countries: the Saracens had been long diſtinguiſhed among the auxiliaries of Rome and Perſia; and they, as well as the Oſroanians, were the experteſt archers in the world. Alexander Severus and Maximin had engaged them as much as poſſible in their ſervice, and they were extremely uſeful in the wars with the Germans, to whom their arrows were fatal at a great diſtance. The Goths themſelves (*a*), in the reign of Valens, were incapable of reſiſting them: in a word, they at that time were the beſt cavalry in the world.

We have already obſerved, that the legions raiſed in Europe were much preferable to thoſe of Aſia, but it was directly contrary with reſpect to the cavalry; I mean that of the Parthians, the Oſroanians, and the Saracens. This was the power that ſtopped the full career of the Roman conqueſts, becauſe, after the death of Antiochus, a new nation of Tartars, who had the beſt cavalry of any people, made themſelves maſters of the Upper Aſia.

This cavalry was heavy (*b*), and that of Europe

(*a*) Zozim. l. iv.

(*b*) See the account given by Zoſimus of the cavalry of Au-

light, quite contrary to the preſent nature of their military equipage. Holland and Friſeland were not as yet won from the waters; and (*a*) Germany was full of woods, lakes and marſhes, where the cavalry were of little importance.

When a free paſſage was opened to the great rivers, the ſtagnant waters ſhrunk from thoſe marſhes, and Germany aſſumed a new ſurface. Many changes were effected by the works of Valentinian (*b*) on the Necker, and thoſe of the Romans on the Rhine; and commerce being once eſtabliſhed, thoſe countries which did not originally produce horſes (*c*), began to propagate the breed, and the inhabitants made great uſe of thoſe animals.

Conſtantine (*d*), the ſon of Heraclius, having been poiſoned, and his ſon Conſtance ſlain in Sicily, Conſtantine the bearded, his eldeſt ſon, ſucceeded to the empire; but the grandees of the eaſtern provinces being aſſembled on this occaſion, were determined to crown the other brothers of this prince jointly with himſelf; alleging, that as it was indiſpenſably neceſſary for them to believe in the Trinity, ſo it was reaſonable they ſhould be governed by three emperors.

The Grecian hiſtory is crouded with proceedings as extraordinary as this, and a low turn of mind be-

relian, and that of Palmyra. See likewiſe what Ammian Marcellinus relates of the Perſian cavalry.

(*a*) The greateſt part of that country was then covered with water, but the art of man has ſince made it habitable and commodious.

(*b*) See Ammian Marcellin. l. xxvii.

(*c*) Caeſar repreſents the German horſes as too ſmall, and good for little.

(*d*) Zonares's life of Conſtantine the Bearded.

ing then the characteriſtic of that nation, their former wiſdom was no longer conſpicuous in their actions, and the empire became a ſcene of troubles and revolutions, to which it was impoſſible to aſſign any preparatory motives.

An univerſal bigotry had ſtupified and emaſculated the whole empire. Conſtantinople was the only place in the eaſt where chriſtianity was predominant, and likewiſe, where the puſillanimous indolence, and degrading ſoftneſs of the Aſiatic nations, were blended with devotion itſelf. Of a thouſand inſtances that might be alleged, I ſhall only mention the conduct of Philippicus the general of Maurice's army, who, being on the point of charging the enemy in the field, burſt into tears (*a*) when he ſuddenly conſidered what numbers of mankind were then to be deſtroyed.

The tears of the Arabians (*b*) flowed from a very different ſource, when they wept with regret that their general had agreed to a truce which fruſtrated their intended effuſion of Chriſtian blood.

There is a total difference between an army of fanatics, and another of bigots; and it evidently appeared in a late memorable revolution, in which Cromwel's army reſembled the Arabians, whilſt the Iriſh and Scotiſh forces were like the Greeks.

A groſs ſuperſtition, which debaſes the mind as effectually as true religion exalts it, had reduced all virtue, and devout confidence in the Deity, to a

(*a*) Hiſtory of the emperor Maurice by Theophylact. l. ii. c. 3.

(*b*) Ockley's hiſtory of the conqueſt of Syria, Perſia, and Egypt, by the Saracens.

ſtupid veneration for images; and hiſtory preſents us with generals who would raiſe a ſiege, (*a*) or ſurrender a city, for (*b*) the gallant acquiſition of a relic.

Chriſtianity degenerated under the Grecian empire into as many corruptions as were intermixed with it in our time by the Muſcovites, till the Czar Peter the firſt new modelled that nation, and introduced more changes into the dominions he governed than are uſually eſtabliſhed in thoſe which conquerors uſurp.

We may eaſily believe the Greeks were infected with idolatry. There can be no ſuſpicion that the Italians and Germans were but coldly devoted to external worſhip; and yet when the Greek hiſtorians take notice of the contempt expreſſed by the Italians for images and relics, one would be apt to compare them with the modern zealots againſt Calvin. Nicetas informs us, that the Germans, in their march to the Holy Land, were received by the Armenians as friends, becauſe they did not offer any adoration to images. Now, if the Italians and Germans did not ſufficiently reverence images, in the apprehenſion of the Greeks, what an enormous veneration muſt then be paid to them by this people!

The eaſt was on the point of being made the ſcene of ſuch a revolution, as happened about two centuries ago in the weſt, when, upon the revival of learning, the abuſes and corruptions in religion became evident to all, and as every perſon was inquiſitive after a proper remedy, ſo there were ſome ſo bold and untractable as to rend the church by

(*a*) Life of Lacapena by Zonaras.
(*b*) Life of John Comnenus by Nicetas.

diviſions, inſtead of reſtoring it to its original purity by a due reformation.

Leo Iſaurus, Conſtantine Copronymus, and Leo his ſon, were implacable againſt images; and when the worſhip of them had been re-eſtabliſhed by the empreſs Irene, Leo the Arminian, Michael the Stammerer, and Theophilus, aboliſhed them again. Theſe princes imagined they could not moderate that worſhip unleſs they deſtroyed it effectually; they likewiſe turned their hoſtilities againſt the Monks (*a*), who incommoded the ſtate, and as their proceedings were always carried into extremes, they endeavoured to exterminate that fraternity, inſtead of regulating them in a proper manner.

The monks (*b*), being accuſed of idolatry by thoſe who favoured the new opinions, retorted, in their turn, upon their adverſaries, and accuſed them of magical practices (*c*), and then calling upon the people to behold the churches, that were diveſted of images, and the other furniture, which, till that time, had been the objects of adoration, they created a belief in their flock, that theſe holy places muſt certainly be profaned by daily ſacrifices to Daemons.

(*a*) Valens, many years before this event, made a law to compel the monks to ſerve the government in the army in times of war, and cauſed all who diſobeyed that injunction, to be ſlain.

(*b*) Theſe circumſtances, relating to the monks, cannot fix any criminal imputation on their order in general; for it would be unjuſt to repreſent an inſtitution as pernicious becauſe it may happen to be abuſed in ſome particular countries and at certain periods of time.

(*c*) Leo the grammarian's lives of Leo the Arminian, and Theophilus. Suidas, under the article of Conſtantine the ſon of Leo.

The controverſy relating to images was connected with very delicate circumſtances, which kindled it into a raging flame, and in the event made perſons of ſolid judgment incapable of propoſing a moderate worſhip. The diſpute included the tender article of power, and the monks having ſeized it, in conſequence of their ſpiritual uſurpations, they could neither enlarge nor maintain it but by making daily additions to the acts of external adoration, wherein they were ſo conſiderably intereſted. For this reaſon all oppoſitions to the eſtabliſhment of images were conſidered as ſo many hoſtilities againſt themſelves, and when they had ſucceeded in their pretenſions, their power was no longer limitable.

This period was remarkable for ſuch a conjuncture as happened ſome centuries afterwards in the warm diſagreement between Barlaam and the monks of that time, which brought the empire to the verge of deſtruction. The ſubject of the diſpute was, whether the light which encircled Jeſus Chriſt on mount Tabor was created or not. The monks indeed were indifferent as to either part of the queſtion in debate, but as Barlaam made a direct attack upon that fraternity, they found it conſiſtent with their intereſt to aſſert that light to be uncreated.

The war, which thoſe emperors, who were called Iconoclaſts, declared againſt the Monks, revived ſome particular principles of government, and offered a plauſible pretence for employing the public revenue, for the public advantage, and for diſengaging the ſtate from every inconvenience that encumbered it.

When I conſider the profound ignorance into which the Grecian prieſts had plunged the laity, it ſeems natural to compare the former to thoſe Scythians mentioned by Herodotus (*a*), who cauſed the eyes of their ſlaves to be plucked out, that their attention might not be diverted, when they were churning milk for their maſters.

When the empreſs Theodora had re-eſtabliſhed the uſe of images, the monks immediately began to corrupt the public devotion, and proceeded even to oppreſs the ſecular clergy: they thruſt themſelves into every beneficial ſee, (*b*) and gradually excluded all eccleſiaſtics from epiſcopal promotion. By this proceeding they became unſupportable; and if we draw a parallel between them and the Latin clergy, and compare the conduct of our Popes with that of the patriarchs of Conſtantinople, we ſhall ſee, in our pontiffs and clergy, a ſet of men altogether as judicious as the others were irrational.

We are preſented with a ſurprizing contradiction in human nature, when we conſider that the miniſters of religion among the ancient Romans, when they were not made incapable of public employments and civil ſociety, were but little ſollicitous about either; and that after the eſtabliſhment of Chriſtianity, the eccleſiaſtics, who were moſt ſecluded from temporal affairs, engaged in them with the greateſt moderation; but when the monks, in the declenſion of the empire, became the ſole clergy, theſe people who were forbidden by a more particular profeſſion, to intermeddle with the tranſactions of ſtate, embraced all opportunities that

(*a*) Lib. iv. (*b*) Vide Pachymer. l. viii.

could poſſibly introduce them into the government, and never ceaſed to fill every place with confuſion, and to diſcompoſe the world which they pretended to renounce.

There was not any affair of the empire, any particular peace or war, any truce or negotiation, or any private treaty of marriage capable of completion without the miniſtration of theſe monks; they crouded into the cabinets of princes, and compoſed the greateſt part of the national aſſemblies.

The calamities which reſulted from this irreligious officiouſneſs are inconceivable: theſe eccleſiaſtic ſtateſmen infuſed an indolent inſignificance into the minds of princes, and communicated a taint of imprudence to their beſt actions. Whilſt Baſilius employed his naval forces in erecting a church to the honour of St. Michael (*a*), he abandoned Sicily to the depredations of the Saracens, and ſuffered them to take Syracuſe; but leſt he ſhould be ſingular in that proceeding, Leo his ſucceſſor conſigned his fleet to the ſame employment, and permitted the Barbarians to poſſeſs themſelves of Tauromenia and the iſland of Lemnos.

Andronicus Palaelogus (*b*) entirely neglected his maritime power, becauſe he had been aſſured God was ſo well ſatisfied with his zeal for the church's peace, that his enemies would never preſume to invade his dominions by ſea. He was even apprehenſive that the Deity would call him to a ſtrict account for the time he devoted to the neceſſary affairs of ſtate, and deducted from ſpiritual attentions.

The Greeks being very loquacious, great diſput-

(*a*) See the lives of Baſilius and Leo by Zonares and Niciphorus. (*b*) Pachymer. l. vii.

ants and naturally inclinable to ſophiſtry, were perpetually incumbering religion with controverſial points; and as the monks were in great reputation in a court which was always weak in proportion to its corruption; that court, and thoſe monks mutually communicated infection to each other, in conſequence of which the emperors devoted all their thoughts, ſometimes to calm, and frequently to inflame, theological diſputes, which were always obſerved to be moſt frivolous when they were debated with the greateſt warmth.

Michael Palaelogus (*a*), whoſe reign was ſo infeſted by controverſies in religion, growing ſenſible of the melancholy devaſtations committed by the Turks in Aſia, ſaid with a ſigh, that the raſh zeal of ſome perſons, who, by exclaiming againſt his conduct, had exaſperated his ſubjects againſt him, made it neceſſary for him to employ all his cares to accompliſh his own preſervation, and compelled him to be a tame ſpectator of the ruin of ſeveral provinces. I contented my ſelf, ſaid he, with providing for the ſecurity of thoſe diſtant parts, by the miniſtration of governors, who being either corrupted by the enemy, or apprehenſive of puniſhment, never acquainted me with the unhappy ſituation of the people with whoſe welfare they were intruſted.

The patriarchs of Conſtantinople had aſſumed an unlimited power, and as the emperors and their grandees generally retired to the churches, when the people were ſpirited up to inſurrections, the Patriarchs had conſequently an opportunity of deli-

(*a*) Pachymer. l. vii. c. 29. We have had recourſe to the tranſlation of the preſident Cauſin.

vering them up to the popular fury, and never failed to exercise this power as they were directed by any particular fancy, by which means they always became the arbiters of public affairs, though in a very indirect manner.

When the elder Andronicus (*a*) caused the patriarch to be admonished not to intermeddle with the transactions of state, but to confine his attention to spiritual affairs, such a request, replied that imperious priest, is as if the body should say to the soul, I do not claim any community with you, and have no occasion for your assistance in the exercise of my functions.

Such monstrous pretensions became insupportable to princes, and the patriarchs were frequently divested of their sees. But such a proceeding, in a superstitious nation, who detested all the ecclesiastical functions of the patriarch whom they considered as an intruder, produced continual schisms, each particular patriarch, the old, the new, and the last elected, being supported by his own set of partisans.

Such contentions as these were much more pernicious than any disagreements on points of doctrine, because they resembled an hydra to whom every defeat was a renovation.

The rage of disputation became so natural to the Greeks, that Cantacuzenus (*b*), when he took Constantinople, found the emperor John and his empress engaged in a council which had been summoned against some adversaries of the monks: and when

(*a*) Palaeologus. See the history of the two emperors of this name written by Cantacuzenus, l. i. c. 50.

(*b*) Cantacuzen. l. iii. c. 99.

Mohammed the ſecond beſieged that city (*a*), the emperor could not ſuppreſs the theological animoſities, and the council of Florence (*b*) engaged the general attention much more than the Turkiſh army.

As every perſon, in common diſputes, is ſenſible he may be deceived, a tenacious and untractable ſpirit ſeldom prevails to any extreme, but in thoſe controverſies where religion is the ſubject; for there, as every perſon from the nature of the point in debate becomes perſuaded that his own opinion is true, he grows exaſperated againſt thoſe, who, inſtead of concurring with his ſentiments, endeavour to make him a convert to their own.

Thoſe, who may happen to read the hiſtory written by Pachymerus, will be effectually convinced of the unalterable inability of divines to accommodate their own diſagreements, and will ſee an emperor (*c*) who ſpent his days in aſſembling people of that claſs, liſtening to their diſputations, and reproaching them for the inflexibility of their opinions: they will likewiſe behold another engaged with a hydra of controverſies that were perpetually riſing to new life, and will be ſenſible that the ſame pacific methods and perſevering patience, the ſame inclination to finiſh their contentions; in a word, the ſame artleſs pliancy to their intrigues, joined with the ſame

(*a*) Hiſt. of the laſt Palaeologi by Ducas.

(*b*) The queſtion in debate was, whether a congregation, who heard maſs from a prieſt who had conſented to pacific meaſures, ought not to have fled from him as if he had been a deſtructive flame: the great church was accounted a profane temple, and the monk Gennadius hurled his anathemas againſt all who were deſirous of peace.

(*c*) Andronicus Palaeologus.

deference to their averſions, will never reconcile theſe implacable eccleſiaſtics while the world endures.

We ſhall preſent the reader with a remarkable inſtance of the diſpoſition we have been deſcribing: the partiſans of the patriarch Arſenus (*a*) were prevailed upon, by the ſollicitations of the emperor, to come into a treaty with thoſe who were in the intereſt of the patriarch Joſeph. This treaty ſpecified that both parties ſhould write down their ſeveral pretenſions, and then throw the two papers which contained them into a pan of live coals, and if one of them ſhould remain unconſumed, they were then to acquieſce with that determination from heaven; but if both ſhould happen to be burnt, the parties were no longer to perſiſt in their demands. The fire deſtroyed the two papers, the factions were reconciled, and the peace continued for a day. The next morning they pretended that the renunciation of their claims ought to flow from an internal perſuaſion, and not from chance, and from that moment the contention was renewed with greater animoſity than ever.

The diſputes of divines ſhould always be conſidered with great attention; but at the ſame time this ought to be concealed as much as poſſible, becauſe, any viſible ſollicitude to calm the contending parties never fails to credit their ſingularities, and conſequently tempts them to believe their ſentiments are of that importance as to comprehend the welfare of the ſtate and the ſecurity of the ſovereign.

It is altogether as impracticable to decide the diſagreement of clergymen by attending to their affected ſubtilties, as it would be to aboliſh duels by

(*a*) Pachymer. l. vii.

erecting a court, with a delegation to trace a point of honour through all its refinements.

Such was the imprudence of the Greek emperors, that when a religious controversy had been lulled asleep by time, they again awakened it in all its rage. Justinian, Heraclius, and Manuel Comnenus, proposed articles of faith to their ecclesiastics and laity, who would certainly have been deceived in the truth, though it had flowed from the lips of those princes in all its purity. And as they were always defective in forms, and generally in essentials, and grew desirous of displaying their penetration, which they might have manifested to more advantage in other affairs confided to their judgment; they engaged in vain disputes on the nature of God, who, as he withdraws himself from the proud curiosity of the learned, so he veils the majesty of his existence as effectually from the great men of the earth.

It is an error to believe any human power can be absolute and infallible in these respects, for such there never was, nor ever will be imparted to any mortal. The largest extent of temporal authority is confined to certain limitations, and when the grand seignior ordains a new taxation at Constantinople, the universal murmurs of his subjects make him sensible of those restrictions of his power which till then were concealed from his observation. A Persian monarch may indeed compel a son to murder his father, or oblige a parent to plunge his dagger into the heart of his child, but he can never force his subjects to drink wine. There is a general principle in every nation which is the invariable basis of power, and when once this principle is too

much loaded, it infallibly ſhrinks into ſmaller dimenſions.

An unacquaintedneſs with the true nature and limits of eccleſiaſtical and ſecular power, was the moſt pernicious ſource of all the calamities that befel the Greeks, and involved both prieſts and people in perpetual errors.

This great diſtinction, which conſtitutes all the tranquillity of a nation, is founded not only on religion, but on reaſon and nature, which never confound things really diſtinct in themſelves, and which can only ſubſiſt in conſequence of that very diſtinction.

Though the prieſthood among the ancient Romans did not form a ſeparate body, yet the diſtinction we have been repreſenting was as well known to them, as it can be to us. Clodius had conſecrated the houſe of Cicero to the goddeſs of liberty, but when that great orator returned from his exile, he did not fail to demand it as his lawful property: the Pontiffs were of opinion, that if it had been ſo conſecrated without an expreſs order obtained from the people, it might be reſtored to him without any violation of religion. They have declared, ſays Cicero, (*a*), that they only examined the validity of the conſecration, and not the law enacted by the people, and that they had decided the firſt article as pontiffs, and the ſecond, in the quality of ſenators.

(*a*) Epiſt. ad Attic. l. iv.

CHAPTER XXIII.

1. *The Duration of the Eaſtern Empire accounted for.* 2. *Its Deſtruction.*

AFTER this account of the Grecian empire, it ſeems natural to enquire how it could poſſibly ſubſiſt ſo long, and I believe ſufficient reaſons may be aſſigned for that duration.

The Arabians having invaded the empire, and conquered ſeveral provinces, their chiefs became competitors for the Khalifat, and the flame of their firſt zeal only burſt out in civil diſſenſions.

The ſame people having conquered Perſia and afterwards divided and weakened themſelves in that country, the Greeks were no longer obliged to keep the principal forces of the empire ſtationed on the banks of Euphrates.

Callinicus an architect, who came from Syria to Conſtantinople, invented an artificial flame, which was eaſily ventilated into a point by means of a tube, and was of ſuch a peculiar nature, that water and every other ſubſtance which extinguiſh common fire did but increaſe the violence of this. The Greeks were in poſſeſſion of it for ſeveral years, and managed it in ſuch a manner as made it capable of firing their enemies ſhips, particularly the Arabian fleet which ſailed from Africa or the Syrian coaſts to invade them even in Conſtantinople.

This flame was ranked among the ſecrets of ſtate; and Conſtantine Porphyrogenitus in his treatiſe on the adminiſtration of the empire, and which he de-

dicated to his ſon Romanus, adviſes him to tell the Barbarians, when they ſhould deſire him to give them any of the Grecian fire, that he was not permitted to part with it, becauſe an angel, who preſented it the emperor Conſtantine, commanded him to refuſe it to all other nations, and that thoſe who had diſobeyed that injunction were conſumed by a fire from heaven the moment they entered into the church.

Conſtantinople was the greateſt, and almoſt the only city of commerce in the world; for the Goths on the one ſide, and the Arabians on the other, had ruined all manner of traffic and induſtry in every other part. The ſilken manufactures were brought thither from Perſia, and were even neglected in that country ſince the Arabian invaſion. We may add to this that the Greeks were maſters at ſea, which opened an immenſe flow of riches into the ſtate, and proved an inexhauſtible ſource of relief in all its emergencies; and if at any time there ſeemed to be any declenſion of the public affluence, it was immediately recruited by a new acceſſion.

We ſhall juſtify this obſervation by a remarkable inſtance. The elder Andronicus Comnenus though he was the Nero of the Greeks, yet amidſt all his vices he was indefatigable in the ſuppreſſion of injuſtice and vexations in the grandees, and it is a known fact, that during the three years of his reign he reſtored ſeveral provinces to their ancient ſplendor.

In fine, the Barbarians, having once fixed their ſettlement on the banks of the Danube, were no longer ſo formidable to the empire as before, but rather became uſeful to it as a barrier againſt other

barbarous nations. And thus whilſt the empire was haraſſed by any bad government, ſome particular incidents were always in reſerve for its relief. Thus we ſee Spain and Portugal in a condition, amidſt all their weakneſs, to ſupport themſelves with the treaſures of the Indies; the temporal dominions of the Pope owe their ſafety to the reſpect paid to their ſovereign; and the rovers of Barbary derive their ſecurity from the obſtructions they faſten upon the commerce of leſſer (*a*) nations, and the very piracies of theſe people on inferior ſtates make them ſerviceable in their turn to the greater.

The Turkiſh empire is at preſent in the ſame ſtate of declenſion to which that of the Greeks was formerly (*b*) ſunk, but in all probability it will ſtill ſubſiſt a long time; for ſhould any prince endanger it by purſuing his conqueſts to an immoderate extent, it will always be defended by the three trading powers of Europe, who are too ſenſible of their own intereſt ever to be unconcerned ſpectators of its fall.

It is happy for theſe trading powers, that God has permitted Turks and Spaniards to be in the

(*a*) They infeſt the navigation of the Italians in the Mediterranean.

(*b*) All projects of this nature againſt the Turks, and particularly ſuch as have any ſimilitude to that which was formed in the papacy of Leo the tenth, by which it was concerted, that the emperor ſhould march to Conſtantinople through Boſnia; the king of France through Albania and Greece, whilſt the maritime powers were to embark at their ſeveral ports; I ſay ſuch projects were never ſeriouſly intended, or were framed at leaſt by thoſe who were altogether unacquainted with the true conſtitution of Europe.

world, for of all nations they are the moſt proper to enjoy a great empire with inſignificance.

In the time of Baſilius Porphyrogenitus, the Arabian power came to its period in Perſia. Mohammed the ſon of Sambrael, who was then ſovereign of that empire, invited four thouſand Turks from the north, in the quality of auxiliaries; but, upon a ſudden diſſatisfaction conceived by this prince, he ſent an army againſt them which was ſoon put to flight by the Turks. Mohammed, in the height of his indignation againſt his puſillanimous ſoldiers, gave orders that they ſhould paſs before him habited like women; but they diſappointed his anger, and joined the Turks: upon which the united army immediately diſloged a garriſon which was ſtationed to guard a bridge over the Araxes, and opened a free paſſage to a vaſt body of their country-men.

When they had extended their conqueſts through Perſia, they ſpread themſelves from eaſt to weſt over the territories of the empire, and Romanus Diogenes, who endeavoured to oppoſe their progreſs, became their priſoner; after which they ſubdued all the Aſiatic dominions of the Greeks down to the Boſphorus.

Some time after this event the Latins invaded the weſtern regions, in the reign of Alexis Comnenus. An unhappy ſchiſm had for a long time infuſed an implacable hatred between the nations of two different communions, and would have produced fatal effects much ſooner, had not the Italians been more attentive to check the German emperors whom they feared, than they were to diſtreſs the Greek emperors whom they only hated.

Affairs were in this ſituation, when all Europe imbibed a religious belief that the place where Jeſus Chriſt was born, as well as that where he accompliſhed his paſſion, being profaned by the infidels, the ſureſt atonement they could make for their own ſins, would be to diſpoſſeſs thoſe Barbarians of their acquiſitions by force of arms. Europe at that time ſwarmed with people who were fond of war, and had many crimes to expiate, and as it was propoſed to them to obtain their remiſſion by indulging their prevailing paſſion, every man armed himſelf for the cruſade.

When this conſecrated army arrived in the eaſt, they beſieged and made themſelves maſters of Nice, which they reſtored to the Greeks; and whilſt the Infidels were ſeized with a general conſternation, Alexis and John Comnenus chaſed the Turks to the banks of Euphrates.

But as advantageous as theſe cruſades might be to the Greeks, the emperors trembled to ſee ſuch a ſucceſſion of fierce heroes and formidable armies marching through the heart of their dominions.

This induced them to leave nothing unattempted that might create a diſſatisfaction in Europe at theſe expeditions; and the votaries to the croſs were continually enſnared by every inſtance of treachery that could poſſibly be expected from a timorous enemy.

It muſt be acknowleged that the French, who promoted theſe expeditions, had not practiſed any conduct that could render their preſence very ſupportable; and we may judge by the invectives of Anna Comnena againſt our nation, that we act

without much precaution in foreign countries, and were at that time chargeable with the ſame exceptionable freedoms we are reproached for at this day.

A French nobleman was going to ſeat himſelf upon the emperor's throne, but earl Baldwin caught him by the arm; you ought to know, ſaid he, that when we are in any country whatever, it is proper to comply with the cuſtoms that prevail there. What a clown is he, replied the other, to ſit whilſt ſo many captains are ſtanding!

The Germans, who came after the French, and were the moſt civil and undeſigning people in the world (*a*), ſuffered very ſeverely for our follies, and were continually embarraſſed with a ſet of diſpoſitions that had been ſufficiently irritated by our countrymen againſt all foreigners.

In fine, the averſion of thoſe eaſtern people was worked up to the higheſt extreme; and this with ſome incivilities offered to the Venetian merchants, operating upon the ambition, avarice, and falſe zeal of that nation as well as the French, determined them to form a cruſade againſt the Greeks.

The united army of theſe two European nations found their enemies altogether as puſillanimous and unwarlike as the Chineſe appeared to the Tartars in our time. The Frenchmen ridiculed their effeminate habit (*b*), and walked through the ſtreets of Conſtantinople dreſſed in flowered mantles, and carrying pens and paper in their hands, in deriſion to that nation, who had degenerated from all milita-

(*a*) Hiſtory of Manuel Comnenus by Nicetas, l. i.

(*b*) Nicet. Hiſtory of the eaſtern tranſactions after the taking of Conſtantinople, c. iii.

ry discipline; and when the war was over, they refused to admit any Greeks into their troops.

The Venetians and French soon after declared for the western empire, and transferred the imperial throne to the earl of Flanders, whose dominions, being very distant, could not create any jealousy in the Italians. The Greeks still supported themselves in the east, being separated from the Turks by a chain of mountains, and divided from the Italians by the sea.

The Latins, who found no obstacles in their conquests, met with many in their settlement. The Greeks returned from Asia into Europe, retook Constantinople, and seized the greatest part of the west.

This new empire however was but a faint shadow of the former, and had no solid power for its basis.

It comprehended few territories in Asia, besides the provinces on this side the Meander and Sangar, and most of those in Europe were parcelled out into small sovereignties.

We may add to this, that during the sixty years the Latins were possessed of Constantinople, the conquered people being dispersed, and the victors engaged in war, all commerce was transferred to the cities in Italy, and Constantinople became divested of its riches.

The commerce even of the inland countries was carried on by the Latins. The Greeks (*a*), who were but newly re-established, and were likewise alarmed with innumerable apprehensions, became desirous to ingratiate themselves with the Genoese, by granting

(*a*) Cantacuzen. l. iv.

them a permiſſion to traffic without paying any duties; and as they were unwilling to irritate the Venetians, who had not accepted of peace, but only conſented to a truce, theſe were likewiſe diſcharged from the ſame payments.

Though Manuel Comnenus had ſuffered the navigation of the empire to decline before Conſtantinople was taken, yet it could be eaſily re-eſtabliſhed, ſince commerce ſtill ſubſiſted; but when all maritime affairs became entirely neglected under the new empire, the miſchief grew remedileſs, becauſe the power of the empire was daily declining.

This ſtate, which extended its dominion over many iſlands, and was interſected by the ſea, which likewiſe ſurrounded ſeveral of its territories, was entirely unprovided of ſhips. The former communication no longer ſubſiſted between the provinces: the inhabitants (*a*) were obliged to ſhelter themſelves in the inland parts from pyrates, and when they thought themſelves ſafe in ſuch a ſanctuary, they ſoon found it neceſſary to retire into the fortreſſes, to preſerve themſelves from the hoſtilities of the Turks.

Theſe barbarous people were at that time engaged in a peculiar war againſt the Greeks, and might properly be called hunters of men. They ſometimes marched two hundred leagues into a country to accompliſh their depredations; and as they were in ſubjection to ſeveral ſultans (*b*), it was impoſſible to purchaſe a peace from every tribe; and to procure it from any particular parties, was altogether inſignificant. Theſe Barbarians had embraced

(*a*) Pachymer l. vii.

(*b*) Cantacuzen l. iii. c. 96. Pachymer. l. xi. c. 9.

Mohammediſm, and their zeal for that religion ſtrangely prompted them to ravage the Chriſtian territories: beſides, as they were the moſt unamiable people on earth (*a*), and married to wives as diſagreeable as themſelves, the moment they were acquainted with the Grecian women, all the reſt of that ſex became inſupportable to them, and thoſe beauteous females were continually expoſed to the brutal paſſion of theſe Barbarians (*b*). In fine, they had been always accuſtomed to invade the properties of other people, and were the ſame Huns who had formerly involved the Roman empire in ſo many calamities.

The Turks broke in like a deluge upon the ſhattered remains of the Grecian empire in Aſia, and thoſe of the inhabitants, who were happy enough to eſcape their fury, fled before them to the Boſpho-

(*a*) This circumſtance gave birth to a northern tradition related by Jornandes the Goth: that Phillimer, king of the Goths, having made an inroad into the Getic territories, found ſeveral women who were ſorcereſſes, and drove them to a great diſtance from his army; after which thoſe female Magicians wandered in the deſerts, where that ſpecies of Daemons called Incubi, conſorted with them, and by their amorous familiarities produced the nation of the Huns. Genus ferociſſimum quod fuit primum inter paludes minutum, tetrum, atque exile, nec aliud voce notum, niſi quae humani ſermonis imaginem aſſignabat. i. e. A fierce and ſavage people, who lived ſequeſtered from the reſt of mankind, among fens and marſhes, ghaſtly and haggard in their perſons, and whoſe voices were only an imperfect articulation of human ſpeech,

(*b*) Michael Ducas's Hiſt. of John Manuel, John and Conſtantine, c. ix. Conſtantine Porphyrogenitus obſerves, at the beginning of his extract of the embaſſies, that when the Barbarians came to Conſtantinople, the Romans ought to have been very cautious of ſhewing them the grandeur of their riches, and the beauty of their wives.

rus, from whence ſuch, as could accommodate themſelves with ſhips, ſailed to thoſe parts of the empire that were ſituated in Europe, which occaſioned a conſiderable addition to the number of the inhabitants, though they were diminiſhed in a ſhort period of time: for civil wars began to rage with ſo much fatality, that the two factions invited ſeveral Turkiſh ſultans to their aſſiſtance (*a*) with this extravagant and inhuman ſtipulation, that all the people of the country, who were made captives from the oppoſite party, ſhould be carried into ſlavery; by which means each of thoſe factions concurred in the deſtruction of their own country with a view of ruining their adverſaries.

Bajazet having conquered all the other ſultans, the Turks would then have acted agreeably to their future behaviour in the reign of Mohammed II. had not they been in danger of extermination by the Tartars.

I am now afraid to deſcribe the miſeries which reſulted from theſe revolutions, and ſhall only intimate, that the empire under its laſt monarchs, being contracted within the ſuburbs of Conſtantinople, finiſhed its progreſs like the Rhine, which ſhrinks into a rivulet before it loſes itſelf in the ocean.

(*a*) See the hiſtory of the emperors John Palaeologus and John Cantacuzenus, written by Cantacuzenus.

THE END.

INDEX.

ACARNANIANS, ravaged by the forces of Macedon and Ætolia, Page 60.
Achaians, the ſtate of their affairs, 59, 60.
Activity, of the Roman ſoldiers, deſcribed, 36, 37.
Actium, battle of, gained by Auguſtus over Antony, 52.
Adrian, the emperor, relinquiſhes the conqueſts of Trajan, 152, 153. Which greatly diſpleaſes the people, 153. Reeſtabliſhes military diſcipline, 162.
Æqui, a warlike people, 33.
Ætolians, character of that people, 59. Join the Romans againſt Philip, 62. Join Antiochus againſt the Romans, 63, 64.
Africa, cities of, ſubject to the Carthaginians, ill fortified, 50.
Agrippa, Octavius's general, reduces Sextus Pompeius, 124.
Alexander, ſucceſſor of Heliogabalus, put to death by the Roman ſoldiers, 163.
Alexis Comnenus, the events of his reign, 232, Alexis and John Comnenus, drive back the Turks to the Euphrates, 233.
Ally, of the people of Rome, the title of, much ſought after, it carried with it the compleateſt ſlavery, 72.
Amalazonta, queen of the Goths, ſupplies Belisarius with proviſions, 201.
Ambaſſadors, Roman, always ſpeak with a haughty tone, 71.
Ambition, why a very common evil in the Grecian empire, 212.
Anarchy, prevails at Rome during the civil wars, 127.
Andronicus Palaeologus, why he neglected the care of his fleet, 222. Inſolent anſwer of a patriarch of Conſtantinople to the old Andronicus, 224. Spends his time in the diſcuſſion of theological ſubtilties, 225.
Andronicus Comnenus, the Nero of the Greeks, 230.
Antiochus, his ill conduct in the war againſt the Romans, 66. The diſhonourable treaty he made with them, 67.
Antony, gets poſſeſſion of Caeſar's book of accounts, 118. Speaks Caeſar's funeral oration, 119. Is deſirous of having the government of Ciſalpine Gaul aſſigned to him, to the prejudice of Decimus Brutus, who obtains it, 120. Defeated at Modena,

121. Joins Lepidus and Octavius, 122. He and Octavius purſue Brutus and Caſſius, ibid. Swears to re-eſtabliſh the republic; loſes the battle of Actium, 125, 126.
Antoninus, the two emperors, beloved and reſpected, 154.
Appian, author of the hiſtory of the wars of Marius and Sylla, 102.
Arabians, their rapid conqueſts, 214. Very dextrous archers, 215. Excellent horſemen, ibid. Their diviſions favourable to the empire of the eaſt, 229. Their power deſtroyed in Perſia, 232.
Arcadius makes an alliance with the Viſigoths, 194.
Archers, Cretan, formerly moſt eſteemed, 41.
Arianiſm, moſt of the Barbarians, who turned Chriſtians, of that ſect, 198. The prevailing ſect for ſome time in the empire, ibid. Its doctrine, 210.
Ariſtocracy ſucceeds monarchy at Rome, 85. Changes by degrees into Democracy, 86.
Armies, Roman, not very numerous at firſt, 39. The beſt diſciplined that ever were, 40. Naval, formerly more numerous than at preſent, 53. In the civil wars of Rome had no determined object in view, 125. Only attached to the good fortune of their leader, 126. Under the emperors exerciſe the ſupreme magiſtracy, 165. By what means Dioclefian diminiſhed their power, 168. Great armies, either by land or ſea, more troubleſome, than ſerviceable to the ſucceſs of an enterpriſe, 201.
Arms, the Roman ſoldiers grew weary of their arms, 183. A Roman ſoldier was puniſhed with death, if he left his arms in the field, 185.
Arſenius and Joſeph, contend for the ſee of Conſtantinople; the heat and obſtinacy of the partiſans, 226.
Arts, in what manner introduced among different nations, 41, etc. Arts and commerce reputed ſervile occupations by the Romans, 102.
Aſia, a country which luxury and effeminacy have never quitted, 65.
Aſſociation of ſeveral cities of Greece, 59. Of ſeveral princes in the government of the Roman empire, 165, 167. Looked upon by the Chriſtians as one cauſe of its ruin, 187.
Aſtrology, judicial, much in vogue in the Grecian empire, 212.
Athamanes ravaged by Macedon and Ætolia, 60.

Athenians, ſtate of their affairs after the Punic wars, 60.
Attila reduces all the north, and makes both empires tributary, 189. Whether it was his moderation that made him not extirpate the Romans, ibid. In what ſlaviſh ſubjection he kept both empires, 190. His character, ibid. His alliance with Genſeric, 194.
Avari attack the empire of the eaſt, 209.
Auguſtus, ſurnamed Octavius, 127. Begins to eſtabliſh a new form of government, ibid. His ſecret motives, and the plan of his government, 128, 129. Parallel of his conduct with that of Caeſar, ibid. Whether he ever really deſigned to reſign the empire, 129. Parallel of Auguſtus and Sylla, 129, 130. Very cautious of conferring the freedom of Rome on any one, 131. Places a governor and a garriſon in Rome, 132. Aſſigns funds for the payment of the land and ſea forces, 133. Takes from the people the legiſlative power, 136.
Auſtin, St. refutes the letter of Symmachus, 189.
Authority, that of a prince who ſucceeds a republic, more abſolute than any, 147.

Bajazet, why he did not ſucceed in the conqueſt of the Eaſtern empire, 238.
Baldwin, count of Flanders, crowned emperor by the Latins, 235.
Balearean ſlingers much valued, 41.
Barbarians became formidable to the Romans, 165. Their incurſions on the territories of the Roman empire, in the reign of Gallus, 166. Repulſed by Rome, 167, 168. Their irruptions in the time of Conſtantius, 174. The emperors ſometimes kept them off with money, 179. Which drains the riches of Rome, 180. Employed in the Roman armies as auxiliaries, 181. Refuſe to ſubmit to the Roman diſcipline, 185. Obtain lands in the Weſt on the extremity of the empire, 195. Might have become Romans, ibid. The greateſt part of them deſtroy one another, 197. On turning Chriſtians, embrace Arianiſm, 198. Their politics, manners, etc. ibid. Different manners of fighting among divers barbarous nations, 199. The moſt powerful did not make the beſt ſettlements, 200. Once ſettled, became leſs formidable, 197, 230.
Barlaam, his conteſt with ſome Greek monks, 220.

Baſil, the emperor, loſes Sicily through his own fault, 222.
—— Porphyrogenitus; extinction of the power of the Arabs in Perſia, in his reign, 232.
Battle loſt, worſe by the diſcouragement it occaſions, than by the loſs of men ſuffered in it, 55.
Beliſarius, to what he attributed his ſucceſs, 199. Lands in Africa with only 5000 men, to attack the Vandals, 200. His exploits and victories. His Character, 201, 202.
Bigotry enervates the courage of the Greeks, 217. Contrary effects of bigotry and fanaticiſm, ibid.
Bithynia, origine of that kingdom, 64.
Blues and Greens, factions which divided the empire of the Eaſt, 203. Juſtinian favours the Blues, 204.
Boeotians, character of that people, 60.
Brutus and Caſſius are guilty of a miſtake fatal to the republic, 111. Both kill themſelves, 122.
Booty, how divided among the Romans, 30.

Cæsar, parallel of, with Pompey and Craſſus, 105, etc. Prevails againſt Pompey, 108. What enabled him to attempt the liberty of his country, ibid. Frightens Rome as much as Hannibal had done, 110. His elevation more owing to his great perſonal qualities, than to his good fortune ſo much magnified, ibid. Purſues Pompey into Greece, ibid. Whether his clemency deſerves to be much commended, 113. Whether there be any reaſon to boaſt of his diligence, ibid. Makes an attempt to have the diadem put on his head, ibid. Treats the ſenate with contempt, and draws up *ſenatus conſulta* himſelf, 114. Conſpiracy againſt him, 115. Whether the aſſaſſinating Caeſar was properly a crime, 116, 117. All his acts ratified by the ſenate after his death, 117. His obſequies, 119. Almoſt all his conſpirators make a miſerable end, 124. Parallel between Caeſar and Auguſtus, 128. Total extinction of his family, 148.
Caligula, character of that emperor; reſtores the Comitia, 140. Suppreſſes accuſations of *Leſe Majeſte*, 140, 141. Whimſical in his cruelties, 145. Is ſlain: Claudius ſucceeds him, 146.
Callinicus, inventor of the Grecian fire, 229.
Campania, character of its inhabitants, 33.
Cannæ, battle of, the Romans loſe it againſt the Carthagi-

nians, 54. Firmneſs of the Roman ſenate notwithſtanding this loſs, 54, 55.
Canvaſſing for places of truſt introduced at Rome chiefly during the civil wars, 127.
Capuans, indolent and voluptuous, 33.
Cappadocia, origine of that kingdom, 64.
Caracalla, the character and conduct of that emperor, 158. Augments the ſoldiers pay, 159. Inſtitutes divine honours to his brother Geta, whom he had put to death, 161. Is in like manner ranked among the gods by the emperor Macrinus, his ſucceſſor and murderer, 162. Effect of his profuſion, ibid. regretted by the ſoldiers, 163.
Carthage, portrait of that republic at the time of the firſt Punic war, 46. Parallel of it with the republic of Rome, 47. Had none but hired troops, 48. Its eſtabliſhment leſs ſolid than that of Rome, 49. Its ill conduct in the war, 50. Its government oppreſſive, ibid. The founding of Alexandria hurts its trade, 51. Receives peace from the Romans, after the ſecond Punic war, on hard terms, 58.
Caſſius and Brutus commit a fault very fatal to the republic, 111.
Cato, a ſaying of, concerning the firſt triumvirate, 107. After the battle of Pharſalia adviſes to protract the war, 111. Parallel between Cato and Cicero, 121.
Cavalry, Roman, becomes equal to any, 40. At the time of the war againſt the Carthaginians, inferior to the cavalry of that nation, 51. Numidian cavalry, enters into the ſervice of the Romans, 52. At firſt only the eleventh part of each legion; augmented afterwards, 183. Diſcipline leſs neceſſary to cavalry, than to infantry, 184. Roman cavalry ſkilled in the uſe of the bow, 199. Cavalry of Aſia excelled that of Europe, 215.
Cenſors, their power, 89, etc. could not depoſe any magiſtrate, 91, etc. Their office in relation to the cenſus, 90, 91. *Note.*
Centuries, Servius Tullius divides the people by, 89. *Note.*
Chriſtians, opinion entertained in Greece againſt ſhedding their blood, 211.
Chriſtianity, what facilitated its eſtabliſhment in the Roman empire, 158. Looked upon by the Pagans as the cauſe of the ruin of the Roman empire, 187.
Chriſtianity, gives place to Mahometaniſm in a part of Aſia and

Africa, 214. Why God permitted it to be extinguiſhed in ſo many places, 214, 215.
Cicero, his conduct after the death of Caeſar, 119. Labours to raiſe Octavius, ibid. Parallel of Cicero and Cato, 121.
Civil, the civil wars of Rome did not hinder its aggrandiſement, 111. In general made the people more warlike, and more formidable to their enemies, 111, 112. Of two ſorts in France, 127.
Claudius, the emperor, entruſts his officers with the adminiſtration of juſtice, 146.
Clemency, of a ſucceſsful uſurper, whether it merits high commendation, 113.
Cleopatra, runs away at the battle of Actium, 125. Had undoubtedly in view to gain the heart of Octavius, 126.
Colonies, Roman, 49.
Comitia, become tumultuous, 96.
Commerce, reaſons why the power to which it raiſes a nation, is not always of long continuance, 51. Commerce and arts looked upon by the Romans as ſervile employments, 102.
Commodus ſucceeds Marcus Aurelius, 154.
Comnenus, Andronicus, the Nero of the Greeks, 230.
—— Alexis. See Alexis.
—— Johannes. See John.
—— Manuel. See Manuel.
Compaſs, invention of, has brought navigation to great perfection, 53.
Conqueſts of the Romans, ſlow in the beginning, but continued, 33. More difficult to be preſerved than made, 57.
Conſpiracy againſt Caeſar, 115.
Conſpiracies, frequent in the beginning of Auguſtus's reign, 116. Why become more difficult now than among the ancients, 213.
Conſtantine, removes the ſeat of the empire to the Eaſt, 171. Diſtributes corn at Conſtantinople and Rome, 172. Withdraws the legions, ſtationed on the frontiers, into the heart of the provinces; conſequences of this innovation, 174, 175.
Conſtance, grandſon of Heraclius by Conſtantine, ſlain in Sicily, 216.
Conſtantine, ſon of Heraclius, poiſoned, ibid.
Conſtantinus Barbus, ſon of Conſtance, ſucceeds his father, ibid.
Conſtantinople, takes its name from Conſtantine, 171. Divided into two factions, 203. Exorbitant power of its patriarchs,

223. Supports itſelf under the later Greek emperors by its trade, 230. Taken by the croiſaders, 234. Retaken by the Greeks, 235. Its trade ruined, ibid.
Conſtantius, ſends Julian into Gaul, 175.
Conſuls annual, the eſtabliſhment of, at Rome, 29.
Coriolanus, in what tone the ſenate treated with him, 55.
Corn, diſtribution of, in the time of the republic, and under the emperors, 172.
Country, love of their country, a kind of religious ſentiment among the Romans, 100, 101.
Courage, warlike, its definition, 39.
Croiſades, 233.
Croiſaders, make war on the Greeks, and crown the count of Flanders emperor, 234, 235. Keep poſſeſſion of Conſtantinople for ſixty years, 235.
Cynocephalæ, battle of, where the Ætolians, aſſiſted by the Romans, defeat Philip, 62.

DANCING, a part of the military exerciſe among the Romans, 145.
Danes, their land-forces almoſt always beat by thoſe of Sweden for near two centuries paſt, 174, etc.
Decemvirs, prejudicial to Rome's greatneſs, 34.
Declenſion of the Roman greatneſs, its cauſes, i. Wars in diſtant countries, 93. ii. Conferring the freedom of the city on all their allies, 94, 95. iii. Inſufficiency of their laws in their ſtate of greatneſs, 98. iv. Corruption of manners, 99. v. Diſuſe of triumphs, 130. vi. Invaſion of the empire by the Barbarians, 191, 192. vii. Too many of the Barbarian auxiliaries incorporated in the Roman armies, 181. Compariſon of the general cauſes of Rome's greatneſs with thoſe of its declenſion, 183. Declenſion of Rome, imputed by the Chriſtians to the Pagans, and by thoſe to the Chriſtians, 187.
Denarii, diſtributions of, in triumph, 149.
Deſertion, why common in our armies, and ſcarce known in thoſe of Rome, 39.
Deſpotic, whether any power be ſo in every reſpect, 227.
Deſpotiſm, rather promotes the oppreſſion, than the union of the people, 97.
Dictatorſhip, its eſtabliſhment, 88.

Diocleſian, introduces the cuſtom of aſſociating ſeveral princes in the government of the empire, 168.

Diſcipline, military, the Romans repair their loſſes by re-eſtabliſhing it in all its vigour, 37. Adrian re-eſtabliſhes it; Severus neglects it, 162. Several emperors maſſacred for attempting to reſtore it, 163. Quite aboliſhed among the Romans, 183. Barbarians incorporated in the Roman armies refuſe to ſubmit to it, 185. Compariſon of its ancient rigour with its remiſſneſs, ibid.

Diſeaſes of the mind generally incurable, 212.

Diſputation, natural to the Greeks, 224.

Diſputes, obſtinate in matters of religion, 225. What regard ought to be paid to them by ſovereigns, 226.

Divination by water in a baſon, practiſed in the Grecian empire, 212.

Divines, incapable of ever accommodating their differences, 226.

Diviſions more eaſily appeaſed in a monarchy than in a republic, 47.

Domitian the emperor, a monſter of cruelty, 150.

Druſilla, the emperor Caligula, her brother, decrees divine honours to her, 145.

Duillius, the conſul, defeats the Carthaginians in a ſea engagement, 53, 54.

Duronius, M. the tribune why expelled the ſenate, 91.

EAST, ſtate of, at the time of the final defeat of the Carthaginians, 57, etc.

Eaſt, empire of, ſubſiſts longer than that of the Weſt, why, 193. 229. Juſtinian's conqueſts only haſten its ruin, 202. Why plurality of wives hath always been the cuſtom in the Eaſt, 203. What ſupported this empire, notwithſtanding the weakneſs of its government, 229, 230. Its final ruin, 237, 238.

Egypt, a ſketch of the government of that kingdom after the death of Alexander, 65. Ill conduct of its kings, 67, etc. Wherein conſiſted their principal ſtrength, 68. Deprived by the Romans of the auxiliary troops which they had from Greece, ibid. Conquered by Auguſtus, 172.

Emperors, Roman, generaliſſimo's of the armies of the empire, 131. Their power increaſes by degrees, 134. The moſt cruel, not hated by the lower people, why, 143. Were proclaimed by the Roman armies, 147. Inconvenience of this

method of election, ibid. In vain endeavour to make the power of the senate be respected, 148, 149. Successors of Nero, to Vespasian, 149. Their power might appear more tyrannical than that of modern princes, why, 155. Often foreigners, why, 157. Murder of several emperors successively, from Alexander to Decius, inclusive, 163, 164. Who recovered the empire from the brink of ruin, 168. Their life begins to be less in danger, 169. Live more effeminately, and apply less to business, ibid. Want to have divine honours paid them, 170. Several Greek emperors hated by their subjects on account of religion, 211. Dispositions of the people towards them, 212. Inflame theological disputes, instead of stifling them, 227. Wholly neglect the marine, 236.

Empire, Roman, its establishment, 131, etc. Compared to the government of Algiers, 164. Over-run by divers barbarous nations, 165. Repulses, and rids itself of them, 168. Association of several princes in the government of the empire, 165, 168. Partition of the empire, 171. Never weaker than when its frontiers were best fortified, 207, 208. Empire of the East. See East.—Of the West. See West.—Grecian, See Grecian.—Of the Turks. See Turks.

Enfranchisement of slaves, limited by Augustus, 131. Motives which rendered it so frequent, 132.

Engagements, naval, depend at present more on the sailors than soldiers, 53.

Engines of war unknown in Italy, in the infancy of Rome, 32.

England, wisdom of its government, 92.

Engraving, usefulness of that art for geographical charts, 213.

Enterprizes, great, more difficult to accomplish now, than in ancient times, why, 213.

Epicurism, introduced at Rome towards the end of the republic, occasions a corruption of manners, 99.

Eutychus, the heretic; what it was he taught, 211.

Examples; some bad ones of worse consequence than crimes, 90.

Exchange, variation in the course of, inferences drawn from it, 213.

Exercises, bodily, sunk into contempt among the moderns, though very useful, 145.

Faults committed by governors, sometimes the necessary effect of the situation of affairs, 180.

Feasts, the law which limited the expences of them at Rome, abrogated by the tribune Duronicus, 91.
Fen Gregeois, the Greek emperors forbid the discovery of the secret of it to Barbarians, 229, 230.
Fiefs, whether the laws of, are in themselves prejudicial to the duration of an empire, 81.
Fleets carried formerly a much greater number of land forces than at present, why, 53. A fleet able to keep the sea, is not built and fitted out in a short time, 54.
Fortune decides not the fate of empires, 182.
Freedom of Rome granted to all its allies, 96. Inconveniencies resulting from thence, 96, 97.
French crusaders, their ill conduct in the East, 223.
Friesland and Holland were formerly neither inhabited, nor habitable, 216.
Frontiers of the empire, fortified by Justinian, 207.

Gabinius demands a triumph, after a war which he had entered into against the inclination of the people, 128.
Galba, the emperor, holds the empire a very short time, 149.
Gallus, incursions of the Barbarians on the territory of the empire under his reign, 166. Why they did not then settle in it, 192.
Gaul, government both of the Cisalpine and Transalpine, entrusted to Caesar, 108, 109.
Gauls, parallel of that people with the Romans, 45.
Generals of the Roman armies; causes of the increase of their authority, 94.
Genseric, king of the Vandals, 194.
Germanicus, regretted by the Roman people, 139.
Germany, its forests cut down, and its morasses drained, 216.
German crusaders pay dear for the faults of the French crusaders, 234.
Gladiators, the Roman soldiers entertained with a spectacle of gladiators, to accustom them to blood-shed, 175. *Note.*
Gordians, the emperors, all three assassinated, 164.
Goths, received by Valens into the empire, 167, 168.
Government, a free government, what required to make it lasting, 92. Of Rome, excellent, because it comprehended in its system the means of correcting its abuse, ibid. Military,

whether preferable to civil, 154. Inconveniencies of totally changing its form, 174.

Grandeur of the Romans, causes of its growth, i. Triumphs, 26. ii. Adopting foreign customs which they judged preferable to their own, ibid. iii. Capacity of their kings, 27. iv. The interest which the consuls had in acting as men of honour during their consulship, 29. v. Distribution of the spoils to the soldiers, and of the conquered lands to the citizens, 30. vi. Continuance of war, 33. vii. Their unshaken firmness which kept them from being ever discouraged, 55. viii. Their address to make their enemies destroy one another, 70. ix. Excellence of their government, whose plan supplied the means of correcting its abuses, 92. Grandeur of Rome is the true cause of its ruin, 94. The general causes of its increase and declension compared, 182,—185.

Graecia major, character of the inhabitants who peopled it, 33.

Greece, state of, after the conquest of Carthage by the Romans, 60, 61. Empire of, what sort of events its history presents, 210. Heresies frequent in that empire, ibid. Great part of it invaded by the Latin crusaders, 234. Retaken by the Greeks, 235. By what methods it supported itself after the check given it by the Latins, 236. Final ruin of this empire, 237, 238. Towns of, the Romans make them independent of the princes to whom they belonged, 63. Subjected by the Romans to make neither war nor alliance without their consent, 69. Place their confidence in Mithridates, 83.

Greeks not looked upon as religious observers of an oath, 99, 100. No nation so great enemies of heretics, 211. Emperors hated by their subjects on account of religion, ibid. Continually embroiled religion by controversies, 212, 213.

Greens and Blues, factions which divided the empire, 203. Justinian declares against the Greens, 204.

Hannibal, to what he owed his victories over the Romans, 52. Innumerable obstacles surmounted by him, 54. Vindicated from the blame commonly thrown on him for not laying siege to Rome immediately after the battle of Cannae, and suffering his men to enervate themselves at Capua, 56. The change of his fortune owing to his conquests, ibid. Reduced by Scipio to act on the defensive; is defeated by the Roman general, 58.

Heliogabalus, wants to ſubſtitute his own gods in the place of thoſe of Rome, 157, 158. Is ſlain by the ſoldiers, 163.
Heraclius, puts Phocas to death, and takes poſſeſſion of the empire, 214.
Hernici, a warlike people, 33.
Hiſtory, Roman, why more barren in facts ſince the emperors, 133
Holland and Friſland, were formerly neither inhabited nor habitable, 216.
Homer, vindicated from the cenſures of thoſe who blame him for commending his heroes for their ſtrength, dexterity and agility, 145.
Honorius, obliged to leave Rome, and flee to Ravenna, 194.
Honours, divine, ſome emperors arrogate them to themſelves by formal edicts, 170.
Horſes bred in many places where formerly there were none, 216.
Huns paſs the Cimmerian Boſphorus, 177. Serve the Romans in quality of auxiliaries, 199.
Huſbandry and war the only profeſſions of the Roman citizens, 102.

Iconoclasts oppoſe the uſe of images, 194. Accuſed of magic by the monks, 219.
John and Alexius Comnenus drive back the Turks to the Euphrates, 233.
Ignorance, groſs ignorance into which the Greek clergy plunged the laity, 221.
Illyrium, kings of, greatly depreſſed by the Romans, 60.
Images, the worſhip of, carried to a ridiculous exceſs under the Greek emperors, 217, 218. Effects of this ſuperſtitious worſhip, 218. The Iconoclaſts exclaim againſt the worſhip of them, ibid. Some emperors aboliſh it, the empreſs Theodora reſtores it, 220, 221.
Imperial ornaments, more reſpected by the Greeks, than the perſon of the emperor, 212.
Infantry in the Roman armies was, in relation to the cavalry, as 10 to 1, but afterwards quite the reverſe, 183.
Invaſions of the Northern Barbarians on the empire, 165, 192. Cauſes of theſe invaſions, 166, etc. Why no longer any ſuch invaſions, ibid.
Joſeph and Arſenus contend for the ſee of Conſtantinople; the heat and obſtinacy of their followers, 226.

Italy, character of its inhabitants in the infancy of Rome, 32. Unpeopled by removing the ſeat of the empire to the eaſt, 172. Gold and ſilver become very ſcarce in it, 173 Yet the emperors ſtill exact the ſame tributes, 174. The Italian army appropriate to themſelves the third part of that country, 196.

Jugurtha, the Romans ſummon him to ſurrender at diſcretion, 77.

Julian Didius, proclaimed emperor by the ſoldiers, who afterwards deſert him, 155.

Julian, the emperor, a plain and modeſt man, 170, 171. The ſervice which this prince did the empire under Conſtantius, 175. His army purſued by the Arabians, why, 179.

Juſtice, the power of adminiſtering it, conferred by Claudius on his officers, 146.

Juſtinian, undertakes to reconquer Africa and Italy from the Barbarians, 198. Employs the Huns to good purpoſe, 199. Is unable to fit out more than fifty ſhips againſt the Vandals, 200 His reign delineated, 202. His conqueſts only ſerve to weaken the empire, 202, 203. Marries a proſtitute; the power ſhe aſſumes over him, 203. The repreſentation Procopius gives of it, 205. The imprudent deſign he formed of extirpating all the heterodox, ibid. Difference in opinion between him and the empreſs, 206, 207. Builds a prodigious number of forts, 207.

KINGS of Rome, expelled, 29. What rendered all kings ſubject to Rome, 83.

LACEDÆMON, ſtate of the affairs of that republic after the total defeat of the Carthaginians by the Romans, 60.

Lands of the conquered, confiſcated by the Romans for the benefit of the people, 30. This cuſtom ceaſes, 35 Equal diſtribution of lands in the old republic, 42. By what means they reverted, in proceſs of time, into the hands of a few, ibid. A diſtribution of the lands reſtores the republic of Sparta when fallen from its ancient power, 44. The ſame method raiſes Rome from its low ſtate, ibid.

Latin cruſaders. See Cruſaders.

Latin towns, colonies of Alba; by whom founded, 33.

Latins, a warlike people, ibid.

Laws have never greater force than when they ſecond the ruling paſſion of the nation for whom they are made; 48. Of Rome

could not prevent its ruin, why, 98. Better calculated to promote the grandeur than the eſtabliſhment and perpetuity of the republic, ibid. Variations in them during the reign of Juſtinian, 205. From whence theſe variations could proceed, ibid.

Leagues, why ſeldom formed againſt the Romans, 70.

Legion, Roman; how it was armed, 35, 36. Compared with the Macedonian Phalanx, 63. Forty ſeven legions ſtationed by Sylla in different parts of Italy, 104. The legions of Aſia always beat by thoſe of Europe, 157. Levied in the provinces; conſequences thereof, ibid. Withdrawn by Conſtantine from the banks of the great rivers into the heart of the provinces; fatal conſequences of this change, 174.

Leo, his enterprize againſt the Vandals miſcarries, 220. Leo, ſucceſſor of Baſil, loſes, by his own fault, Tauromenia and the Iſland of Lemnos, 222.

Lepidus appears in arms in the Forum at Rome, 117. A member of the ſecond triumvirate, 122. Excluded the triumvirate, by Octavius, 124.

Limits ſet by Nature to ſome ſtates, 65.

Livius, M. the cenſor, degrades thirty-four tribes all at once, 91.

Lucretia raviſhed by Sextus Tarquin; conſequences thereof, 27. That outrage however, not ſo much the primary cauſe, as the accidental occaſion of the expulſion of the kings, ibid.

Lucullus drives Mithridates out of Aſia, 84.

Macedonia, and Macedonians; ſituation of the country; character of the nation, and its kings, 61.

Macedonians, ſect of, what was their doctrine, 210.

Magiſtracies, Roman: in what manner, to whom, by whom, and for what time they were conferred in the republic, 105. In what manner obtained under the emperors, 136.

Majeſty, application made by Tiberius of the law which declared it treaſon to commit any outrage againſt the majeſty of the Roman people, 134. The crime of *Leſe Majeſte* was, under that emperor, imputed to thoſe whom they could accuſe of nothing elſe, ibid. Whether, however, the accuſations founded on this charge were as frivolous as they appear to us, 138.

Manlius, orders his ſon to be put to death for defeating the enemy without orders, 38.

Manners of the Romans corrupted by Epicuriſm, 99.

Marches of the Roman army ſudden and ſpeedy, 39.
Manuel Commenus, the emperor, neglects the marine, 236.
Marcus Aurelius, his elogium, 154.
Marcus, his repreſentations to the Romans on their making Pompey their only reſource, 106.
Marius turns the courſe of the rivers in his expedition againſt the Cimbri and Teutones, 38. Rival of Sylla, 102.
Martius, Campus, 37.
Maſiniſſa holds his kingdom of the Romans, 72. Protected by the Romans, to keep the Carthaginians in awe, 58. And to reduce Philip and Antiochus, 75.
Mauricius, the emperor, and his children, put to death by Phocas, 210.
Metellus reſtores military diſcipline, 38.
Michael Palæologus, plan of his government, 223.
Militia, Roman, 93. A burden to the ſtate, 180, 181.
Military art, carried to perfection by the Romans, 34. Their continual application to it, 40, 41. Whether military government be preferable to civil, 154.
Military virtue retained by the Romans after they had loſt all other, 102.
Mithridates, the only king who made a brave defence againſt the Romans, 82. Situation of his dominions, his forces, and conduct, ibid. Forms ſome legions, ibid. The diſſenſions of the Romans give him advantages againſt them, 83. His wars againſt the Romans intereſting by the great number of revolutions with which they preſent us, ibid. Several times defeated, 84. Betrayed by his ſon Macchares, ibid. And by Pharnaces his other ſon, 85. Dies like a king, ibid.
Mohammed, his religion and empire make a rapid progreſs, 214.
Mohammed, ſon of Sambrael calls in 3000 Turks to Perſia, 232. Loſes Perſia, ibid.
Mohammed II. extinguiſhes the empire of the Eaſt, 138.
Monarchy Roman, ſucceeded by Ariſtocracy, 85.
Monarchic ſtate, ſubject to fewer inconveniencies from the infringement of the fundamental laws, than a republic in the like caſe, 46, 47. Diviſions in it more eaſily appeaſed, 47. Leſs excites the ambitious jealouſy of private perſons, 86.
Monks of Greece accuſe the Iconoclaſts of magic, 219. Why they ſo warmly maintained the worſhip of images, 220. Abuſe

the people, and oppreſs the ſecular clergy, 221. Intermeddle in every affair of ſtate, 222. Conſequence of this abuſe, ibid. are ſpoiled at court, and the court ſpoiled by them, 223.
Monothelites, heretics, their doctrine, 211.
Multitude makes the ſtrength of our armies: the ſtrength of the ſoldiers that of the Roman armies, 38.
Murders and confiſcations, why leſs common among us than under the Roman emperors, 142.

NARSES, the eunuch, favourite of Juſtinian, 202.
Nations, the reſources of ſome nations of Europe, who are in themſelves weak, 231.
Nero diſtributes money to the troops even in time of peace, 149.
Nerva, the emperor, adopts Trajan, 150.
Neſtorianiſm, the doctrine of that ſect, 210, 211.
Nobles of Rome oppoſe the Plebeians encroaching on them as they had done on the Patricians, 89. In what manner the diſtinction of Noble and Vaſſal was introduced in Gaul, 186.
North, invaſions of the people of the North, on the empire. See Invaſions.
Normans, ancient, compared with the Barbarians who laid waſte the Roman empire, 192.
Numidian Cavalry, formerly the moſt famous, 51. Corps of, enter into the Roman ſervice, 52.

OATH, the Romans religious obſervers of an oath, 30, 100. The Greeks quite otherwiſe, 99, 100. The Romans become leſs ſcrupulous on this head, 100.
Octavius flatters Cicero, and conſults him, 121. The ſenate endeavour to pull him down, 122. He and Antony purſue Brutus and Caſſius, ibid. Defeats Sextus Pompeius, 124. Excludes Lepidus from the triumvirate, ibid. Though not a brave man, gains the affections of the ſoldiers, 125. Surnamed Auguſtus. See Auguſtus.
Odenatus, prince of Palmyra, drives the Perſians out of Aſia, 167.
Odoacer, gives the laſt blow to the empire of the Weſt, 196.
Oppreſſion, total, of Rome, 112.
Ops, temple of, Caeſar had depoſited immenſe ſums in it, 118.
Oroſius, anſwers Symmachus's letters, 188.
Oſroenians, excellent archers, 215.
Otho, the emperor, holds the empire but a ſhort time, 149.

PARTHIANS, repulse the Romans, why, 65. War against them projected by Caesar, 118. Carried on by Trajan, 151. Difficulties attending this war, ibid. Instruct Roman refugees under Severus in military discipline, and afterwards make use of them against Rome, 156.

Partition of the Roman empire, 171. Occasions its ruin, why, 174.

Patriarchs of Constantinople, their exorbitant power, 223. Often driven from their see by the emperors, 224.

Patricians, their prerogatives, 85. To what reduced by time, 89.

Pay, at what time the Romans first granted it to their troops, 34. What it was under the different governments of Rome, 159, 160.

Peace, not to be bought with money, why, 179. Inconveniencies of acting contrary to this maxim, ibid.

Penalties against soldiers that proved cowards, renewed by the emperors Julian and Valentinian, 185.

Pergamus, origine of that kingdom, 64.

Persians conquer Syria from the Romans, 166. Take Valerian prisoner, 167. Odenatus prince of Palmyra drives them out of Asia, ibid. Advantageous situation of their country, 208. Had no wars but with the Romans, 209. As good negotiators as soldiers, ibid.

Pertinax, the emperor, succeeds Commodus, 155.

People of Rome want to have a share of the authority of government, 86. Retire to Mons sacer, 87. Obtain tribunes, ibid. Become too numerous, colonies are draughted out, 132. Under Augustus lose the power of making laws, 136. Under Tiberius that of chusing magistrates, ibid. Character of the Plebeians under the emperors, 147. Bastardisement of the Roman people under the emperors, 149.

Phalanx, Macedonian, compared with the Roman legion, 63.

Pharsalia, battle of, 111.

Philip of Macedon sends very inconsiderable succours to the Carthaginians, 58, 59. His behaviour to his allies, 62. The success of the Romans against him led them to general conquest, 63.

Philip, a successor of the former, joins the Romans against Antiochus, 66.

Philippicus, a piece of bigotry of that general, 217.

Phocas, the emperor, is ſubſtituted in the place of Mauricius, 210. Put to death by Heraclius from Africa, 214.
Plautian, favourite of the emperor Severus, 156.
Plebeians admitted to the magiſtracies, 87 Their forced reſpect for the Patricians, 87, 88. Diſtinction between theſe two orders aboliſhed by time, 89.
Pompey, commended by Salluſt for his ſtrength and activity, 145. His prodigious conqueſts, 85. By what methods he gained the affections of the people, 105. His ſurprizing ſucceſs therein, 105, 106. Twice abſtains from deſtroying the liberty of Rome when it is in his power, 106. Parallel of Pompey with Caeſar, 107. Corrupts the people with money, ibid. Aſpires to the dictatorſhip, ibid. Joins Caeſar and Craſſus, ibid. The cauſe of his ruin, 108. His foible to want to be applauded in every thing, 110. Defeated at Pharſalia, retires to Africa, 111.
Pompeius, Sextus, makes head againſt Octavius, 124.
Porphyrogenitus, meaning of that name, 210.
Poſt, a Roman ſoldier was puniſhed with death for abandoning his poſt, 185.
Poſts, their uſefulneſs, 213.
Power, Roman, tradition concerning it, 153. Eccleſiaſtical and ſecular, diſtinction between them, 228. This diſtinction known to the old Romans, ibid.
Predictions, authors of, very common towards the end of the Grecian empire, 212.
Prefects of the Pretorium compared to the Grand Viſiers, 169.
Printing, has diffuſed light every where, 213.
Procopius, the credit which his ſecret hiſtory of Juſtinian's reign deſerves, 205.
Proſcriptions, Roman, enrich the dominions of Mithridates with many Roman refugees, 82. Invented by Sylla, 104. Practiſed by the emperors, 156. Effect of thoſe of Severus, ibid.
Ptolomies, the treaſures of the, carried to Rome, what effects they produced there, 172.
Punic war, the firſt, 47, etc. The ſecond, 54. Is terminated by a peace concluded on conditions very hard for the Carthaginians, 58.
Pyrrhus, the Romans take leſſons from him in the art of war; character of that prince, 45, 46.

RAPINE, the only method which the old Romans had to enrich themſelves, 29.
Regillus, lake of, victory obtained by the Romans over the Latins near that lake; the fruits which they gathered from it, 34, 35, 80, 81.
Regulus, defeated by the Carthaginians in the firſt Punic war, 52.
Religion, Chriſtian, what facilitated its eſtabliſhment in the Roman empire, 158.
Relics, worſhip of, carried to a ridiculous exceſs in the Grecian empire, 218. Effects of this ſuperſtitious worſhip, ibid.
Republic, what ought to be its plan of government, 94. Is not really free, if no diviſions happen in it, 97. Never lodges too much power with one citizen, 106 —Roman, quite overturned, 112. Conſternation of the firſt men in the republic, 115. Not free, even after the death of the tyrant, 117.
Republics of Italy, defects of their government, 92.
Roads, public, well kept up by the Romans, 39.
Romans, their union with the Sabins, 26. Adopt the foreign cuſtoms which appear preferable to their own, ibid. Improve in the art of war, 34. New enemies combine againſt them, 35. Religious obſervers of an oath, 30, 100. Their ſkill in the art of war, how acquired, 30. The old Romans looked on the ſcience of war as the only ſcience, 35. Roman ſoldiers, men of prodigious ſtrength, 36. How they were trained, 37. Why let blood for having committed certain faults, 38. Not ſo ſickly as ours, but healthy and vigorous, 39. Defended themſelves by their arms againſt the arms of every other people, 40. Their continual application to the ſcience of war, 41. Compariſon of the old Romans with modern nations, 41, etc. Parallel of the old Romans with the Gauls, 45. Did not employ foreign troops, 48. Their behaviour to their enemies and allies, 70. Were never ſincere in any treaty of peace, 71. Eſtabliſhed it as a law, that no Aſiatic king ſhould enter Europe, 74. Their political maxims invariably obſerved at all times, ibid. One of the principal was, to ſow diſſenſion between powers in alliance, 75. Authority which they exerciſed even over kings, ibid. Never carried on a diſtant war without being aſſiſted by an ally, neighbour to the enemy, 76. Interpreted treaties with ſub-

tilty, to turn them to their own advantage, ibid. Did not think themſelves bound by treaties which neceſſity had forced their generals to ſign, 77. Inſerted impracticable conditions in their treaties with the vanquiſhed, that they might have a pretence to begin the war again, ibid. Set themſelves up as judges, even over kings, 78. Stript the vanquiſhed of their all, ibid. The methods they made uſe of to bring all the gold and ſilver of the univerſe to Rome, 79. The awe they impreſſed on the whole earth, ibid. Did not immediately appropriate to themſelves the countries which they reduced, 80. Become leſs faithful to their oaths, 100. Love of their country a ſort of religious ſentiment with them, ibid. Preſerve their valour even in the midſt of luxury and voluptuouſneſs, 101. Look upon arts and commerce as occupations of ſlaves, 102. Moſt of them of ſervile extraction, 132. Lament the death of Germanicus, 139. Made fierce by their education and cuſtoms, 142. All their power ended in their becoming the ſlaves of a barbarous maſter, 146. Impoveriſhed by the Barbarians who ſurrounded them, 180. Become the maſters of the world by their political maxims, ſink into ruin by departing from them, 182. Grow weary of their arms, and change them, 183. Roman ſoldiers mixed with the Barbarians contract the ſpirit of independence of the latter, 185. Overwhelmed with tributes, 186.

Rome, in her infancy compared with the towns of Crim Tartary, 25. Ill built at firſt, without order and without ſymmetry, ibid. In the beginning makes but ſlow advances to greatneſs, 32. Taken by the Gauls, loſes nothing of its ſtrength, 35. The city of Rome alone furniſhes ten legions againſt the Latins, 44. State of, at the time of the firſt Punic war, 47. Parallel of this republic with that of Carthage, 47, etc. State of her forces at the time of the ſecond Punic war, 49. Her ſurprizing firmneſs, notwithſtanding the checks ſhe ſuffered in this war, 54. Was like the head, which gave law to all the ſtates or nations of the univerſe, 81. Permitted the conquered nations to govern themſelves by their own laws, ibid. Acquires no new ſtrength by Pompey's conqueſts, 85. Its inteſtine diviſions, 85, etc. Excellency of its government, in that it furniſhed the means of correcting its abuſes, 92. Degenerates into anarchy, for what reaſon, 96. Its greatneſs the cauſe of its ruin, ibid. Would have become

great under any form of government, 98. The methods taken to people it with inhabitants, 132. Abandoned by its ſovereigns, becomes independent, 196. Cauſes of its deſtruction, ibid.
Romulus and his ſucceſſors always at war with their neighbours, 26. He adopts the uſe of the Sabin ſhield, ibid.
Rubicon, a river of Ciſalpine Gaul, 109.

SABINES, their union with the Romans, 26. A warlike people, 33.
Salvian refutes the letter of Symmachus, 188.
Samnites, the moſt warlike people of all Italy, 35. Allies of Pyrrhus, 46. Auxiliaries of the Romans againſt the Carthaginians and Gauls, 49. Accuſtomed to the Roman yoke, 50.
Schiſm between the Latin and Greek church, 232.
School, military, of the Romans, 37.
Scipio Æmilianus, how he treats his men after the defeat near Numantia, 38.
Scipio deprives the Carthaginians of their Numidian horſe, 52.
Scythia, ſtate of that country at the time its inhabitants invaded the Roman empire, 193.
Seleucus founder of the Syrian empire, 64.
Senate, Roman, had the direction of affairs, 47. Its conſtant maxim, not to treat with an enemy, till they had quitted the Roman territory, 55. Its firmneſs after the defeat at Cannae, and ſingular behaviour towards Terentius Varro, ibid. Its profound policy, 69. Its behaviour with the people, 88. Its abjection, 114. After the death of Caeſar confirms all the acts he had made, 117. Grants indemnity to his murderers, ibid. Its mean ſervitude under Tiberius; cauſes thereof, 135. The uſe Tiberius made of the ſenate, 148. Unable to recover its influence, 149.
Severus, the emperor, defeats Niger and Albinus, his competitors for the empire, 155. Governed by Plautian his favourite, 156. Unable to take the city of Atra in Arabia, why, 157. Amaſſes immenſe wealth, by what means, 158. Suffers military diſcipline to grow remiſs, 162.
Shipping of the Carthaginians excels that of the Romans, both very indifferent, 52. Improved by the invention of the ſea-compaſs, 53.
Slingers, Balearian, formerly in higheſt repute, 41.

Soldiers, why fatigue kills ours, 36. The number a nation can furniſh at preſent; what it could furniſh formerly, 41, 42.
Stoiciſm, ſuicide among the Romans favoured by it, 122, 123. At what time it prevailed moſt among them, 153.
Suffrages, at Rome, commonly given by tribes, 90, 91.
Suicide, why a heroic action among the Romans, 123.
Survey of the inhabitants of Rome compared with the ſurvey made by Demetrius of thoſe of Athens, 43. Inference drawn from thence of the forces of both cities at the time of thoſe ſurveys, ibid.
Sylla employs his ſoldiers in laborious work, 38. Conquers Mithridates, 84. Gives an irreparable blow to Roman liberty, 103. The firſt that entered Rome in arms, ibid. Was the inventor of proſcriptions, 104. Voluntarily abdicates the dictatorſhip, ibid. Parallel of Sylla and Auguſtus, 129, 130.
Sylvius Latinus, founder of the towns of Latium, 33.
Symmachus, his letter to the emperors concerning the altar of Victory, 188.
Syria, power and extent of that empire, 64. The kings of Syria aſpire to the conqueſt of Egypt, ibid. Manners and diſpoſition of the people, 65. Luxury and effeminacy of the court, ibid.
Sword, the Romans quit their own for the Spaniſh, 40.

TARENTINS, idle and voluptuous, 33.
Tarquin, his ſon raviſhes Lucretia; conſequences thereof, 27. A more valuable prince, than is generally imagined, 28.
Tartars, a nation of the, ſtop the progreſs of the Romans, 215.
Taxes, Rome eaſed of them, 161. Re-eſtabliſhed, ibid. Never more neceſſary than when a ſtate is weakened, 186. Carried by the emperors to an intolerable exceſs, ibid.
Theodora, the empreſs, reſtores the worſhip of images, abrogated by the Iconoclaſti, 221.
Theodoſius the younger, emperor, with what inſolence Attila ſpeaks of him, 189.
Theſſalians, ſubjected by the Macedonians, 60.
Thraſimenus, the battle of, the Romans loſe it, 54.
Tiberius, the emperor, extends the ſovereign power, 134. Suſpicious and diſtruſtful, ibid. In his reign the ſenate ſinks into a ſtate of abjection that cannot be expreſſed, 135. Deprives the people of the power of electing magiſtrates, and

assumes it himself, 136. Whether the abject state of the senate can be imputed to him, 137.
Ticinus, battle of, fatal to the Romans, 54.
Titus, the emperor, the darling of the Roman people, 150.
Titus Livius, censured for what he makes Hannibal say, 57.
Trajan the emperor, the most accomplished prince in history, 150. Portrait of that prince; he makes war on the Parthians, 150, 151.
Treaty, dishonourable, can never be excused, 67.
Trebia, battle of, the Romans lose it, 54.
Treasures amassed by princes, fatal to their successors, why, 159. Of the Ptolomies carried to Rome; the consequences thereof, 172.
Tribes, division of the people by tribes, 90. *Note.*
Tribunes, their creation, 87. Emperors invested with the power of the tribunes, 138.
Trinity, by allusion to the Trinity, the Greeks took it into their heads that they ought to have three emperors, 216.
Triumphs, their origin; in what manner they contributed to the Roman grandeur, 26. For what they were granted, 30. Use of triumphs abolished under Augustus, for what reason, 130.
Triumvirate, first, 107. Second, 122.
Tullius, Servius, compared to Henry VII. of England, 28. Cements the union between the Towns of Latium and Rome, 33. Divides the Roman people into centuries, 89. *Note.*
Turks, their empire at present almost as weak as the Grecian was, 231. In what manner they conquered Persia, 232. Driven back to the Euphrates by the Greek emperors, 233. In what manner they made war on the Greeks, and their motives for it, 236, 237. Extinguish the empire of the East, 238.
Tyrants, murder of, passed for a virtuous act in the republics of Greece and Italy, 116. Their fate at Rome, 163.
Tyranny, the most cruel is that which is exercised under colour of law, 135.
VALENS, the emperor, opens the Danube, consequences of that event, 176. Receives the Goths into the empire, 177. The victim of his imprudent easiness. 178.
Valentinian fortifies the banks of the Rhine, 176. The Germans make war on him, 180.
Valerian, the emperor, taken by the Persians, 167.
Varro, Terentius, his shameful flight, 55.

Veii beſieged, 34.
Velites, what ſort of troops they were, 40.
Veſpaſian, the emperor, labours to re-eſtabliſh the empire, 149. 150.
Veſſels or ſhips, Rhodian, formerly the beſt ſailors, 41. In former times only coaſted along, 52. Since the invention of the compaſs, ſtand out to ſea, 53.
Vitellius holds the empire but a little time, 149.
Union of a body politic, wherein it conſiſts, 97.
Unhappy, the moſt unhappy are ſtill ſuſceptible of fear, 140.

WARS, perpetual under the Roman kings, 26. Agreeable to the people, on account of the gain they made by them, 29. With what vigour they were carried on by the conſuls, 30. Almoſt uninterrupted under the conſuls, 31. Effects of this continuity, ibid. Seldom deciſive in the infancy of Rome, why, 32. Firſt Punic, 23. Second, 54. Ended by a peace concluded on conditions very hard for the Carthaginians, 58. War and Huſbandry, the only two profeſſions of the Roman citizens, 102. Of Marius and Sylla, ibid. What was their principal motive, ibid.
Weſt, empire of the, why the firſt overturned, 193. Not aſſiſted by that of the Eaſt, 194. Overrun by the Viſigoths, ibid. A ſtroke of good policy in thoſe who had the government of it, 195. Its fall, 196.
Wives, why a plurality of wives hath always been in uſe in the Eaſt, 203.

ZAMA, battle of, gained by the Romans over the Carthaginians, 52.
Zeno, the emperor, perſuades Theodoric to attack Italy, 194.

THE END.